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Abstract 
 
This thesis contributes to the extant research on the impact of 
regulatory constraints on financial markets, by presenting a collection of 
three intertwined essays. 
The first essay examines the relation between regulatory constraints 
on market risk and the fluctuation of the financial market, often depicted in 
the literature but not empirically proven. I find that market volatility is 
significantly dependent on (and Granger-caused by) the relative market 
risk exposure of Italian banks, measured as the ratio of value at risk and 
banks’ market risk limit.  
In the second paper, I explore the channel for the results obtained in 
the first paper. The theoretical framework is based on a risk-constrained 
mean-variance framework. In such a framework, if the constraint binds, the 
portion of the portfolio invested in risky assets (alpha) is lower than in the 
unconstrained scenario, as expected. Furthermore, alpha is inversely 
related to the relative market risk exposure (as above, given by the ratio 
between value at risk and market risk limit). Empirical tests confirm that 
this constrained mean-variance framework is more accurate in forecasting 
investment behaviour in risky assets of the Italian banks than the ordinary 
mean-variance framework.  
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In the third essay, I investigate the role of uncertainty, whose relevance 
has been deeply investigated by several papers. By adding uncertainty to 
the constrained mean-variance framework built in the previous chapter, I 
find that an increase in uncertainty determines a decrease of the portion of 
portfolio invested in risky assets, in line with the literature. I perform 
empirical tests which confirm the theoretical result, especially in high-
volatility periods when constraints bind tighter.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction1 
 
In 2006, Ben Bernanke, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank (the 
Fed) at the time, highlighted the importance of modern risk management as 
a central element of good supervisory practice, and encouraged the 
industry to push forward the risk management frontier. 
Just a few years later, in 2010, after the beginning of the crisis, Janet 
Yellen, Chair of the Fed for 2014 to 2018, said that “methods of modern risk 
management may have intensified the cycle…because of their reliance on 
metrics such as value at risk [VaR] that are highly sensitive to recent 
performance, especially volatility. In good times, volatility declines, and 
value at risk along with it. This pattern generated a pro-cyclical willingness 
to take on risk and leverage, amplifying and propagating the boom and bust 
cycle. The vicious cycle of a collapse of confidence, asset fire sales, 
evaporation of liquidity, and a deleveraging free fall was the mirror image 
of the manic mortgage market that preceded it” (Yellen 2010). 
Still in 2010, the then Chairman of the Fed, Ben Bernanke, said that 
“during the worst phase of the financial crisis, many economic actors 
metaphorically threw up their hands and admitted that, given the extreme 
and, in some ways, unprecedented nature of the crisis, they did not know 
                                                          
 
1 The views expressed in this thesis are of the author, and they do not reflect those of the 
institution to which he is affiliated. 
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what they did not know...The profound uncertainty associated with the 
‘unknown unknowns’ during the crisis resulted in panicky selling by 
investors” (Bernanke 2010).  
It is remarkable how the  opinion on risk management techniques, and, 
specifically, on value at risk radically changed in the four years from the first 
speech to the latest one: from being initially described as a crucial method 
to be used by banking and financial industries, value at risk became a quasi-
evil mechanism which, along with uncertainty, exacerbated the financial 
crisis.  
It is worth noting that before 2007, value at risk was a sort of golden 
standard among the measures of market risk. Since 1994, when a technical 
document of JP Morgan-Riskmetrics was released, it has become the most 
used method to measure the downside risk of banks and investment firms. 
In fact, VaR is the maximum amount expected to be lost over a given time 
horizon at a pre-defined confidence level, hence it gives investors a measure 
of possible expected losses for the following few days and helps them to 
manage their risk exposures. In 1996, an additional boost to the diffusion 
of VaR as a risk measure came from the Bank of International Settlements 
(BIS) which considered value at risk methodologies as acceptable from a 
regulatory point of view, also as a risk constraint. Since then, VaR-type 
measures have gained even more favour among financial intermediaries; 
today, despite criticism, they are still largely used, even by very small banks, 
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to manage and limit exposure to market risk, and they are still a central 
element of good supervisory practice for defining market risk constraints.  
However, as demonstrated by the financial crisis of 2007-08, value at 
risk cannot adequately capture credit risk inherent in trading exposures, 
given that it focuses on general market risk and not on the risk of default of 
counterparties, which can become material in crises. Furthermore, it does 
not effectively consider market illiquidity. In addition, VaR expresses only 
maximum losses at a given confidence level (on a certain time horizon); 
hence it does not discriminate among losses occurring beyond the 
predetermined level of confidence, thus incentivizing banks to take on tail 
risk. In particular, illiquidity is one of the major flaws of VaR which emerged 
in the crisis and the BIS states that when several banks hold exposures of 
the same traded asset, the market of that asset may rapidly turn illiquid in 
case of the banking system stress. In fact, at the height of the crisis banks 
were unable to exit or hedge positions in certain asset markets, suddenly 
illiquid, thus recording substantial mark-to-market losses. More generally, 
some of the limits of the VaR were dealt with by the BIS in recent years 
(Basel Committee 2016b) by complementing and amending the market risk 
regulation (with the introduction of the expected shortfall measure, see 
section 5.2). VaR, used as a risk measure for individual financial 
intermediaries, may have further negative effects on the whole financial 
system: in periods of financial turmoil market volatility increases and 
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consequently VaR goes up potentially triggering fire sales which in turn 
increase volatility.  
The use of value at risk has been criticized from the beginning, when 
Danielsson et al. (2001) highlighted that VaR would have induced crashes 
when they would not have otherwise occurred. However, only the financial 
crisis of 2007-2009 determined the radical change of opinions reported at 
the beginning of the section. In fact, the crisis expressly highlighted the 
inherent problems of VaR, evidencing its drawbacks. In detail, in the 
immediate aftermath of the crisis, VaR was accused of contributing to the 
intensification of the cycle, by amplifying and propagating the boom and 
bust cycle as it homogenizes behaviours of the market participants.  
In general, the literature was concordant about the amplification effect 
caused by VaR: Adrian and Shin (2010, 2013) and Danielsson et al. (2010) 
found that VaR constraints may have a pro-cyclical effect by amplifying the 
impact of shocks and increasing market volatility. However empirical 
evidence in support of such claims is extremely limited.   
After the crisis, papers on pro-cyclicality and on the relation between 
single investors’ behaviour and system’s reaction have proliferated, as 
described in the following sections, though the results of such theoretical 
analyses have been mixed. Danielsson et al. (2004, 2010, 2012) claim that 
when traders operate under value at risk constraints, market fluctuations 
are amplified and risk regulation may have the effect of exacerbating price 
11 
 
fluctuations; on a different line of reasoning, Adrian and Boyarchenko 
(2012) state that tightening intermediaries’ risk constraints affects the 
systemic risk-return trade-off by lowering the likelihood of systemic crises. 
VaR also affects portfolio allocation decisions, although the results 
coming from literature are mixed. Alexander and Baptista (2002) and Basak 
and Shapiro (2001), in different frameworks, show that regulation leads 
financial institutions to take higher exposure in risky assets in their 
portfolio allocation strategy. In contrast with these results, Cuoco and 
Isaenko (2008) and Yiu (2004) find that VaR may reduce allocation to risky 
assets. 
Finally, as reported by Bernanke in the address delivered in 2010 at 
Princeton University, uncertainty along with VaR has been blamed for 
worsening the crisis. Several studies show that uncertainty is negatively 
related to investments in risky assets (e.g. Guetlein 2016). From the 
empirical side, all the papers on the topics, which are not abundant, are 
focused on the analysis of behaviour of specific actors of the system in 
peculiar market situations (e.g. Cont and Wagalath 2014) on the impact on 
market variance of distressed selling). 
Hence, comprehensive evidence, both theoretical and empirical, on 
the impact of VaR (and possibly of uncertainty) on financial market and 
portfolio allocation does not exist. 
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Therefore, the existence of mixed theoretical results, limited empirical 
support and the lack of comprehensive evidence suggests the need for 
further theoretical and empirical investigation into the effects of VaR 
constraints to understand if limitations on risk may really decrease risk 
exposures of individual banks, while reducing the fluctuations of the whole 
system.  
Hence, the overall goal of this thesis is to answer questions on the still 
unproven existence of an empirical relation between (regulatory) market 
risk-constrained investors’ decisions and system fluctuations; on the 
theoretical basis on which such a relation is grounded; and on the impact of 
risk limits and investment decisions taking into account the effects not only 
of risk but also of uncertainty.  
I limit my analysis geographically to the Italian banking and financial 
markets which are large enough to be explored, but not internationalized 
enough (Observatoire de l’Epargne Europeene 2013) to have such relations 
significantly affected by non-domestic banks. In fact, in more 
internationalized financial markets, the role of non-domestic banks is 
relevant; therefore, in such markets, the reaction of financial market risk to 
banks’ behaviour cannot be empirically tested just by looking at domestic 
bank data. On the contrary, for Italy, which is less internationalized, the 
relationship between investors’ decisions and financial markets is generally 
stronger and an analysis of this relation is more representative of the effects 
of investors’ behaviour on financial markets. 
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Before highlighting the main contributions of this thesis, the next 
section provides some background to the context by reviewing the relevant 
literature. 
 
1.1 Value at risk and risk exposure 
The streams of literature relevant for this thesis concern the 
theoretical and empirical impact of risk-constraints on investor behaviour 
and on fluctuations of the system; literature on uncertainty is relevant for 
chapter 4.  
From the theoretical side, the shortcomings of VaR have been 
repeatedly underlined in the literature. A large number of the papers on this 
topic, written before the 2007-09 crisis, focus more on the potential impact 
of risk limits, while the ones published after the crisis focus on the 
mechanisms enacted by the crisis.  
The studies on the potential effects of VaR date back to the first decade 
of the century and examine possible distortions that such constraints cause 
to investment decisions or to the investment results. This stream of 
research gives no conclusive evidence on distortions; conclusions vary from 
having higher or lower exposure in risky assets to lower returns or to the 
inexistence of the impact of VaR limits. 
Basak and Shapiro (2001) analysed the optimal, dynamic portfolio and 
the wealth and consumption policies of investors who maximized utility 
14 
 
and manage market-risk exposure by using value at risk. They found that 
VaR risk managers optimally choose a larger exposure to risky assets than 
non-risk managers, and consequently incur larger losses when losses occur; 
furthermore, in a general-equilibrium analysis they find that the presence 
of VaR risk managers amplifies the stock-market volatility at times of down 
markets and attenuates volatility at times of up markets. In the same line, 
Sentana (2001) focused on the mean-variance allocation with VaR 
constraint in a world with one riskless asset and a finite number of risky 
assets. He looked at three building blocks (mean-variance portfolio 
frontiers, mean-variance indifference curves, iso-VaRs) to find the best 
portfolio allocation with a VaR cap. He concludes that the existence of a VaR 
constraint is a cost for a fund manager in terms of lower return (but also 
lower risk) and lower Sharpe ratio. Unlike the above, Campbell et al. (2001) 
show that when expected returns are assumed to be normally distributed, 
a model with a VaR limit provides almost identical results to the mean-
variance approach. Yiu (2004) looked at the optimal portfolio allocation 
under a VaR-constrained utility maximization problem in a continuous time 
setting. Yiu used numerical methods to find that when portfolio value 
increases the VaR constraint becomes active and reduces the allocation of 
investments to risky assets. Furthermore, Cuoco and Isaenko (2008) found 
that when VaR is re-evaluated dynamically, the risk exposure of a trader 
subject to a VaR limit is always lower than that of an unconstrained trader 
and that the probability of extreme losses are also lower. 
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From the empirical side there is relatively little research which deals 
contemporaneously with portfolio optimization and value at risk 
constraints. Among the most relevant, Puelz (2001) presents four model 
frameworks that apply VaR to portfolio decisions. One of the frameworks 
considered is the standard mean-variance. He concludes, also by using 
empirical data, that VaR-optimal portfolios are penalized in case of loss: in 
particular, he states that VaR optimal portfolios are more likely to incur 
large losses when losses occur. In addition, Campbell et al. (2001) found 
that the higher the confidence level of VaR, the lower the portion of the 
portfolio invested in risky assets. Cont and Wagalath (2014), in the stream 
of literature regarding price dynamics, show that distressed selling (due, 
for instance, to capital requirements set by regulators) has an impact on 
market variances and covariances. They apply the model to a three-month 
period immediately after the collapse of Lehman, showing that they cannot 
refute the hypothesis of no liquidation of assets (fire sales) and find an 
impact on the variance-covariance matrix. On the basis of data from five 
major US investment banks, Adrian and Shin (2010) show that financial 
intermediaries manage their balance sheets actively in a way that causes 
leverage to be high during booms and low during busts. They conclude that 
leverage of financial intermediaries is pro-cyclical as a consequence of the 
active management of balance sheets to respond to changes in prices and 
measured risk.  
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1.2 VaR-based regulation and systemic risk 
A new wave of studies on risk management have emerged since the 
beginning of the 2007-09 crisis (and some prior years). Most of them 
underline the unintended consequences on systemic risk of VaR constraint 
(e.g. pro-cyclicality, amplification effect) and the possible distortions (or 
change in behaviour) caused by the constraints on allocation decisions.  
Danielsson et al. (2004, 2010, 2012) demonstrate that when risk 
neutral traders operate under value at risk constraints, market conditions 
exhibit signs of amplification of shocks through feedback effects: although 
traders are risk-neutral, the VaR constraint makes them act as if they were 
risk-averse. Furthermore, the authors build a model where VaR constraint 
has a role in the amplification effect of deleveraging on volatility, and they 
also find that when risk is regulated, prices are lower and volatility is higher; 
hence, risk regulation may have the effect of exacerbating price fluctuations. 
Shin (2010) looks at the balance sheets of investors to find a pro-cyclical 
effect of the VaR constraint. In particular, he shows that when VaR is less 
binding (and investors’ equity is larger than necessary), investors use the 
slack in the balance sheet to purchase additional risky securities thus 
causing an amplified response to improvements in fundamentals. A few 
authors put some trading behaviours (e.g. fire sales due to binding 
constraints such as risk limits) at the centre of their analysis on pro-
cyclicality. In this field, Cont and Wagalath (2013) modelled the impact of 
fire sales on volatility and correlations. They found that the more 
17 
 
widespread a security is among different portfolios of various financial 
agents, the higher the cost of imposing common behaviour via regulatory 
constraints. Jang and Park (2016) integrate a VaR constraint to fund 
manager’s wealth and ambiguity functions showing that a fund manager 
using VaR-based risk management is exposed to large losses in bad states.  
Adrian and Boyarchenko (2012), in a model where agents are risk-
constrained, find a relation between supervisory requirements, cost of risk 
and systemic risk in the sense that tighter capital requirements shift the 
term structure of systemic risk downward at the cost of an increased price 
of risk. Kaplanski and Levy (2015) reached the conclusion that with VaR 
regulation, institutions face a new regulated capital market line, which 
induces resource allocation distortion in the economy; only when a riskless 
asset is available does VaR regulation induce an institution to reduce risk, 
otherwise the regulation may determine both higher risk and asset 
allocation distortion. Examining possible distortion or change in behaviour 
of investors, Alexander and Baptista (2006) find that under certain 
circumstances, regulation may increase the standard deviation and the 
probability of extreme losses. More generally, they show that when VaR 
constraint is imposed it is plausible that certain banks will select riskier 
portfolios than they would have chosen in the absence of the constraints.  
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1.3 The interplay of risk and uncertainty 
In general, uncertainty is associated with Knight (1921) who separated 
the notion of risk, as a measurable uncertainty, from the non-measurable, 
known as Knightian uncertainty. Knightian uncertainty is unobservable, 
though some proxies can be used to assess its changes over time. Non-
Knightian uncertainty refers to the uncertainty of a variable for which the 
probability distribution of ex-ante realizations can be defined, but the 
values are not defined.  
Literature offers mixed conclusions about the impact of uncertainty on 
the demand for risky assets.  Guetlein (2016) claims that in the standard 
expected utility framework an increase in risk aversion reduces the demand 
for risky assets, whereas with ambiguity aversion this in not necessarily the 
case. Pinar (2014) finds that under certain circumstances ambiguity 
aversion leads to giving less weight to a fund consisting of risky assets. 
Illeditsch (2011) builds on the work by Epstein and Schneider (2008), who 
examined the effect of ambiguous information on stock prices to argue that 
the interaction between risk and uncertainty can cause drastic changes in 
the stock prices. Such an interaction may explain the large increase in 
volatility after unexpected events. Maccheroni et al. (2013) built a mean-
variance framework with a risk-free asset, a risky asset, and an ambiguous 
asset. Using this framework, they found that ambiguity has a negative 
impact on the fraction of wealth invested in non-free risk assets. 
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1.4 Main goal of the thesis and chapter preview 
The literature on VaR reported above shows that VaR amplifies market 
shocks, thus causing an increase of volatility, and affects the portfolio 
decisions of investors. However, no articles provide empirical evidence on 
the amplification effect. In addition literature does not give a clear view on 
the direction of the impact of risk limits on portfolio allocation, since not all 
research has found that imposing risk limits reduces investments in risky 
assets, as it could be expected. Finally, although much of the literature 
points towards an inverse impact of uncertainty on investment in risky 
assets, there is no theoretical evidence of such relation under VaR 
constraints in a mean-variance framework. Empirical evidence of such an 
inverse relation is also lacking in literature.  
In this thesis I provide supporting empirical evidence of the 
amplification effect of VaR on market volatility. I find that VaR constraints 
reduces investments in risky assets, as expected by regulators, and I 
provide empirical evidence of these effects. Lastly, I confirm the inverse 
relation between uncertainty and risky investments and empirically 
demonstrate that this relation is, significantly, especially valid in turbulent 
periods. 
The thesis is structured as follows: chapter 2 contributes to the strand 
of literature concerning the unintended consequences on the financial 
system of imposing VaR limits. As mentioned in the literature section, when 
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risk is regulated, volatility is higher; hence, risk regulation may have the 
effect of exacerbating price fluctuations. Various theoretical papers have 
found a relation between constrained investors and the system via value at 
risk. This relation has been extensively discussed but not empirically 
proven. The original contribution of the chapter is the empirical analysis of 
the relation between risk constraint and financial system fluctuations, 
which proves that market volatility is significantly dependant on value at 
risk of banks and Granger-causes market volatility. I empirically prove this 
relation for the Italian market, where the impact of the behaviour of Italian 
banks on the local stock exchange is more direct and visible than in other, 
more internationalized, financial systems. The result is in line with various 
papers which theoretically modelled this effect and complements the 
evidence of other empirical research.  
Chapter 3 investigates the theoretical background of the results of 
chapter 2 and contributes to the strand of literature about the impact of risk 
limits on investors’ decisions. In this chapter, a mean-variance framework 
is used to determine the optimal percentage alpha of portfolio invested in 
risky assets, both in a risk-constrained and in an unconstrained setting. The 
literature on the impact of the constraint on risky investment is mixed. I 
find that, if the constraint binds, constrained alpha is lower than the 
unconstrained, giving support to papers showing that risk constraints can 
reduce risk exposure of individual banks. The empirical part of chapter 3 
supports that constrained alpha forecasts the actual risky investments of 
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banks better than the traditional mean-variance framework, thus 
supporting the assumption that banks that are regulated use the risk-
constrained setting to take decisions about risky investments. From the 
empirical analysis, some additional results give support to literature on fire 
sales, providing some possible clues on the timing of fire-sales, which may 
occur while passing from the unconstrained to the constrained framework, 
in transitions from stable to turmoiled markets.   
Lastly, chapter 4 contributes to literature on financial uncertainty and 
complements the results obtained in chapter 3 about the different 
investment periods (stable periods or turmoiled periods). This chapter 
builds on the theoretical results reached in chapter 3 about the constrained 
alpha to give additional information on the impact of uncertainty, the crucial 
role of which has been largely described in literature since the financial 
crisis. The theoretical results are in line with literature, showing that 
increasing uncertainty decreases the portion of portfolio invested in risky 
assets, thus providing new evidence since no articles found a closed formula 
under VaR constraints in a mean-variance framework. As for chapter 3, 
some empirical tests confirm the statistical significance of market data for 
constrained alpha opposed to the non-significance of the unconstrained 
alpha, thus providing new supporting empirical evidence in favour of the 
inverse relation. Furthermore, I find that in turbulent periods, for 
constrained-alpha the impact of risk and uncertainty are significant but 
expected returns are not. Interestingly, in low-volatility periods 
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investments are not driven by risk and uncertainty (not significant) but by 
expected returns, which are significant and with the expected sign. These 
results, new in the empirical literature, confirm the results of theoretical 
papers about the amplification of fluctuations of financial markets: in fact, 
the constrained investment in risky assets is significantly dependent (with 
a negative sign) on expected risk and expected uncertainty in turbulent 
periods but not in stable periods; hence, in turmoil, risky assets held by 
banks decrease thus amplifying the effect on volatility and uncertainty of 
the financial market.  
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 
empirically examines, using the time series techniques, the relation 
between risk-constraints and market volatility. The conjecture is that risk-
constraint Granger-causes market volatility fluctuations.  
Chapter 3 investigates the mechanism on which the relation from risk-
constraint to market volatility is grounded by theoretically relating risk 
constraints to investors’ choices. In addition, with forecasting techniques 
based on mixed frequency regressions (MIDAS), the chapter empirically 
analyses if the banks behave as constrained investors using the model 
obtained in the theoretical part of the chapter.  
Having ascertained in chapter 3 that banks behave like constrained 
investors, chapter 4 investigates if their investment decisions are also 
affected by uncertainty, in addition to risk, finding a positive answer from 
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theoretical formulas. Empirical tests, with ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions, confirm that banks invest on the basis of the constrained 
investors’ framework and their investment choices are affected by the 
existence of uncertainty.  
Finally, chapter 5 briefly summarizes the key findings of the thesis and 
offers directions for future research areas. 
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Chapter 2. Fuelling fire sales? Prudential regulation and crises: 
evidence from the Italian market  
 
2.1 Introduction 
In 2006, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank (Fed), Ben 
Bernanke, highlighted the importance of modern risk management as a 
central element of good supervisory practice and encouraged the industry 
to push forward the risk management frontier.  
Just a few years later, in 2010, after the beginning of the crisis, Janet 
Yellen, Chair of the Fed from 2014, said that “methods of modern risk 
management may have intensified the cycle…because of their reliance on 
metrics such as value at risk that are highly sensitive to recent performance, 
especially volatility. In good times, volatility declines, and value at risk along 
with it. This pattern generated a pro-cyclical willingness to take on risk and 
leverage, amplifying and propagating the boom and bust cycle. The vicious 
cycle of a collapse of confidence, asset fire sales, evaporation of liquidity, 
and a deleveraging free fall was the mirror image of the manic mortgage 
market that preceded it” (Yellen 2010). 
In the four years between Bernanke’s speech and Yellen’s one, the 
opinion on risk management techniques changed radically: from crucial 
methods for economic stability and the main contributors to the decline of 
volatility (Panetta et al. 2006), they became a quasi-evil mechanism of 
depression which contributed to the worsening and deepening of the crisis 
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(Bernanke 2008, Financial Stability Forum 2008, Senior Supervisors Group 
2008). The mentioned risk management techniques encompass, beyond  
the ability of the banks to distribute their credit risk by selling it to the 
market via complex financial products (originate-to-distribute model), the 
use of risk measures, such as value at risk (VaR), to estimate the potential 
loss of investments in a predetermined period of time. 
Much of the literature underlines some drawbacks of VaR and finds that 
VaR constraints may have a pro-cyclical effect by amplifying the impact of 
shocks and affecting market volatility (Adrian and Shin 2010, 2013, 
Danielsson 2010). Furthermore, Danielsson et al. (2001) claim that the use 
of value at risk could have induced crashes when they would not have 
otherwise occurred. Danielsson et al. (2004) found that the main channel of 
transmission of the amplification effect, in a VaR-constrained framework, is 
the adjustments of the expected returns and covariances of the investors 
and the related increase to risk aversion caused by the VaR constraint. The 
empirical evidence of the above-mentioned effects is very limited and is in 
favour of the existence of the amplification effect (Adrian and Shin 2010). 
This chapter shows empirically that the increasing tightness of the 
value at risk constraint may amplify the instability of the financial market 
in crises. To the best of my knowledge, no empirical proof of this relation 
has been given so far; to measure the tightness of the VaR constraint I use a 
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unique dataset of daily VaR and VaR limits of a sample of Italian banks taken 
from supervisory reporting. 
From the point of view of individual banks or financial agents, value at 
risk may be seen as the gold standard among the measures of market risk. 
Since 1994, when a technical document of JP Morgan-Riskmetrics was 
released, it has become a standard method to measure downside risk of 
banks and investment firms. In 1996, an additional boost to the diffusion of 
VaR as a risk measure came from the Bank of International Settlements 
(BIS) which considered value at risk methodologies as acceptable from a 
regulatory point of view (Basel Committee 1996). Since then, VaR-type 
measures have gained even more favour among financial intermediaries 
and today they are also used by small banks to manage their exposure to 
market risk. Value at risk is often preferred to other measures because it is 
easy to understand (it is measured in price units, such as dollars or euros, 
or as a percentage of portfolio value), it can be used to compute and 
compare risk of different types of assets and various portfolios, and it can 
be used to allocate capital to different units, even if it is not easily additive. 
Therefore, from the point of view of financial intermediaries (individual 
view), VaR is a good instrument to measure and compare market risk of 
their investments.  
However, from a systemic point of view (systemic view), VaR and 
other risk management measures may homogenize the behaviours of 
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financial agents, thus amplifying the cycle. This criticism dates back to 2001, 
when it was raised by the former President of the European Central Bank 
(Trichet 2001) and by the Financial Market Group of the London School of 
Economics (Danielsson et al. 2001). After the beginning of the crisis, 
criticisms of VaR gained so much consensus that even the BIS (Basel 
Committee 2016a and 2016b), which adopted VaR for regulatory purposes 
first, mentioned various drawbacks of the method (e.g. inability to 
adequately capture credit risk inherent in trading exposures; incentives for 
banks to take on tail risk; inability to capture the risk of market illiquidity) 
and proposed new risk measures. In particular, illiquidity is one of the 
major flaws of VaR which emerged in the crisis, as the BIS states that when 
several banks hold exposures of the same traded asset, the market of that 
asset may rapidly turn illiquid in case of banking system stress. In fact, at 
the height of the crisis, banks were unable to exit or hedge positions in 
certain asset markets, which were suddenly illiquid, thus recording 
substantial mark-to-market losses. VaR, used as a risk measure for 
individual financial intermediaries, may have further negative effects on the 
whole financial system: in periods of financial turmoil, market volatility 
increases and consequently VaR goes up. The increase of VaR for banks and 
other financial agents which use VaR to measure their risks increases their 
exposure to a higher level of market risk. If the risk level is too high banks 
sell (or even fire sell) some of their financial assets to reduce the risk. Such 
sales may cause further oscillations (increase of volatility) of the prices of 
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listed securities and, consequently, create an additional rise of VaR, so 
creating the start of a vicious circle. The circle could be particularly intense 
if the number of banks using VaR and holding securities in common is high. 
In this chapter, the existence of this vicious circle has been tested. The 
data used is the daily VaR of some Italian banks and their internal limits of 
VaR, the daily volatility of the Italian financial market and the spread 
between the yield of the 10-year reference Italian government bond and the 
German bond (measure of sovereign risk).  
The ratio between VaR and the internal limit of VaR (VaR ratio) is used 
to measure the tightness of the constraint. To take into account any 
potential endogeneity of the data (see section 2.3), a vector autoregression 
model (VAR) has been employed. The main results of the empirical tests are 
that market volatility has a significant, positive relation with lagged VaR 
ratio and that the VaR ratio does Granger-cause market volatility changes. 
Moreover, the impact of the value at risk ratio seems to have a kind of 
overshooting effect since the VaR ratio with longer lags has a negative 
impact on market volatility.  
Despite the huge amount of theoretical literature on risk management 
and pro-cyclicality, this is the first empirical investigation which directly 
takes into account data from bank and financial markets to prove the 
existence of the macro-impacts of VaR. 
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The results provide additional keys to interpret crisis development, 
further suggestions for studies on systemic risk and on the unintended 
consequences of individual regulatory instruments, and evidence of the 
mechanism that takes place when a measure used to control and contain 
the risk of individual financial agents has an impact on the whole system 
and on market variables (such as prices, returns and volatility), via the 
homogenization of behaviours.  
 
2.2 Theoretical background  
A few years ago, several researchers highlighted that using VaR and 
other volatility-based measures as risk limits might have some drawbacks. 
On the theoretical side, critiques are based on the idea that market volatility 
(seen as a market risk measure) is endogenous in the sense that it depends 
on the behaviour of market players and on the interaction among them. In 
particular, in bad times, the use of common risk management techniques, 
such as VaR, increases the similarity of behaviours of different banks so 
causing unintended and unpredictable effects on the system as a whole. 
Along with endogeneity, the assumption that the use of VaR and, more 
generally, of risk limits may amplify ordinary fluctuations of the economic 
cycle and of financial variables (pro-cyclicality) has been a strong criticism 
of the use of VaR. 
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On these points, Danielsson et al. (2010) demonstrate that when risk 
neutral traders operate under value at risk constraints, market conditions 
exhibit signs of amplification of shocks through feedback effects. This effect 
complements other amplifications of shocks highlighted in literature (for 
instance, very recently by Kokas et al. (2019)). Similarly, but in a different 
framework, Adrian and Boyarchenko (2012) described a model where 
agents are risk-constrained, and they studied the impact of prudential 
policies on the trade-off between system-wide distress and risk pricing. 
They uncovered a relation between supervisory requirements, cost of risk 
and systemic risk. In particular, they found that tighter capital 
requirements shift the term structure of systemic risk downward at the cost 
of an increased price of risk.  
Discussing pro-cyclicality, Panetta et al. (2009) show that many 
variables (e.g. capital regulation, accounting standards and managers’ 
incentives) can have a pro-cyclical impact. Adrian and Shin (2006) highlight 
that the mechanism of targeting the leverage level by market agents can 
foster pro-cyclicality. They also suggest that some micro-behaviours which 
have macro-impact may have the same vicious effect (e.g. the use of the VaR 
model to determine internal capital allocation). Again in 2010, Adrian and 
Shin said that some accounting rules also contribute to increased turmoil: 
in particular, the mark-to-market principle applied to balance sheets of 
financial intermediaries along with VaR constraints can foster pro-
cyclicality and have an impact on market liquidity and on volatility 
31 
 
measures. In 2013, the same authors (Adrian and Shin 2013) studied the 
balance sheets of five major investment banks and showed that pro-
cyclicality can be due to the fact that banks actively manage their balance 
sheets in order to keep constant the ratio between their value at risk and 
equity.   
Furthermore, some authors have shown that prudential regulation has 
a greater impact on pro-cyclicality than accounting standards (Amel-Zadeh 
et al. 2014, Brousseau et al. 2014, Jones 2015), and that such prudential 
regulation, when oriented more to individual banks than to the financial 
system, may not give the right relevance to the possible systematic impact 
(also on financial markets) of banks’ risks (Fiordelisi  and Marqués-Ibañez  
2013). 
All the previously mentioned problems (pro-cyclicality, leverage, 
market liquidity, risk management) have been put together from a stream 
of literature which examine panic behaviours; in this framework, panic 
happens when the circular relationship between market risk and asset 
price level causes shifts in risk, mainly generated by self-fulfilling 
behaviours (Bacchetta et al. 2012). 
A few of the above-mentioned criticisms of VaR have recently been 
addressed by the Basel committee, which have implemented some ad hoc 
advancements to the framework of risk measures (Basel Committee 2012, 
2013, 2014, 2016b). However, some important drawbacks persist, as the 
Committee itself admits (Basel Committee 2016a).  
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The above-mentioned papers are mainly theoretical. On the empirical 
side the literature on the vicious circle between market risk measures and 
financial markets is not extensive. In 2010, in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis, the need for empirical research on ways in which regulations can be 
designed to make bank capital less pro-cyclical was underlined (Wilson et 
al. 2010).  
Cont and Wagalath (2014), in the stream of literature regarding price 
dynamics, showed that distressed selling (due, for instance, to capital 
requirements set by regulators) can have an impact on market variances 
and covariances. They applied the model to a three-month period 
immediately after the collapse of Lehman, showing that they could not 
refute the hypothesis of no liquidation of assets (fire sales), and found an 
impact of it on the variance-covariance matrix. Adrian and Shin (2010), on 
the basis of data from five major US investment banks, showed that financial 
intermediaries manage their balance sheets actively in a way that causes 
leverage to be high during booms and low during busts. They concluded 
that leverage of financial intermediaries is pro-cyclical as a consequence of 
the active management of balance sheets to respond to changes in prices 
and measured risk. In their regressions they found a significant negative 
relation between lagged change in VaR and change in leverage. The result 
was based on quarterly data for five investment banks for a sample period 
of 15 years ending at the first quarter of 2008. Furthermore, they explored 
the nexus between deleveraging of these banks and volatility of the market 
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by looking at the repo market (weekly data, from 1990 to 2008, from all 
primary dealers), finding that the growth rate of repos on dealers’ balance 
sheets significantly forecast innovations in the market volatility index 
(VIX).  
In this chapter, the relation between the tightness of the VaR 
constraint (VaR ratio)  and market volatility is directly tested. Daily data on 
value at risk and financial markets are used (450 observations, one-and-a-
half year window) and, on the basis of time series techniques, the existence 
of Granger causality between the VaR ratio and market volatility is also 
verified. Granger causality does not imply a true causality relation among 
variables but indicates whether one time series is useful in forecasting 
another and the direction of such type of causality. This feature of Granger 
causality is extremely useful for the chapter goal, which is to verify the 
existence of a flow of information and its direction between time series. 
Hence, the methodology is different from the one used by Adrian and Shin 
(2010) which was based on a longer time-span but on two different panel 
regressions and two different samples with different data frequencies. in 
detail, they studied the correlations firstly between VaR and leverage and 
secondly between volatility and repos. An additional significant difference 
from other empirical papers is related to the geographical perimeter of the 
variables: Adrian and Shin (2010) and Cont and Wagalath (2014) used US 
data, whereas the focus of this work is on Italian data. This choice is based 
on the idea that Italian market is not as international as other European (or 
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US) markets. This feature is particularly important for this type of analysis: 
to perform an empirical analysis of the relation between national financial 
intermediaries and the corresponding national financial market requires a 
focus on markets where domestic financial intermediaries may have a 
relevant impact on the local financial market. In fact, the Italian market is 
one of the least internationalized among the largest European nations with 
regards to both stocks and government bonds (the two main components 
of the portfolio of securities for Italian banks). For stocks, a report to the 
European Commission  (Observatoire de l’Epargne Europeene 2013) shows 
that in 2011 (a period immediately before the time window of the empirical 
analysis of the present chapter), the Italian Stock Exchange was less 
internationalized than other large European countries (Spain, France, 
United Kingdom, Germany) in terms of the share of foreign investment to 
total market capitalization of the Stock Exchange  (see Fig. 2.1). 
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Fig. 2.1. Foreign investments to total market capitalization  
 
Share of foreign investment investors, as a percentage of total market capitalization 
per EU country, as of 31 December 2011. Foreign investors are defined as any investors 
whose residence differs from the registration country of the company whose shares 
they hold. Foreign investors can be European (other than national) or non-European. 
Source:  Observatoire de l’Epargne Europeene - OEE (Paris, France) (2013). 
 
With regards to government bonds, an IMF working paper (Andritzky 
2012) shows that in 2011 the share of government securities held 
domestically was higher in Italy than in other large European countries (see 
Fig. 2.2).  
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Fig. 2.2. Government securities held by domestic investors 
 
Portion of domestically held government securities as per cent of total domestic financial 
assets. 
Source of the graph: R. Andritzky (2012).  
 
Furthermore, the relation between Italian Stock Exchange and Italian 
banks, which is a relevant information for this chapter, is stronger than in 
other countries. On the basis of the same European report cited before 
(Observatoire de l’Epargne Europeene 2013), Italian banks hold a higher 
share of listed companies relative to other large European countries (9%; 
against less than 1% for the UK, 5% for Germany and 4% for France). 
Against this background, the analysis of the relationships between 
domestic banking data and national financial data for Italy is more 
significant than for the other above-mentioned countries, where national 
financial data may also be influenced by the behaviour of non-domestic 
banks. 
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2.3 Methodology 
The test of the relation between market volatility and the VaR ratio 
(VaR of banks divided by their internal limits of VaR) is based on two major 
steps. The first step is to compute the volatility of the market; the second 
step is to examine market volatility in relation with the VaR ratio and 
possibly with other relevant variables. There is no obvious dependant-
independent relation between the VaR ratio and market volatility. In fact, 
by definition, VaR depends on market volatility. Conversely, for the 
research question of the chapter, VaR may impact volatility.  
The endogeneity of the variables is supported by the literature. In fact 
Adrian and Shin (2006, 2010, 2013) show how the use of risk limits 
measured in terms of VaR may determine fire sales, which have an impact 
on market volatility and, in turn, on VaR (hence on risk limit); Cont and 
Wagalath (2014) show that fire sales may have an impact on market data. 
This double-way interaction between market volatility and VaR exactly 
expresses the endogeneity idea where it is not known ex-ante which 
variable drives the other, and which one can be considered exogenous. 
To deal with such endogeneity and with the possible reverse causality 
problem, I opted to use the vector-autoregression technique (VAR), where 
current values of variables are put in relation only with lagged ones (Brooks 
2007), without any contemporaneous terms. It is worth noting that, based 
on the public information published by the major Italian banks, the value at 
risk model used by banks in the period under analysis was based on 
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historical simulation not on the parametric model. Hence, the VaR 
definition was based on the worst 1% loss level (in a 10-day period) and 
not on a measure of market volatility; the variables used in the regressions 
are thus neatly distinct. Nevertheless, since they refer to similar concepts, 
in section 2.5.2 I perform some additional tests to further check the 
robustness of the results obtained in the baseline regressions. In the limited 
number of empirical research articles on the impact of value at risk, the VAR 
approach has not been used. I opted for this approach since it helps to deal 
with endogeneity and to test the lead-lag relations among interconnected 
variables. Furthermore, it let me exploit the unique daily dataset available 
on VaR and internal risk limits. In the chapter, some specific robustness 
tests are performed to control for possible concerns related with the use of 
the method (lag order selection, reverse causality). 
The VAR methodology is widely used in literature to test lead-lag 
relations among variables; Lafuente-Luengo (2009) uses it to find evidence 
of the intraday lead-lag relationship between futures market volatility and 
spot market volatility; Bec and Gollier (2009) use it to show that VaR is 
influenced by the state of the financial market cycle and Chomicz-
Grabowska and Orlowski (2020) examine the dynamic interactions 
between financial market risk (VIX) and some key macroeconomic stability 
variables with this technique. However, given the uniqueness of the data 
used in this chapter (VaR and VaR limits for individual banks), VAR has not 
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been used in literature for testing the relation between the VaR constraint 
and market volatility. 
Finally, in the VAR framework used in this chapter, a variable 
regarding Italian government bonds is also considered since these bonds 
greatly affected the Italian financial market in the period examined.  
 
2.3.1 Volatility computation 
The first step of the analysis is the computation of market volatility. In 
the baseline empirical tests I use the annualized 10-day volatility of the 
returns of the market index, in line with the regulatory requirements for 
VaR (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 1996).  
As mentioned in the previous section, the use of this volatility variable 
may cause some endogeneity doubts to arise. In addition, autocorrelation 
of returns may affect independence of returns, impacting on both the VaR 
and the 10-day volatility measures. To control for these possible concerns, 
in the robustness checks I reperform the vector autoregression by 
substituting the 10-day volatility variable with volatility coming from the 
ARMA-GARCH (autoregressive moving average model for the mean with 
generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity model for the 
variance) approach, thus cleaned of the autocorrelation effects. To compute 
the GARCH volatility, I iteratively perform the following steps (Box Jenkins 
approach): 
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- assess the stationarity of the series of returns by looking at the sample 
autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions; 
- select the stationary model for conditional mean (autoregressive AR, 
moving average MA, or ARMA model) on the basis of the 
autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions of the 
dependent time series; 
- estimate the coefficients that best fit the selected ARMA model; 
- check the non-correlation and homoscedasticity of the residuals; in 
this case, estimation of GARCH models for volatility and a further 
check of the partial autocorrelation function of squared residuals. 
The ARMA(p,q) model is described by the following equation: 
 
Yt = ϕ0 + ∑ ϕiYt−i + ∑ θjεt−j + ϵt
q
j=1
P
i=1    (2.1) 
 
where: 
p refers to the number of autoregressive terms, 
q refers to the number of lagged error terms, 
ϕ refers to the coefficients of the autoregressive terms and the 
constant, 
θ refers to the coefficient of the moving average terms. 
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Seasonal adjustments can be added to (2.1) in order to best capture 
seasonal variations in the data. For instance, a seasonal moving average 
(SMA) can be included when a seasonal moving average term (with lags) 
captures some economic regularities of the data. The resulting MA lag 
structure would be obtained from the product of the lag polynomial 
specified by the MA terms and the one specified by any SMA terms. For 
instance, if the third addendum of (2.1) is a standard second-order MA 
process without seasonality: 
 
𝑌𝑡 =  𝜖𝑡 +  𝜃1𝜖𝑡−1 +  𝜃2𝜖𝑡−2    (2.2) 
 
which can be written as: 
 
𝑌𝑡 = (1 +  𝜃1𝐿 +  𝜃2𝐿
2)𝜖𝑡    (2.3) 
 
where L is the lag operator such as LkYt=Yt-k.  
 
With the inclusion of a seasonality factor at lag 3, the polynomial 
becomes  
 
𝑌𝑡 = (1 +  𝜃1𝐿 +  𝜃2𝐿
2)(1 + 𝜔3𝐿
3)𝜖𝑡  (2.4) 
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As explained at the beginning of the section, in the last step of the Box-
Jenkins approach, if the time series plots of residuals and of squared 
residuals of the ARMA model show some clusters of volatility (typical of 
financial series) the model should be improved, by adding an ARCH/GARCH 
models for volatility.   
ARCH(p) models, where p refers to the order of the lagged 
autoregressive terms of previous innovations, have the following form: 
 
𝜎𝑡
2 =  𝜔 +  ∑ 𝛼𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 𝜖𝑡−𝑖
2  ,    𝜔 > 0, 𝑖 > 0, 𝛼𝑖 ≥ 0  (2.5) 
 
𝜖𝑡 =  𝜎𝑡𝑧𝑡 where zt   is white noise. 
Relative to the ARCH effects, the GARCH model assumes that the 
conditional variances of innovations follow an ARMA model. In that case, 
GARCH (p, q) refers to the following representation:  
 
𝜎𝑡
2 =  𝜔 +  ∑ 𝛼𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
𝜖𝑡−𝑖
2 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=1
𝜎𝑡−𝑖
2  ,     
𝜔 > 0, 𝑖 > 0, 𝛼𝑖 ≥ 0, 𝛽𝑖 ≥ 0    (2.6) 
 
𝜖𝑡 =  𝜎𝑡𝑧𝑡 where zt   is white noise 
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and  ∑ αi
p
i=1 + ∑ βi
q
i=1 < 1  to have stationarity. 
 
2.3.2 Vector autoregression 
With the second step of the analysis, the relation between market 
volatility and the VaR ratio of the banks is examined by using a Vector 
Autoregression technique. The vector autoregression (VAR) is an 
econometric model used to capture the linear interdependencies among 
multiple time series. VAR models generalize the univariate autoregressive 
model (AR model) by allowing for more than one evolving variable. Each 
variable has an equation explaining its evolution based on its own lags and 
the lags of the other model variables.  
In mathematical terms, a VAR model describes the evolution of a set of 
k variables over the same period (t = 1, ..., T) as a linear function of only their 
past values. The variables are collected in a k × 1 vector yt, where the i-th 
element, yi,t, is the observation at time “t” of the i-th variable.  
The representation of a VAR is as follows: 
 
𝐲𝐭 = β0 + ∑ βi𝐲𝐭−𝐢
p
i=1 + μt    (2.7) 
 
where yt is a k × 1 vector of variables determined by p lags of all k 
variables in the system, μt is a k × 1 vector of error terms, β0 is a k × 1 vector 
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of constant term coefficients and βi are k × p matrices of coefficients of the 
ith lag of yt. 
Since only lagged values of the variables appear on the right-hand side 
of the equations, simultaneity is not an issue and OLS yields consistent 
estimates. To choose the maximum lag p in the VAR model, specific tests are 
used.  
All variables have to be of the same order of integration; in detail, to 
run a VAR in levels all variables have to be I(0) (stationary). 
In this chapter, as reported in the empirical section (2.5.1), all 
variables are stationary or reduced to stationarity hence the VECM (vector 
error correction model) is not used, but an unrestricted VAR in the reduced 
form. In fact, the goal of the chapter is not to study the long-run equilibrium 
and the related adjustment process, for which VECM would be one of the 
possible useful approaches, but to examine the lead-lag relation among 
variables, and to test if the risk constraint (measured with the VaR ratio) 
Granger-causes the market volatility variable.  
 
2.4 Data  
2.4.1 Main variables 
In the present chapter three types of data are used: financial market 
data; government bond data; measures of exposure to market risk of some 
banks.  
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The main financial market data used come from Datastream and are 
the daily closing prices of the Italian Stock Exchange Index (FTSE MIB). The 
Italian Index FTSE MIB is a weighted average of the quotes of its 
components (40 shares). The weights are available on the site of the London 
Stock Exchange group, which Italian Stock Exchange is a member of. The 
index accounts for around 80% of the capitalization of the Stock Exchange. 
The government bond data come from Bloomberg and are the daily 
quotes for the 10-year Italian government bond and the 10-year German 
government bond. The Italian government bond yield has become 
particularly important since 2011, when the sovereign bond crisis 
occurred. During that period the spread between the yield of the Italian and 
the German government bonds became a crucial reference for financial 
analysts and was used as a measure of the credit (or sovereign) risk of the 
country. 
Data about banks comes from supervisory databases and measures 
daily market risk exposure of Italian banks (i.e. value at risk) which have a 
validated internal model to measure market risk exposure. To have a 
validated internal model means that banks have been authorized to 
measure their market risk exposure by using their own value at risk model 
instead of the standard regulatory one. In the dataset, beyond the level of 
value at risk there are also data on the internal limits of VaR set by these 
banks to manage their market risk. In this chapter, the ratio between value 
at risk level and the internal limit of VaR is used as the measure of the risk 
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constraint impact, with the assumption that the higher the value of this 
ratio, the higher the risk incurred relative to the maximum acceptable risk 
(where the maximum acceptable risk level is the internal limit). Moreover, 
the higher this ratio, the more likely that the bank would sell some financial 
assets to reduce its risk. Further data on banks (e.g. the securities bought 
and sold by banks in a certain period), used in this chapter for descriptive 
purposes, are from the central bank databases, too. It is important to note 
that regulatory market risk exposure concerns only portfolios held with 
trading intent; therefore, our VaR measure basically considers the portfolio 
of banks held for trade (HFT). 
For all the data mentioned, the time window of the analysis starts from 
the beginning of April 2012 and ends at the end of December 2013 (see Fig. 
2.3). 
 
Fig. 2.3. Volatility in the time window used 
 
Left scale: volatility; right scale: correlation; blue line - realized 30-day volatility; red line 
- Implied 30-day volatility (implied in options, IVI30, as computed by FTSE). grey line - 
right scale, correlation between realized and implied volatility. 
Source: FTSE (2014). 
 
Time window used 
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I have chosen this time span for four reasons. Firstly, for this period I 
have a representative sample of banks in the VaR dataset. Secondly, it is a 
period of high volatility; this higher-than-usual volatility is a good starting 
point to test the research idea of pro-cyclicality in turmoil periods caused 
by the use of regulatory measures. Thirdly, volatility shows both increases 
and decreases in the period; this is useful in order to test our hypothesis not 
only applicable in periods of sharp increase of volatility. Lastly, this period 
does not include the peak of the second half of 2011, which was more 
related to a specific (sovereign risk crisis, i.e. issuer risk) than to general 
market risk as the analysis of specific market risk is beyond the objective of 
this chapter.  
 
2.4.2 Summary statistics 
By following the methodology described in section 2.3.1  the returns 
on the closing price of the FTSE MIB index have been preliminarily 
calculated in order to compute volatility. In the period examined, the index 
returns have a mean close to zero and a daily standard deviation of 1.6% 
(see table 2.1, column a), which is equivalent to an annual volatility of 
almost 25%. 
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Table 2.1. Summary statistics – Italian stock exchange index, value at 
risk and government bonds.  
Statistics FTSE MIB 
index –
returns 
(a) 
VaR / 
internal 
limit of VaR 
(b) 
Yield Gov’t 
bond  
(BTP)(%) 
(c) 
Spread Italy-
Germany 
(basis 
points) 
(d) 
     
 Mean 0.00 0.51 4.79 324 
     
 Median 0.00 0.50 4.54 302 
     
 Maximum 0.06 0.74 6.49 523 
     
 Minimum -0.05 0.35 3.80 220 
     
 Std. Dev. 0.02 0.08 0.67 76 
     
Number of 
observations 
456 428 440 440 
     
Time window from 01 April 2012 to 31 December 2013. Daily observations. Index returns 
are computed as log variations of daily closing prices (source Datastream). The ratio 
between VaR and internal limits is based on supervisory reporting data; the source of 
government bond data is Bloomberg. BTPs (Buoni poliennali del Tesoro) are Italy’s 
government bonds. 
 
Public information on risks released by every bank (retrievable from 
the website of each bank) show that in the sample period the largest part of 
market risk was generated by both stocks and Italian government bonds 
held. In fact, Italian government bonds (BTP, Buoni Poliennali del Tesoro) 
with fixed rate and medium-long term maturity average around 15% of the 
HFT portfolio and 35% of trading activity in the period. As mentioned 
before, in the period examined government bonds had a large impact on 
value at risk because the sovereign risk market crisis started in the second 
half of 2011.  
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As in the empirical analysis I use the sovereign risk variable measured 
by the spread between Italy and Germany’s bonds. In table 2.1 I also show 
this variable (column d).  
Data on the reference Italian bond show an average yield of 4.8% with 
a standard deviation of 0.67% (table 2.1, column c). In the period, the 
spread with Germany’s 10-year bond, which was a proxy of the credit 
(sovereign) risk measure for financial investors, has been on average equal 
to 324 basis points (table 2.1, column d). The average exposure of the Italian 
banks to market risk relative to their own internal limit (VaR ratio) has been 
around 50%, with a maximum of 74%, and a high range of variability (table 
2.1, column b).  
The sample of banks used in this study is representative of the system: 
the trading activity of these banks accounts for more than 40% of the 
negotiations on the components of the stock exchange index and more than 
50% of the held-for-trade portfolio of the Italian banking system.  
Since the empirical part is based on data on VaR of Italian banks and 
volatility of the Italian financial market, it is important that securities 
traded by domestic banks do represent a not-immaterial portion of the 
whole trading activity in the financial market. From the data collected, in 
the sampled period Italian banks traded around 20% of the value of 
negotiations of the first five securities of the index (shares bought and sold 
by banks divided by market turnover by value), whose weight accounts for 
more than 50% of the Italian index. To be coherent with the data used in 
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the estimations (see previous section), the cited incidence on market 
turnover is computed only on proprietary trading and on securities coming 
from the held for trading (HFT) portfolio of banks, which is the portfolio 
used by banks to measure market risk (i.e. the perimeter of VaR 
calculations). If I added the turnover of other portfolios (e.g. available-for-
sale portfolio) which are also traded by banks, the weight would be far 
higher.  
 
2.5 Results 
As mentioned in the previous section, I tested the relation between the 
Italian market volatility and the VaR ratio. This ratio is computed as the 
simple average of the VaR ratios (level of VaR divided by the internal limit) 
of Italian banks, with the assumption that if a bank, whatever its dimension, 
is close to the VaR limit, it will start to fire sell thus triggering the 
amplification effect on market volatility.  
Given that VaR concerns expected future losses, to measure market 
volatility I used both the historical standard deviation of the market (the 
annualized 10-day volatility of the returns of the market index, as described 
in section 2.3.1), which assume that history will repeat itself, and, in the 
robustness tests, the best possible estimations of volatility calculated on the 
basis of an ARMA-GARCH model, which takes into account all peculiarities 
of the financial series of returns.  
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Finally, I controlled for the impact of the spread (hereinafter the 
spread) between Italian government bonds and the German bonds. In fact, 
this spread is a measure of sovereign risk which is not of interest for the 
goal of the research. However, in the period considered, for Italy this risk 
(measured by the spread) may have affected the market volatility variable 
used to measure general market risk. The changes of the spread are 
funnelled towards the market volatility through two channels. One of the 
transmission mechanisms of a shock is via the price of the shares of the 
banks listed in the market: an increase of the spread causes a decrease of 
the value of the portfolio held by Italian banks (a relevant part of their 
portfolio consists of BTPs) and, for listed bank, of the value of their shares. 
In turn, this has an impact on market volatility of the market index which in 
Italy is strongly dependant on banks’ shares (in December 2013, almost one 
third of the market capitalization of the index was related to banks).  The 
second transmission mechanism is via the risk management techniques 
(VaR). Since a not-irrelevant portion of the portfolio held by banks consists 
of BTP, a negative shock on BTP price due to the increase of the spread has 
an impact on VaR and the VaR ratio (since the internal risk limit does not 
immediately change); consequently, banks may decide to sell risky financial 
assets to reduce their market risk exposure, thus fuelling the market 
instability.  
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2.5.1. Main results 
Before estimating the VAR model, I assessed the stationarity of the 
variables by running the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-
Perron (PP) unit root tests. The results of these tests show that all the 
variables, except the GARCH volatility, were not stationary (at a 5% level of 
significance) unless purged from the trend effect (Brooks 2007). Hence, I 
detrend the non-stationary variables in order to have all stationary 
variables in the unrestricted vector autoregressive model (VAR) (see table 
2.2, columns g and h). In line with literature (Brooks 2007, Lutkepohl 2007, 
Chomicz-Grabowska et al. 2020, Ozcicek and McMillin 1999), to calculate 
the right VAR dimensions (i.e. the best lag order), which is two, I use the 
information criteria, in particular the Schwarz information criterion (SIC). 
In fact, Lutkepohl (2007) suggests using such criterion if consistency and 
not forecasting ability is the goal of the econometric test to be run. Since in 
this chapter I do not use VAR for forecasting, I opted for the SIC as the main 
criterion to determine the number of lags. For the sake of completeness for 
the regressions performed, the Akaike information criterion also suggests 
using a VAR order equal to two for the regressions reported in both table 
2.3 and table 2.4 (see table 2.2). The resulting model is stable and removes 
most of the autocorrelation (Lutkepohl 2007). To control for the robustness 
of the lag order choice, some additional checks are performed in section 
2.5.2. 
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Table 2.2. Lag order selection and stationarity tests  
 Lag order selection 
Lags 
 
VAR table 2.3 VAR table 2.4 
SIC 
(a) 
 
AIC 
(b) 
 
SIC 
(c) 
 
AIC 
(d) 
 
   
  
Lag 1 -21.93 -22.05 -33.23 -33.35 
     Lag 2 -21.94§ -22.16§ -34.14§ -34.35§ 
     Lag 3 -21.75 -22.06 -33.95 -34.27 
     Lag 4 -21.65 -22.07 -33.82 -34.24 
     Lag 5 -21.51 -22.05 -33.68 -34.22 
     Lag 6 -21.37 -22.02 -33.52 -34.17 
     
 Stationarity checks 
     
Variable 
Unit root test 
(ADF) 
 
(e) 
Unit root test 
(PP) 
 
(f) 
Unit root test 
on detrended 
variable (ADF) 
(g) 
Unit root test on 
detrended 
variable (PP) 
(h) 
     Volatility (10- 
day returns) 
-1.49 -1.69* -4.20*** -5.30*** 
     Spread ITA-
GER 
-0.78 -0.82 -3.76*** -3.78*** 
     
VaR Ratio -1.12 -1.40 -4.52*** -4.37*** 
     VaR ratio on 
HFT 
-0.67 -0.66 -12.02*** -12.79*** 
     Volatility 
(GARCH) 
-2.52** -2.42** NA Na 
     Volatility of 
the BTP yield 
-1.19 -1.68* -3.51*** -4.62*** 
     Lag order selection: AIC stands for Akaike information criterion, SIC stands for Schwarz 
information criterion. I limit the analysis to the sixth lag to consider the weekend effect (see 
section 2.5.2); the result does not change up to 10 lags. 
Stationarity checks: null: the variable has a unit root. Columns (e) and (f): tests on the variables; 
columns (g) and (h): tests on the detrended, stationary variables (Brooks 2007). ADF (augmented 
Dickey Fuller) test performed with the automatic lag length selection (based on SIC criterion): 
PP (Phillips Perron) test based on Bartlett kernel spectral estimation method and the automatic 
selection (Newey West) for the bandwidth. GARCH has not been detrended (“NA”, columns (g) 
and (h)), given that the unit root null is rejected at 5% (columns (e) and (f)). § indicates lag order 
selected by the criterion.  *** - significant at 0.01 level, ** - significant at 0.05 level, * - significant 
at 0.1 level. Number of observations reported in table 2.3 and 2.4.  
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The results of the regressions (2.7) reported in table 2.3 (column a) 
show that the coefficient between the VaR ratio with one lag and market-
volatility is significant with the expected positive sign, as often underlined 
in theoretical literature. The coefficient of the two-lag VaR ratio is 
significant but with a negative sign, giving empirical evidence also of the 
overshooting effects (or spirals) highlighted in literature.  
55 
 
Table 2.3. Vector autoregression – volatility, VaR ratio and spread (SIC lag order) 
Variables Volatility 
(a) 
VaR ratio 
(b) 
Spread ITA-GER 
(c) 
    
Volatility (-1) 0.954*** 0.149 -0.349 
 (0.05) (0.36) (0.28) 
Volatility (-2) -0.049 -0.010 0.529* 
 (0.05) (0.36) (0.29) 
    
VaR ratio (-1) 0.016** 0.830*** 0.074* 
 (0.006) (0.05) (0.04) 
VaR ratio (-2) -0.018** 0.09* -0.05 
 (0.006) (0.05) (0.04) 
    
Spread ITA-GER (-1) 0.002 -0.035 1.026** 
 (0.009) (0.06) (0.05) 
Spread ITA-GER (-2) 0.004 0.011 -0.089* 
 (0.008) (0.06) (0.05) 
    
Constant -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
    
Vector autoregression among the simple average of the VaR ratio (VaR divided by internal limit), the volatility of the returns of the index and the spread 
between reference government bonds of Italy and Germany. The (-1) and (-2) labels after a variable name stand for lag 1 and lag 2 respectively. Daily 
data for Italian banks and Italian financial market from April 2012 to December 2013. *** - significant at 0.01 level, ** - significant at 0.05 level, * - 
significant at 0.1 level. Number of observations: 383.  
56 
 
 
An additional result reported in table 2.3, in addition to the 
autocorrelation of variables typical of financial series, is that the spread is 
positively related to the VaR ratio with one lag (though at a lower level of 
significance, see column c), thus confirming a possible transmission 
channel through the sale of government bonds (an increase of VaR for 
bonds held in portfolio may determine the sale of such bonds, the decrease 
of their price and the increase of their yield and of the Italy-Germany 
spread).  
Furthermore, the VaR ratio and the spread cause (in terms of Granger 
causality) volatility of the market (at 5% significance) whereas the market 
volatility and the spread do not cause (in terms of Granger causality) the 
VaR ratio, thus showing that the information flows from the VaR ratio and 
the spread towards market volatility. 
As is known, Granger causality is not a measure of causality but a 
demonstration that past values of VaR ratio contain information that helps 
to predict future volatility. Since the VaR ratio is based on expected 
volatility, the result of the empirical test, with a lagged VaR ratio impacting 
on current volatility, may not be an answer to the research question (i.e. if 
the regulatory risk limits affect market volatility) but may simply be 
evidence of the obvious fact that since VaR ratio is based on expected 
volatility it is the best way to predict future volatility. To control for this 
concern and to further test for the possible endogeneity and reverse 
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causality of the VaR and volatility variables (see section 2.3), I ran the same 
vector autoregression by substituting the VaR ratio variable with a variable 
which is not related to regulatory limits, such as VaR divided by the trading 
portfolio of the bank. If the results obtained in table 2.3 were simply 
dependant on the fact that today’s VaR contains expectations on future 
volatility or if the endogeneity concerns had affected the results, this new 
regression should give similar results to before; if the previous results were 
also dependant on the VaR limit (i.e. the denominator of the VaR ratio used 
in table 2.3), the new variable (VaR on HFT) would not be significant.  
The vector autoregression with the best lags (there are two) selected 
on the basis of the SIC criterion (see table 2.2), shows no significant 
correlation between the VaR variable and volatility (table 2.4, column a) nor 
any Granger causality between the two. Since the only difference between 
the VaR-variable used in table 2.3 (VaR divided by the VaR limit) and the 
one used in table 2.4 (VaR divided by the value of the HFT portfolio) is the 
denominator, I can conclude that it was exactly the VaR limit to determine 
the significance reported in the column a of table 2.3. 
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Table 2.4. Vector autoregression – volatility, VaR on HFT and spread (SIC lag order) 
 Variables 
Volatility 
(a) 
VaR on HFT 
(b) 
Spread ITA-GER 
(c) 
Volatility (-1)  0.949***  0.000 -0.362 
  (0.05)  (0.001)  (0.29) 
Volatility (-2) -0.045 -0.000  0.557** 
  (0.05)  (0.001)  (0.29) 
    
VaR on HFT (-1) -0.086  0.915*** -2.204 
 (1.96)  (0.03) (11.63) 
VaR on HFT (-2) -1.43 -0.001 -1.152 
 (1.62)  (0.03) (9.57) 
    
Spread ITA-GER (-1) -0.001 -0.000 1.024*** 
  (0.009)  (0.00)  (0.05) 
Spread ITA-GER (-2)  0.005  0.00 -0.093* 
  (0.009)  (0.00)  (0.05) 
    
Constant -0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Vector autoregression among the simple average of the VaR on HFT (VaR divided by the value of the HFT portfolio), the volatility of 
the returns of the index and the spread between reference government bonds of Italy and Germany. The (-1) and (-2) labels after a 
variable name stand for lag 1 and lag 2 respectively. Daily data on Italian banks and Italian financial market from April 2012 to 
December 2013. *** - significant at 0.01 level, ** - significant at 0.05 level, * - significant at 0.1 level. Number of observations: 383. 
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2.5.2 Robustness tests  
The regressions performed so far are based on three main 
assumptions: the number of lags suggested by the criteria is correct; the 
expected volatility is measurable using the latest volatility data; and the risk 
of the investment in government bonds is correctly measured by the 
spread. The first assumption is particularly relevant, given the sensitivity of 
VAR models to the choice of the number of lags. The others may cause 
inconsistent estimations due to the use of inaccurate measures of the 
phenomenon under analysis if inappropriate variables have been chosen. 
Therefore, in this section I test if the results hold also with different 
lags of the variables and with different measures of the risk related to the 
government bonds and market volatility.  
 
One of the most debated topics in VAR literature is the lag order 
selection. Although information criteria are generally used (Brooks 2007, 
Lutkepohl 2007) to select the lag order of VARs, Lutkepohl suggests a 
criterion based on the likelihood ratio statistic (sequential modified 
likelihood ratio). On the basis of this criterion the best lag order at 5% 
significance is five (the chosen starting maximum lag is six, consistent with 
the evidence that the data shows a weekend effect, as reported below; see 
table 2.7).  
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The results of the regression (2.7) with five lags are reported in table 
2.5 and show that, notwithstanding the higher order and the reduced 
efficiency of the model (in terms of information criteria, see the lag order 
selection part of table 2.2), the core results do not change: the VaR ratio 
with one lag is significant (at 5%) with the expected positive sign (column 
a); the VaR ratio with two lags is negative and significant at 5% (column a) 
thus confirming the overshooting effect. The model is stable and there is no 
autocorrelation (at 1%) up to lag 10. 
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Table 2.5. Vector autoregression – volatility, VaR ratio and spread 
(LR lag order)  
 Variables 
Volatility  
(a) 
VaR ratio 
(b) 
Spread ITA-GER 
(c) 
Volatility (-1)  0.922***  0.079 -0.394 
  (0.054)  (0.403)  (0.325) 
Volatility (-2) -0.009  0.173  0.208 
  (0.073)  (0.547)  (0.442) 
Volatility (-3)  0.068  0.310  0.268 
  (0.072)  (0.540)  (0.436) 
Volatility (-4)  0.022 -0.794  0.197 
  (0.070)  (0.524)  (0.423) 
Volatility (-5) -0.156***  0.306 -0.011 
  (0.050)  (0.379)  (0.306) 
 
   
VaR ratio (-1)  0.016**  0.816***  0.093** 
  (0.007)  (0.055)  (0.044) 
VaR ratio (-2) -0.020**  0.025 -0.058 
  (0.009)  (0.071)  (0.057) 
VaR ratio (-3) -0.003 -0.070 -0.007 
  (0.010)  (0.072)  (0.058) 
VaR ratio (-4)  0.007  0.183**  0.001 
  (0.010)  (0.071)  (0.057) 
VaR ratio (-5) -0.002 -0.019  0.006 
  (0.007)  (0.055)  (0.044) 
 
   
Spread ITA-GER (-1)  0.005 -0.027  0.994*** 
  (0.009)  (0.067)  (0.054) 
Spread ITA-GER (-2)  0.003  0.072 -0.033 
  (0.013)  (0.095)  (0.077) 
Spread ITA-GER (-3) -0.032*** -0.043 -0.079 
  (0.013)  (0.096)  (0.077) 
Spread ITA-GER (-4)  0.029*** -0.165* -0.078 
  (0.013)  (0.099)  (0.080) 
Spread ITA-GER (-5)  0.004  0.149**  0.132** 
  (0.009)  (0.069)  (0.056) 
    
Constant -0.000 -0.000  0.0004 
  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Lag order selected on the basis of the Lutkepohl’s LR. Variables: simple average of the VaR 
ratio (VaR divided the value of the internal limit), volatility of the returns of the index; the 
spread between reference government bonds of Italy and Germany. The (-1) … (-5) labels 
after a variable name stand for lag 1 … lag 5 respectively. Daily data on Italian banks and 
Italian financial market from April 2012 to December 2013. *** - significant at 0.01 level, 
** - significant at 0.05 level, * - significant at 0.1 level. Number of observations: 346. 
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As in the previous section, if I change the VaR ratio to the VaR on HFT 
ratio, the lag order suggested by the LR statistics is six and the significance 
of the VaR variable at lag one fades away (Table 2.6, column a), although the 
model remains  stable and with no autocorrelation (at 1%) up to lag 10. 
 
For market volatility, the variable used is based on the past realization 
of actual volatility. However, VaR is based on expected volatility, hence it is 
useful to check if the relation and the Granger causality would change if a 
different measure of the expected future volatility is used. It is worth noting 
that the market volatility variable based on past results does contain some 
know regularities (autocorrelation, ARCH effect) typical of several financial 
time series which may affect the results of the regressions (see section 2.3 
and 2.3.1 about endogeneity and reverse causality); therefore the 
substitution of the 10-day volatility with the GARCH estimated volatility 
helps also to control for the effect of autocorrelations.  
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Table 2.6.    Vector autoregression – volatility, VaR on HFT and spread 
 Variables 
Volatility 
(a) 
VaR on HFT 
(b) 
Spread ITA-GER 
(c) 
Volatility (-1)  0.894*** -0.001 -0.359 
  (0.055)  (0.001)  (0.333) 
Volatility (-2) -0.009  0.001  0.277 
  (0.074)  (0.001)  (0.447) 
Volatility (-3)  0.087  0.000  0.197 
  (0.073)  (0.001)  (0.442) 
Volatility (-4)  0.031 -0.001  0.315 
  (0.072)  (0.001)  (0.436) 
Volatility (-5) -0.096  0.002 -0.774* 
  (0.070)  (0.001)  (0.426) 
Volatility (-6) -0.079 -0.002*  0.719** 
  (0.052)  (0.001)  (0.314)     
VaR on HFT (-1) 2.370  0.825*** 12.959 
 (3.326)  (0.056) (20.016) 
VaR on HFT (-2) -7.390*  0.049 -4.633 
 (4.297)  (0.072) (25.857) 
VaR on HFT (-3) 4.916 -0.035 -22.407 
 (4.306)  (0.072) (25.910) 
VaR on HFT (-4) 1.218  0.097 3.063 
 (4.357)  (0.073) (26.215) 
VaR on HFT (-5) -0.708  0.013 19.588 
 (3.684)  (0.062) (22.168) 
VaR on HFT (-6) -2.111 -0.017 -9.178 
 (1.653)  (0.028) (9.950)     
Spread ITA-GER (-1)  0.003 -0.0001  0.989*** 
  (0.009)  (0.0001)  (0.055) 
Spread ITA-GER (-2)  0.003  0.0001 -0.010 
  (0.013)  (0.0002)  (0.077) 
Spread ITA-GER (-3) -0.026*** -0.000 -0.111 
  (0.013)  (0.0002)  (0.078) 
Spread ITA-GER (-4)  0.026*** -0.0004* -0.068 
  (0.013)  (0.0002)  (0.080) 
Spread ITA-GER (-5) -0.010  0.0001  0.082 
  (0.013)  (0.0002)  (0.080) 
Spread ITA-GER (-6)  0.012  0.0002  0.046 
  (0.009)  (0.0002)  (0.057) 
    
Constant -0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Note. Vector autoregression among the simple average of the VaR divided by the HFT portfolio, 
the volatility of the index returns and the spread between government bonds of Italy and 
Germany. The (-1) … (-6) labels stand for lag 1 … lag 6 respectively. Daily data on Italian banks 
and Italian financial market from April 2012 to December 2013. *** - significant at 0.01 level, 
** - significant at 0.05 level, * - significant at 0.1 level. Number of observations: 334. 
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Therefore, I computed a different measure for volatility using the 
ARMA-GARCH model, thus cleaning the autocorrelation effects from the 
time series. To estimate the ARMA I initially performed the usual checks on 
the series of the returns of the Italian stock index. This series has no unit 
roots; hence it can be used without applying any procedures to have 
stationarity, and shows autocorrelation for various lags (Ljung-Box 
statistics reject the null of absence of autocorrelation). On the basis of the 
information criteria (AIC, SIC), the model which takes into account 
autocorrelation of the data used is an ARMA(1,1), with a seasonal moving 
average at the 5th lag (see table 2.7).  
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Table 2.7. Returns of the Italian market index (ARMA model) 
Variables Coefficients 
  
C 0.00 
(0.00) 
  
AR(1) 0.59** 
(0.24) 
  
MA(1) -0.64*** 
(0.23) 
  
Seasonal-MA(5) -0.13*** 
(0.05) 
Dependent variable: daily returns of the index. AR(1) is the variable for the autoregressive 
component of order 1; MA(1) is the variable for the moving average component of order 
1, Seasonal-MA(5) is the variable for the seasonal moving average of order 5.  
Level of significance:  * - significant at 10%, ** - significant at 5%, *** - significant at 1% 
Number of observations: 455. 
 
The seasonal variable helps the model to incorporate the weekend 
effect, typical of financial market series. Table 2.8 show the average returns 
for weekdays (column a), with an evident difference between returns for 
Fridays and Mondays.  
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Table 2.8. Returns of the index for weekdays. Summary statistics 
Weekday Mean 
(a) 
Maximum 
(b) 
Minimum 
(c) 
Std. Dev. 
(d) 
Observations 
(e) 
      
Monday -0.001 0.0300 -0.046 0.0151 91 
      
Tuesday 0.001 0.0361 -0.051 0.0160 92 
      
Wednesday -0.00 0.0373 -0.037 0.0150 91 
      
Thursday 0.002 0.0547 -0.047 0.0159 91 
      
Friday 0.001 0.063 -0.044 0.0159 91 
      
Sample 0.000 0.064 -0.051 0.0156 456 
Daily returns of the index computed on the closing price of the Italian index (FTSE MIB). 
Time window from 1 April 2012 to 31 December 2013. Source: Datastream. 
 
The model so structured solves the problem of autocorrelations of 
residuals, is stationary and invertible. However, the squared residuals show 
strong autocorrelation at least up to one month, which is a sign of 
conditional heteroscedasticity. In fact, the heteroscedasticity ARCH-LM 
(autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity, Lagrange multiplier) test 
refutes the null of absence of ARCH in the residuals. Hence I complemented 
the model with an ARCH framework; the one which fits the dynamics of the 
data and has the lowest value of the usual information criteria is the 
GARCH(1,1), with no asymmetry and a t-student distribution of residuals 
(table 2.9).  
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Table 2.9. GARCH model – variance equation 
     
Variables Coefficients 
  
C 0.00 
(0.00) 
  
RESIDUAL(-1)2  -0.02** 
(0.01) 
  
GARCH(-1)  1.01*** 
(0.01) 
  
Variance equation: Dependent variable: variance of the daily returns. RESIDUAL(-1)2 is the 
first term of a GARCH(1,1) model (error squared, lagged 1); GARCH(-1) is the second term 
of a standard GARCH(1,1) model (variance lagged 1).  
Level of significance:  * - significant at 10%, ** - significant at 5%, *** - significant at 1% 
Number of observations included for the regressions: 455. 
  
With respect to other models (GARCH, Threshold-ARCH, Exponential-
GARCH, Power-ARCH) and other distributions of residuals (normal or 
generalized error distribution) this model has two important advantages: 
(i) it has the lowest value of the Akaike information criterion among those 
with significant coefficients for the variance equation; (ii) it cleans the 
correlogram of squared residuals (non-reject of the null of absence of 
correlation) and passes the ARCH-LM test (the null of absence of further 
ARCH effects is not rejected). The result is in line with other studies which 
found that models with t-student distribution of residuals have better 
statistical features given the non-normality (fat tails) of the financial series 
(Talpsepp and Rieger 2010).  
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The VAR framework of the regression (2.7), where the volatility is 
measured by GARCH and the number of optimal lags is one (SIC criterion), 
confirms the existence of a relation flowing from the VaR ratio towards 
market volatility (Granger causality at 10%). The results of the regression 
reported in table 2.10 show the significance, even at a lower level, of the 
VaR ratio at lag one in the regression having market volatility (GARCH) as a 
dependent variable (column a). In addition, the relation between spread 
and the VaR ratio is confirmed (column c, significance at 5%).  
 
Table 2.10. Vector autoregression – market volatility (GARCH), VaR 
ratio and spread 
Variables 
Volatility 
(GARCH) 
(a) 
VaR ratio (on 
internal limit) 
(b) 
Spread ITA-GER 
(c) 
    
Volatility GARCH(-1) 0.992*** 0.044 0.167 
 (0.004) (0.194) (0.15) 
    
VaR ratio (-1) 0.001* 0.907*** 0.031** 
 (0.0004) (0.02) (0.016) 
    
Spread ITA-GER (-1) -0.000 -0.014 0.944*** 
 (-0.00) (-0.02) (0.02) 
    
Constant 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.00) (0.003) (0.002) 
  
   
Vector autoregression among the simple average of the VaR ratio (VaR divided by internal 
limit), the volatility of the returns of the index estimated with a GARCH model, and the 
spread between reference government bonds of Italy and Germany. The (-1) label after a 
variable name stands for lag 1. Daily data on Italian banks and Italian financial market 
from April 2012 to December 2013. *** - significant at 0.01 level, ** - significant at 0.05 
level, * - significant at 0.1 level 
Number of observations: 401. 
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If I substitute the VaR ratio with the VaR divided by the amount of the 
HFT portfolio, the VaR variable (with volatility as dependent variable) 
becomes not significant (table 2.11, column a) and Granger causality 
disappears, thus confirming that it was due to the regulatory limit .
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Table 2.11. Vector autoregression – market volatility (GARCH), VaR on HFT and spread 
Variables 
Volatility 
(a) 
VaR on HFT 
(b) 
Spread ITA-GER 
(c) 
 
   
Volatility (-1) 1.038*** -0.002 -1.62 
 (0.05) (0.006) (2.00) 
Volatility (-2) -0.043 0.002 1.83 
 (0.05) (0.00) (1.99) 
 
   
VaR on HFT (-1) 0.125 0.916*** -1.68 
 (0.29) (0.03) (11.6) 
VaR on HFT (-2) 0.30 -0.001 -1.60 
 (0.25) (0.03) (9.58) 
    
Spread ITA-GER (-1) -0.000 -0.000 1.03*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) 
Spread ITA-GER (-2) 0.000 0.000 -0.09** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) 
 
   
Constant 0.000 0.000 -0.003 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.002) 
Vector autoregression among the simple average of the VaR on HFT (VaR divided by the value of the held for trade portfolio), the volatility of 
the returns of the index, and the spread between reference government bonds of Italy and Germany. The (-1) and (-2) labels after a variable 
name stand for lag 1 and lag 2 respectively. Daily data on Italian banks and Italian financial market from April 2012 to December 2013. *** 
- significant at 0.1 level, ** - significant at 0.05 level, * - significant at 0.1 level. 
Number of observations: 387. 
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For the second robustness test, I tested the sensitivity of the result to 
the spread variable. Hence, I reperformed the VAR tests by substituting the 
variable spread, with a variable more similar to the one used in value at risk 
model, that is the standard deviation of the volatility of returns of the Italian 
government bonds. I calculate the change of the daily yield of the BTP and 
computed the ten-day standard deviation (that is the regulatory time 
horizon for value at risk). The time series has no unit root, when detrended.  
The significance of the VaR ratio with the right positive sign at lag one 
and the overshooting effect (negative sign at lag two) are confirmed (table 
2.12, column a); the yield volatility variable is strongly significant at lag two 
with the expected positive sign, showing that the increased volatility at time 
t-2 has an impact on the VaR ratio at time t-1 and affects volatility at time t.  
Granger causality is confirmed, too. 
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Table 2.12. Vector autoregression – market volatility, VaR ratio and volatility of the spread 
 Variables 
Market volatility 
(a) 
VaR ratio (on internal 
limit) 
(b) 
Volatility of the yield of 
the reference Italian 
government bond (BTP) 
(c) 
    
Market volatility (-1) 0.942*** 0.149 -0.083 
 (0.05) (0.36) (0.07) 
Market volatility (-2) -0.035 -0.053 0.033 
 (0.05) (0.36) (0.07) 
    
VaR ratio (-1) 0.016** 0.835*** -0.016* 
 (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) 
VaR ratio (-2) -0.016** 0.09* 0.010 
 (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) 
    
BTP Yield Volatility (-1) -0.067* 0.220 0.968*** 
 (0.03) (0.26) (0.05) 
BTP Yield Volatility (-2) 0.099*** -0.233 -0.045 
 (0.03) (0.26) (0.05) 
    
Constant 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Vector autoregression among the simple average of the VaR Ratio (VaR divided by internal limit), the volatility of the returns of the index, and 
the volatility of the yield of the reference government bonds of Italy. The (-1) and (-2) labels after a variable name stand for lag 1 and lag 2 
respectively. Daily data on Italian banks and Italian financial market from April 2012 to December 2013. *** - significant at 0.1 level, ** - 
significant at 0.05 level, * - significant at 0.1 level. 
Number of observations: 383. 
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2.6 Conclusions 
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 is a good starting point to discuss the 
impact of micro-regulation (regulation of single financial intermediaries) 
on macro behaviour or macro variables (e.g. financial stability, liquidity of 
the system). 
Various theoretical studies have found a relation between micro and 
macro via value at risk (VaR), a measure of market risk used by several 
banks and also included in some regulatory documents, by finding an 
amplification effect of shocks (on market volatility) of VaR constraints 
imposed on individual investors (banks). Large amounts of theoretical 
(Danielsson et al. 2004) and empirical (Adrian and Shin 2010) literature 
support the existence of an amplification effect of shocks due to VaR 
constraints. On the basis of Danielsson et al. (2004) the main channel of 
transmission of the amplification effect, in a theoretical framework with a 
VaR constraint, is the adjustments of the investors’ expected returns and 
covariances and the related increase of risk aversion caused by the 
constraint. This chapter provides new empirical evidence of the fact that a 
measure of the tightness of  VaR ratio for Italian banks Granger-causes the 
variation of the volatility of the index of the Italian financial market, giving 
support to the theoretical results obtained by the relevant literature, and 
complementing the existing empirical evidence based on US data. I also 
found a significant positive relation (and Granger causality), although at a 
lower significance level, between the VaR ratio and the expected volatility 
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measured by the GARCH model, seen as a measure of volatility expected by 
investors, thus providing empirical evidence of the “expectation channel” 
described by Danielsson (2004) as the way used by the VaR constraint to 
amplify shocks. The above mentioned relation has been found for the Italian 
market, where the impact of behaviours of Italian banks on the local stock 
exchange is more directly visible than in other, more internationalized, 
financial system such as  the US, for which literature has found similar 
results but in a more indirect way. In fact, for the US market Adrian and Shin 
(2010) show the existence of an indirect nexus between VaR and VIX in two 
steps, by using data related only to five investment banks and by running 
two different regressions based on two different datasets. More specifically, 
they show that the growth of leverage is negatively related to the lagged 
growth of VaR and positively related to the growth of repos (quarterly 
data). In an additional regression, they show that the variation of implied 
volatility is negatively related to the lagged growth of repo (weekly data). 
Therefore, from the research of Adrian and Shin (2010), an indirect, 
positive relation between change of VaR and VIX appears to exist.  
The results obtained in this chapter confirm the assumptions about 
the existence of the amplification effect on the volatility of the market 
caused by the existence of risk limits, in line with the results presented in 
several theoretical models (Danielsson et al. 2010, Adrian and Shin 2006, 
Cont and Wagalath 2014). Furthermore, the main findings complement the 
existing empirical literature (Adrian and Shin 2010).  
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In addition, I also got some empirical confirmation about the positive 
relation between the increase of other, market-related risks (namely, 
sovereign risk) and market volatility and I found some evidence of the 
overshooting effects on market volatility of the application of risk limits.  
As stated in the introduction, Janet Yellen pointed out the effect that 
methods of modern risk management and value at risk may have had on the 
intensification of the cycle (Danielsson et al. 2010). On the basis of the 
empirical relation found in this chapter, some doubts about unintended 
consequences of VaR constraints are confirmed: VaR measures used to 
control individual behaviour and to reduce risk to banks may have an 
amplification effect on market volatility thus affecting the results of the 
banks which could be induced, by the interaction of the increased volatility 
and tightening risk limit, to fire sell some assets.  
Therefore, from a policy point of view, setting limits on market risk in 
order to contain risks (and losses) of individual banks, if not supplemented 
with decisions concerning the increase of risks at a macro level, produces 
the unintended effect of increasing market volatility, thus potentially 
triggering fire sales and increasing losses of banks. Any possible changes to 
market risk regulation should therefore try to break such relation between 
individual constraints and market volatility by using risk limits which are 
less directly related to market volatility or by adding some additional rules 
which can limit or monitor the amplification effect. 
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From the research side, this result draws attention to the matter and 
requires further analysis to define a theoretical framework to better 
understand the theoretical channels and dynamics on which this empirical 
evidence is grounded and to offer additional evidence about the direction 
to follow in order to improve regulation and risk management practices.  
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Chapter 3. Risk limits and portfolio allocation in a mean-variance 
world 
 
3.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in chapter 2, in most crises when macroeconomic 
conditions worsen, the risk appetite of financial agents declines and 
investors start to cut their risk exposures by selling assets thus impacting 
the rest of the financial system and causing the deterioration of the whole 
market.  
The consequent fall in prices and increase of standard risk measures 
(such as volatility) determines an additional reduction of the exposure to 
risky assets, thus feeding the vicious circle.  
The financial crisis of ten years ago reheated debates on endogeneity 
of risk, pro-cyclicality of regulation and the impact on systemic risk of 
prudential rules and risk management techniques. 
In 2010, the former chairman of the Fed, Ben Bernanke, argued that 
the financial crisis was a failure of economic engineering (i.e. risk-
management techniques of financial institutions and financial regulatory 
system) and economic management (i.e. management of complex financial 
institutions and day-to-day supervision of these institutions).  
During the period, risk management techniques had become 
widespread. In particular, value at risk (VaR) has become the standard 
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measure of market risk since it summarizes in a single, easy-to-understand 
number the downside risk arising out of financial market variability (Jorion 
2007). Given its useful characteristics (i.e. it provides a common measure 
of risk across different positions and risk factors and enables aggregation 
of risks of positions taking into account the ways in which risk factors 
correlate with each other), VaR is still widely used to monitor market risk 
among practitioners. In addition, the Basel Accords chose it as a measure of 
risk limit and as the basis for regulatory capital calculation. 
However, during the crisis, risk management and, especially, risk 
limits and VaR, appear to have amplified the shock of the financial crisis (see 
chapter 2), as underlined by Danielsson et al. (2010) and Adrian and Shin 
(2010). Although much of the literature agrees on the amplification effect 
due to risk limits, the relationship between such risk limits and investment 
decisions, which can cause such amplification, is still unclear. The existence 
of an amplification effect of shocks may be explained by an excess of 
investment in risky assets under VaR constraints, which is then corrected 
(even with fire sales) in periods of shocks (Basak and Shapiro 2001); 
however, the fact that risk constraint causes an excess of investment in 
risky assets is counterintuitive and not in line with the goals of regulators 
which impose risk limits to reduce the exposure of individual investors to 
risky assets. Hence, understanding the impact of risk limits on investor’s 
decisions is not straightforward, given the existence of the amplification 
effect. The data on the topic in literature are contradictory too.  
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Alexander and Baptista (2002), in a mean-value at risk (mean-VaR) 
framework, found that risk-averse agents may end up selecting portfolios 
with larger standard deviation (thus riskier) if they switch from variance to 
VaR as a measure of risk. Along the same line, Basak and Shapiro (2001) 
show that regulation leads financial institutions to take on higher exposure 
to risky assets and that the presence of VaR risk management amplifies 
stock market volatility. 
In contrast with previous results, Cuoco and Isaenko (2008) found that 
the risk exposure of a trader subject to a VaR limit is always lower than that 
of an unconstrained trader. Yiu (2004) also founds that VaR may reduce 
allocation to risky assets.  
None of the above-mentioned articles searched for empirical support 
of the theoretical results found.  
In this chapter I find that, in a theoretical mean-variance framework 
when VaR constraint binds, investments in risky assets decrease. 
Specifically, I obtain a new closed formula for the allocation of wealth 
between risky and risk-free assets for VaR-constrained investors, and I 
provide new empirical evidence in support of the formula obtained. The 
theoretical result supports the literature claiming that VaR constraint 
reduces risky investments, as expected by regulators, and it is a step toward 
understanding both the theoretical framework standing behind the 
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behaviour of VaR-constrained investors and the impact of imposing risk 
limits on investors.  
The approach of analysing the impact of a VaR limit on investors’ 
decisions is not completely new in literature; however, previous articles are 
not focused on portfolio allocations (e.g. Basak and Shapiro (2001) focus on 
the terminal wealth of a VaR agent). Other researchers solve the problem 
by using numerical methods (e.g. Yiu 2004) or perform a graphical analysis 
of the effect of the constraint (e.g. Sentana 2001), without searching for a 
closed formula. To the best of my knowledge, no previous paper found a 
closed formula for portfolio allocation between riskless and risky assets in 
a mean-variance framework. In addition, unlike several papers on the topic 
I performed some empirical tests, limited to Italy, which confirm that the 
constrained optimization solution found in the theoretical part of the 
chapter is more accurate in forecasting bank’s risky investments than the 
unconstrained one. The empirical test was conducted using mixed-data 
sampling (MIDAS) regressions in order to exploit the information content 
of higher frequency data. I limited the empirical analysis geographically to 
the Italian banking and financial markets which are large enough to be 
explored, but not internationalized enough to have the relations between 
the domestic financial market and national banks significantly affected by 
non-domestic banks. In fact, in 2011, one of the first years included in the 
time window used in the empirical analysis, the share of stocks held by 
foreign investors (in terms of market capitalization) was lower in Italy than 
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in other large European countries (Spain, France, United Kingdom, 
Germany) (Observatoire de l’Epargne Europeene 2013). In the same year, 
the share of government securities held domestically was higher in Italy 
than in other large European countries (Andritzky 2012).  
This chapter is structured as follows: section 3.2 describes the 
relevant literature, section 3.3 introduces the theoretical framework used, 
and section 3.4 describes the empirical tests, while section 3.5 concludes. 
 
3.2 The effects of risk limits: relevant literature  
In the Markowitz model, risk is the variability of returns of the 
investors’ portfolio. As such it is measured by standard deviation or 
variance. However, variance is not necessarily sufficient for capturing risk 
since two distributions with different shapes and different downside risk 
can have the same variance (Rosenberg and Schuermann 2004). In such 
cases measures such as skewness and kurtosis may complement variance 
to quantify risks.  
Another way to overcome the drawbacks of variance is to examine the 
percentiles of the distribution, as in the value at risk (VaR) approach. Jorion 
(2007) argues that the greatest advantage of VaR is that it summarizes in a 
single, easy-to-understand number, the downside risk arising out of 
financial market variability for any institution. Furthermore, VaR provides 
a common measure of risk across different positions and risk factors, 
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enables aggregating the risks of positions taking into account the ways in 
which risk factors correlate with each other, and takes full account of all 
driving risk factors (other traditional measures, such as the Greeks, look at 
one risk factor at a time). Such additional characteristics give VaR an edge 
over traditional risk assessment methods; therefore, VaR is widely used 
among practitioners to monitor market risk. Furthermore, the Basel 
Accords acknowledge the important role of VaR by choosing it as a risk limit 
measure and as the basis for regulatory capital calculation.  
 
3.2.1 Theoretical approaches 
The impact of VaR-based constraints on investment decisions has 
been studied in literature with mixed results.  
Alexander and Baptista (2002) compared mean-VaR and mean-
variance frontiers and found that the standard deviation (hence, the risk 
level) of the optimal portfolio of a risk-averse agent may increase if the 
investor decides to use VaR as the relevant measure of risk. In their article 
they examined the effects of VaR by substituting value at risk to standard 
deviation in the standard mean-variance framework, thus describing a new 
mean-value at risk setting. Using the same line of reasoning, Tsao (2010) 
suggested that the traditional mean-variance framework for portfolio 
selection should be revised when the investor’s concern was the VaR 
instead of the standard deviation, incorporated VaR in the portfolio 
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selection process, and proposed a mean-VaR efficient frontier. He 
concluded that risk-averse investors might allocate wealth inefficiently if 
decisions were based on the mean-variance framework instead of the 
mean-VaR setting, where inefficiency is measured using the loss of return 
given a level of risk. More recently, Tsafack and Tchana (2019), in a 
Markowitz setup, found that VaR restrictions affected manager 
performance even more negatively than other restrictions such as short 
selling constraints, especially in a more volatile market.  
Therefore, for these studies the use of VaR instead of volatility or 
variance as a measure of risk, significantly affects portfolio allocation 
choices and portfolio performances. For portfolio allocation, the use of VaR 
causes an increase in portfolio risk (Alexander and Baptista 2002, Tsao 
2010).  
A second strand of literature examines investment decisions under 
VaR constraints, with mixed results. Basak and Shapiro (2001) analysed the 
effects of VaR-based risk management on optimal wealth, consumption 
choices and portfolio decisions. In their model, risk managers are utility 
maximizers (with utility derived from wealth) in an ongoing economic 
setting and must comply with a VaR constraint. This requires wealth to 
decrease below a given floor only with a pre-specified probability. Their 
model shows that regulation may lead financial institutions to accept higher 
exposure to risky assets, supporting also the idea that, in a regulated 
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framework, losses are larger when they occur. Furthermore, Basak and 
Shapiro showed that the presence of VaR risk management amplifies stock 
market volatility at times of down markets and attenuates the volatility at 
times of up markets. Along the same line, and in the same period, Sentana 
(2001) focuses on mean-variance allocation with VaR constraints. He 
considered a world with one riskless asset and a finite number of risky 
assets. In this world, Sentana introduced three basic building blocks – 
mean-variance portfolio frontiers, mean-variance indifference curves, and 
iso-VaRs – to find the best portfolio allocation with a VaR cap. Specifically, 
he starts from a portfolio selected with the mean-variance approach, then 
he determines the degree of leverage for the chosen position and some iso-
VaRs, which are graphical lines of portfolios which share the same VaR (for 
a fixed probability level) in an expected excess return-standard deviation 
plan. Finally, he concludes that the existence of a VaR constraint is a cost for 
a fund manager in terms of lower return (but also lower risk) and a lower 
Sharpe ratio.  
Additional evidence with results differing from Basak and Shapiro’s 
(2001), comes from the analysis of Yiu (2004), who formulate a constrained 
utility maximization problem in a continuous time setting to look at the 
optimal portfolio when value at risk is imposed. Using numerical methods, 
Yiu found that when portfolio value increases, the VaR is active and the 
allocation to risky assets is reduced. Cuoco and Isaenko (2008) present a 
framework where expected utility of the terminal value of the trading 
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portfolio is maximized, subject to the constraint that the VaR of the portfolio 
is not larger than some pre-specified level. In this framework, based on 
numerical computations founded on assumed values of the parameters, 
they find that, when VaR is re-evaluated dynamically, the risk exposure of a 
trader subject to a VaR limit is always lower than the one of an 
unconstrained trader.  
Alexander and Baptista (2002), in a mean-variance framework with a 
VaR constraint, find that under specific circumstances (i.e. highly risk 
averse banks whose unconstrained optimal portfolio lies on the efficient 
frontier above the minimum variance portfolio but below the VaR-
constrained portfolio), regulation may cause an increase of the standard 
deviation of the optimal portfolio and of the probability of extreme losses; 
more generally, they show that when a VaR constraint is imposed it is 
plausible that certain banks will end up selecting riskier portfolios. 
Lastly, a third wave of studies on risk management have emerged from 
the beginning of the 2007-09 crisis (and some years before). These papers 
mainly focus on some unintended consequences of systemic risk of the VaR 
constraint (e.g. pro-cyclicality, amplification effect) and some possible 
distortions (or changes in behaviour) determined on allocation choices. In 
the strand of literature concerning the systemic effect of the constraint, Shin 
(2010) looks at the balance sheets of investors to find a pro-cyclical effect 
of the VaR constraint. Specifically, he shows that when VaR is less binding 
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(and investors’ equity is larger than necessary), investors use the slack in 
the balance sheet to purchase additional risky securities thus causing an 
amplified response (overshooting) to improvements in fundamentals. Cont 
and Wagalath (2013) model the impact of fire sales on volatility and 
correlations to find that the more widespread a security is in portfolios of 
different financial agents, the higher the amplification effect and the cost of 
imposing common behaviour via regulatory constraints. Danielsson et al. 
(2012) set a model where VaR constraints have a role in the amplification 
effect on volatility caused by deleveraging and found also that when risk is 
regulated, prices are lower and volatility is higher; hence, price fluctuation 
is higher. Kaplanski and Levy (2015) reach the conclusion that with VaR 
regulation institutions face a new regulated capital market line which 
induces resource allocation distortion in the economy. Only when a riskless 
asset is available will VaR regulation induce an institution to reduce risk 
otherwise regulation may both cause risk to increase and asset allocation 
to be distorted. More recently, Vasileiou and Samitas (2020) examined the 
data of five European market indexes, to confirm that VaR models based on 
historical data contribute to pro-cyclicality and overreaction in the stock 
market.  
In summary, on the basis of the contributions of the above-mentioned 
articles, VaR constraint seems to have a negative impact on the returns of 
the investors and seems to determine larger losses when a loss occurs. With 
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regards to portfolio allocation, the literature provides no concordant 
evidence that VaR constraints cause a decrease of risky investments.  
In this chapter I investigate the impact of VaR constraint on portfolio 
allocation by assuming that investors take decisions on the basis of the 
mean-variance framework where VaR is a constraint.  
The approach of analysing the impact of VaR limit on investors’ 
decisions is not completely new in literature; however, previous articles are 
not focused on portfolio allocations (e.g. Basak and Shapiro (2001), who 
examined the terminal wealth of a VaR agent). Other researchers (Yiu 2004) 
analyse the problem in a continuous-time setting and solve it by using 
numerical methods, without looking for a closed formula. Sentana (2001) 
bases his solution on a graphical analysis of the problem with Iso-VaR lines. 
Therefore, no previous papers have found a closed formula for portfolio 
allocation between riskless and risky assets in a mean-variance framework.  
The mean-variance framework is a cornerstone of the investment 
analysis, and related literature often uses it as a benchmark or as a starting 
point of several studies, some mentioned in this section. Furthermore, 
mean and variance, the coordinates to measure return and risk, are still 
widely used by practitioners around the world. In fact, as documented by 
Eun and Lee (2010), one of the effects of the increased financial integration 
among developed countries has been the significant convergence of the 
risk-return characteristics of 17 developed stock markets (Italy included), 
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as it happens when common variables and models are widely used by the 
practitioners. Therefore, in the empirical part of the chapter I use the mean-
variance framework to compare the results obtained for the risk-
constrained scenario. 
From the theoretical framework I find that under a mean-variance 
setup, and if constraint binds, risky investments depend solely on risk 
variables (and not on returns) and are lower than in the unconstrained 
scenario, as expected. In addition, differing from several papers on the 
topic, I perform empirically tests on the result obtained in the theoretical 
part. 
 
3.2.2 Empirical literature 
By moving the focus to empirical articles there is relatively little 
research which deals contemporaneously with portfolio optimization and 
value at risk constraints. Among the most relevant, Puelz (2001) presents 
four models with VaR limits applied to portfolio decisions; one of the 
frameworks is the standard mean-variance. By using monthly returns of six 
national indices (for 1984-1999) and simulated scenarios, he concludes 
that VaR-optimal portfolios are more likely to incur large losses when 
losses occur. Campbell et al. (2001), in the empirical part of their study, 
recognize that VaR is successful in containing exposure to risky assets since 
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they find that the higher the confidence level of VaR the lower the portion 
of the portfolio invested in risky assets.  
However, to the best of my knowledge, no study has directly tested the 
relation between the theoretical result of a risk-constrained portfolio 
allocation problem and the actual allocation choices of investors. In this 
chapter, based on data of financial markets and data coming from the 
supervisory reporting, after having found a solution to the constrained 
optimization problem, I find that this is more accurate in forecasting banks’ 
behaviour than the standard, unconstrained mean-variance setup.  
 
3.3 Theoretical framework: risk limits in the mean variance 
framework 
Risk management, based on variance-type measures of risk, is 
inherently incorporated in the Markowitz mean-variance framework; 
hence, it is almost natural to add a risk limit to such a framework in order 
to study the impact of risk limits on the optimal solution.  
In this section I solve the problem of maximizing mean-variance utility 
of the investors, under a VaR constraint, to find that the portion of wealth 
invested in risky assets is lower for VaR-constrained investors than for 
unconstrained ones.  
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3.3.1 Standard mean-variance framework 
The starting point of the exercise is the mean-variance framework 
used by Bacchetta et al. (2012) where investors maximize mean-variance 
utility over their portfolio return as follows: 
 
max
𝛼𝑡
𝐸𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝 ) − 0.5𝛾 [𝜎𝑡
2(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝 )]   (3.1) 
 
where γ measures risk aversion, 𝜎𝑡
2(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝 ) is the variance of portfolio 
returns at t+1 expected at time t,  𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝
 is the portfolio return at time t+1:  
 
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝 =  𝛼𝑡 𝐸𝑡 (𝑅𝑡+1
𝑘 ) +  (1 − 𝛼𝑡) 𝑅  (3.2) 
 
therefore also 𝜎𝑡
2(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝 ) depends on 𝛼𝑡 . 
In (3.2), αt stands for the share of the portfolio invested in equity, R is 
the gross return of free-risk bonds and 𝐸𝑡 (𝑅𝑡+1
𝑘 ) is the return on the equity 
at t+1. The equity return is computed as follows: 
 
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑘 =  
𝐴𝑡+1+𝑄𝑡+1
𝑄𝑡
    (3.3) 
 
91 
 
where 𝑄𝑡+1 is the tomorrow’s equity price, 𝐴𝑡 represents the dividends 
and 𝐴𝑡 = ?̅? + 𝑚 𝑆𝑡 with S as an exogenous state variable that follows a 
stochastic process and Ā is the constant dividend when m=0. 
 
From the maximization condition, Bacchetta et al. (2012) find that the 
portion invested in equity is equal to: 
 
𝛼𝑡 =
𝐸𝑡 (𝑅𝑡+1
𝑘 )− 𝑅
𝛾 𝜎𝑡
2 ( 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑘 )
      (3.4) 
 
PROPOSITION 3.1: In an overlapping generation setup where investors 
have an endowment W and purchase risk-free bonds (yielding an exogenous 
constant return R) and risky equity (yielding a gross return of 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑘 ) and 
maximize mean-variance utility, the portion of wealth invested in risky assets 
(unconstrained alpha) is positively related to the excess return of the risky 
asset and inversely related to the expected variance of the risky assets: 
 
Therefore, the portion of wealth invested in risky assets increases if 
the excess returns of equity with respect to bonds increases or if the 
variance of the expected returns decreases. The alpha obtained in (3.4) is 
the solution to the unconstrained maximization problem stated at (3.1). 
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3.3.2 Constrained mean-variance framework 
I now introduce a general risk-limit constraint in the following form: 
 
max
𝛼𝑡
𝐸𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝 ) − 0.5𝛾 [𝜎𝑡
2(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝 )]     
subject to: 𝑓[𝜎𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝 )] ≤ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡   (3.5) 
 
where f is positive linear in portfolio volatility; risk limit (hereafter RL) 
is a positive number and 𝜎𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝 ) is positive in alpha.  
The model represents the maximization problem faced by an investor 
subject to a market risk limit; the variable subject to the constraint is a 
measure of risk, such as a function of volatility of portfolio returns.  
From the constrained maximization procedure I find that when the 
constraint binds, investments in risky assets are represented as follows: 
 
f −1(σ𝑡(R𝑝,𝑡+1))=RL    (3.6) 
 
where f −1(σ𝑡(R𝑝,𝑡+1)) is the inverse of the risk function included in the 
constraint. Hence, the proportion of wealth invested in risky assets in the 
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case of binding constraint is related only to the function used to measure 
risk and to the risk limit.  
As expected, when the constraint does not bind, the proportion of 
wealth invested in risky assets is equal to (3.4); therefore, it is directly 
related to the excess return and inversely to the variance of risky assets.  
From the optimization procedure, I also find that: 
PROPOSITION 3.2: For any risk-constrained maximization of the form 
(3.5) either investment in risky assets is the same as in the unconstrained case, 
if constraint is not binding, or risky investment is strictly lower, if constraint 
binds.  
Proof is reported in appendix 3.A. 
 
3.3.3 VaR-based risk limit 
In this section I adapt the general results to the specific risk limit I am 
analyzing, which is the value at risk. VaR is a probabilistic metric of market 
risk used by banks and other investors to monitor risk exposure of their 
trading portfolios. Value at risk indicates the maximum loss expected on an 
investment, at a certain confidence level and over a given time horizon.  
VaR has become so widespread as a measure of risk, that in literature 
it is not unusual to assess investments in a mean-VaR mapping instead of 
the traditional mean-variance one (see, among others, Alexander and 
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Baptista 2006). However, this approach does not take into account that 
investment decisions (based on returns and volatility) and monitoring of 
the investment by the application of regulatory constraints (based on VaR) 
are two different steps of the investment process with the investment step 
preceding the monitoring phase. VaR affects the first step (i.e. the 
investment decisions) only as a constraint since investors cannot buy or sell 
some securities if such operations will cause a breach of VaR limit. 
Therefore, unlike the above-mentioned stream of literature, I assume that 
in ordinary investment activity the investment criteria are first based on 
the traditional risk-return (mean-variance) framework and, only in 
addition are VaR limits taken into account as a constraint. Hence, the VaR 
limits are more a constraint to the decision mechanisms than a variable of 
the risk-return mapping.  
Following Kaplanski and Levy (2015) and Alexander and Baptista 
(2002, 2006), I express value at risk as a positive number measured as 
𝑧𝜎𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝 ) where 𝜎𝑡 is the volatility of portfolio returns at t+1 expected at 
time t, and 𝑧 is the parameter corresponding to the chosen confidence level. 
If the returns are not assumed to be zero, VaR becomes 𝑧𝜎𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝 ) −
 𝐸𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝 ). In a VaR-limited investment process, investors would not buy a 
portfolio of securities with VaR higher than a risk limit V. In line with the 
general framework (3.5), the VaR-constrained maximization becomes: 
max
𝛼𝑡
𝐸𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝 ) − 0.5𝛾 [𝜎𝑡
2(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝 )]    
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subject to: 𝑧𝜎𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝 ) −  𝐸𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝 ) ≤ 𝑉   (3.7) 
 
PROPOSITION 3.3: In the framework described in proposition 3.1, where 
investors maximize mean-variance utility over their portfolio return under a 
VaR limit constraint V and the constraint binds, the portion of wealth invested 
in risky assets (constrained alpha) is positively related to the level of the limit 
and to the excess of the expected return of the risky asset over the riskless one, 
and inversely related to the expected volatility of the risky asset: 
 
𝛼𝑡
𝐶 =
𝑉+𝑅
z 𝜎 𝑡 (𝑅𝑡+1
𝑘 )−(Et (𝑅𝑡+1
𝑘 )−R)
   (3.8)   
 
The proof, in line with the maximization procedure reported in the 
appendix 3.A for the general case, is reported in appendix 3.B.  
The analysis of the VaR-constrained alpha (3.8) highlights that when 
the pre-determined risk limit V increases, the portion of wealth invested in 
risky assets increases, hence, the looser the risk limit, the higher the portion 
of the portfolio invested in risky assets is (in line with Campbell et al. 2001). 
Furthermore, the higher the VaR of the portfolio (denominator), the lower 
the alpha; more generally, when the expected volatility (sigma) increases 
relative to the risk limit V, then alpha decreases. The relation of alpha with 
the expected returns of risky assets is positive, as expected.  
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In the framework set in proposition 3.3, when the constraint does not 
bind I get the same unconstrained alpha as in (3.4), hence the unconstrained 
alpha is positively related to the excess of the expected return of the risky 
asset over the riskless one, and inversely related to the expected volatility 
of the risky asset. 
 
PROPOSITION 3.4: In the framework set in proposition 3.1, if the 
constraint binds the investment in risky assets (constrained alpha) is lower 
than the risky investment in an unconstrained scenario; if the constraint does 
not bind the value of the portion invested in risky assets is equal to that 
obtained in the ordinary (unconstrained) mean-variance setting. 
Proof is reported in appendix 3.B.  
When the constraint binds, the bank reduces alpha to a level that is 
lower than the unconstrained alpha. This would cause an increase of asset 
sales which have an impact on market volatility. This result is in line with 
literature (e.g. Danielsson et al. 2012) which highlights that VaR can be pro-
cyclical and with that some literature (Cuoco and Isaenko 2008, Yiu 2004) 
which shows that risky investments are lower for VaR-constrained 
investors than for unconstrained ones.  
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3.4 Empirical tests: methodology and evidence 
After having found the closed-form solutions for risky investments 
(for constrained and unconstrained investors), in this section I perform 
some empirical tests on the above stated alphas (equations (3.4) and (3.8)).  
In order to verify if the VaR-constrained formula adequately 
represents investors’ behaviour, I test its accuracy of forecasting the 
investment behaviour of Italian banks. I measure the forecasting ability of 
the formula for constrained investors by comparing it with the standard 
mean-variance framework (for unconstrained investors) used as a 
benchmark. This comparison is also useful to better understand which of 
the following banks’ investment process is actually used by banks: (i) an 
investment approach driven by the standard mean-variance framework, 
followed by a phase, not included in the investment process, when banks 
regularly check the compliance with risk limits; (ii) an investment approach 
that incorporates risk-limit assessment from the beginning, thus taking 
constrained investment decisions. 
Specifically, I estimate the coefficients of (3.4) and (3.8) on a sub-
sample of the available data, and then I forecast the portion of the portfolio 
invested in risky assets by Italian banks for the residual part of the sub-
sample, both for the constrained and the unconstrained alpha. 
The final aim is to evaluate if the constrained alpha equation has a 
better performance in forecasting the real alpha (i.e., the observed alpha, 
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which is the portion of trading portfolio invested in risky assets by Italian 
banks), than the unconstrained one. For the empirical tests, I use daily data 
from the Italian financial market to estimate the expected volatility, and 
monthly data of the balance sheets of Italian banks (supervisory reporting) 
for the calculation of alpha.  
Since data used have different frequencies, the empirical exercise is 
mainly based on the MIDAS approach, which gives the opportunity to deal 
with data of different frequency without losing the intra-monthly 
information content of the daily data.  
I focus the analysis only on the Italian banks and the Italian stock 
market since they are large enough to be explored, but not internationalized 
enough to have such relations significantly affected by non-domestic banks. 
In fact, in 2011, one of the first years included in the time window used in 
the empirical analysis, the share of stocks held by foreign investors (in 
terms of market capitalization) was lower in Italy than in other large 
European countries (Spain, France, United Kingdom, Germany) 
(Observatoire de l’Epargne Europeene 2013). In the same year the share of 
government securities held domestically was higher in Italy than in other 
large European countries (Andritzky 2012).  
In more internationalized financial markets the role of non-domestic 
investors and foreign banks is relevant; thus, in such markets, the reaction 
of financial market risk to banks’ behaviour cannot be empirically tested 
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just by looking at domestic banks data. On the contrary, for Italy, given its 
lower level of internationalization, the relationship between investors’ 
decisions and financial markets is generally stronger and an analysis of this 
relation is more representative of the effects of investors’ behaviour on 
financial markets.  
 
3.4.1 Methodology 
Typical regression models relate variables sampled at the same 
frequency. In the presence of variables with different frequencies 
researchers often aggregate the higher-frequency observations to the 
lowest available frequency. This technique has some drawbacks since it 
causes the loss of potential useful information (Foroni and Marcellino 
2013). Direct modelling of mixed frequency data may help to solve this 
problem. Some of the most used techniques to direct model mixed 
frequency variables are bridge equations (Baffigi et al. 2004), mixed 
frequency VAR and the MIDAS approach.  
Bridge equations link low-frequency variables and time-aggregated 
indicators. Forecasts of the high-frequency indicators are provided by 
specific high-frequency time series models, then the forecasted values are 
aggregated and plugged into the bridge equations for the analysis of the low 
frequency variable. One of the drawbacks of the model is the two-step 
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approach which requires a forecast of high-frequency variables and the 
following aggregation to obtain forecasts of the low-frequency variable.  
Mixed frequency VAR (MF VAR) aims to examine co-movements of the 
mixed frequency series. In the classical framework (Mariano and Murasawa 
2010), the state-space representation is used, treating low-frequency series 
as high-frequency series with missing observations.  
Borrowing from existing literature about distributed lag models, 
Ghysels et al. (2004), Ghysels et al. (2007) and Andreou et al. (2013) 
proposed the MIDAS class of models, which allow dependent and 
independent variables to be sampled at heterogeneous frequencies. The 
approach has been thoroughly described in several publications (Ghysels et 
al. 2005, 2006, 2007, Armesto et al. 2010).  
In this approach, lagged explanatory variables are weighted by 
coefficients that come from deterministic specifications (e.g. Almon lags, 
beta polynomials, step functions). In literature, the MIDAS models are 
usually used for forecasting exercises. Further technical details on MIDAS 
models are reported in appendix 3.C. 
Foroni and Marcellino (2014a) compared the different approaches to 
macroeconomic aggregates, finding that MIDAS and bridge equations 
appear to forecast better than the MF-VAR. Schumacher (2016), still using 
macroeconomic variables, does not find a clear preference between MIDAS 
and bridge equations in terms of forecasting performance. 
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In this chapter I opt for the MIDAS approach which overcomes the 
drawbacks of the traditional methods that solve the frequency disparity by 
aggregating the variables at the lowest frequency thus losing valuable 
information. In addition, MIDAS shows better forecast performance than 
the MF VAR (Foroni and Marcellino 2014a). Furthermore, while bridge 
equations are mostly used in macroeconomics, MIDAS is mainly used in 
banking and finance literature. For instance, Ghysels et al. (2006) use MIDAS 
to predict volatility on the basis of returns sampled at different frequencies. 
Furthermore, in a GARCH context, MIDAS is used also to predict volatility of 
commodities (Pan et al. 2017). Recently Audrino et al. (2019) use the MIDAS 
approach to predict bank failures. 
Given its capacity to take account of the most recent high-frequency 
data MIDAS analysis is extremely powerful for forecasting exercises. In this 
chapter, I use it to determine if the constrained formula is more appropriate 
than the unconstrained one to forecast the portion of the portfolio invested 
in risky assets by Italian banks. My expectation is that, given that banks are 
constrained in their behaviour by market risk regulation, the constrained 
alpha formula has the best forecast accuracy. I will test several types of 
weighting schemes (Almon, Beta, Step), and a more traditional aggregation 
scheme, which is the simple average of the high frequency data for each low 
frequency point. 
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Against this methodological background, I estimate the regressions for 
unconstrained alpha and constrained alpha. Starting from (3.4) and (3.8), 
for the regressions I use the inverse of alpha as the dependent variable and 
the inverse of the right-hand side ratios as regressors.  
Hence, for the unconstrained alpha the regression is represented as 
follows: 
 
Α𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1
γ  𝜎2t( R𝑘,𝑡+1)
[Et ( Rk,t+1)−R]
+  𝜖𝑡   (3.9) 
 
While for the constrained alpha, the regression is based on the 
following model:  
 
Αt = β0 +
β1z σ t (Rk,t+1)−β2(Et ( Rk,t+1)−R)
V+R
+ ϵt  (3.10) 
 
3.4.2 Data 
The data comes from the supervisory reporting, has a monthly 
periodicity and covers a time span of nine years (June 2010 – May 2019).  
For the estimation, the expected yield of free risk assets (R) is 
reasonably set equal to zero. To compute alpha, I use the ratio between the 
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value of unencumbered listed shares held by the Italian banking system and 
the total held for trading (HFT) portfolio. I chose listed shares, since they 
are the risky asset class most impacted by VaR. I limited the analysis to the 
unencumbered shares since they are freely disposable in case the VaR 
constraint starts to bind; hence they are the portion of the portfolio which 
is freely impacted by investment decisions. The portfolio chosen is the HFT 
because it is the one relevant from a regulatory point of view (i.e. the 
portfolio the VaR regulation is applied to); hence it is the closest one to the 
concept of a VaR-constrained investment portfolio expressed in the 
previous section.  
With reference to the other variables used for the regressions: to 
measure market yield, I compute the annualized daily return from the 
closing value of the Italian market index; for the expected volatility (and 
variance) I picked the daily volatility (variance) implied in the at-the-money 
index options as reported by the volatility index for the Italian market index 
(which is the equivalent of the VIX). In particular, I use the end-of-day 
values of the IV-MIB (implied volatility of the Italian market index MIB) 
index, which measures the annualized 30-day volatility implied in some 
selected options listed in the national derivative market (IDEM) (i.e. near-
term, out-of-the money options with non-zero bid and ask prices2). The 
                                                          
 
22 For greater details about the calculation methodology used by FTSE MIB, see the 
https://www.borsaitaliana.it/borsa/indici/indici-di-
volatilita/dettaglio.html?indexCode=IVMIB30&lang=it and 
https://research.ftserussell.com/products/downloads/FTSE_Implied_Volatility_Index_Series.pdf 
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realized volatility variable is the annualized 30-day volatility computed on 
the daily return of the closing values of the FTSE MIB market index.  
The time frame of the available data is around nine years. In line with 
literature on forecasting I used the first larger part of the sample (seven 
years from June 2010 to May 2017) for the estimation of the model and I 
used the last part of the observations (two years, from June 2017 to May 
2019) to check the quality of the forecast. In the robustness test, I also 
performed some checks on different periods. 
For the forecasting exercise, I used all the main weighting schemes 
(Almon, Beta, Step) of the MIDAS model in addition to the unrestricted 
MIDAS (U-MIDAS) and the traditional method of averaging out the high-
frequency data.  
 
3.4.3 Results 
The expected results of the tests are that investment behaviour of 
Italian banks is always affected by regulatory VaR constraints; hence, the 
forecast based on the constrained alpha formula (3.8) is expected to be 
closer to the actual data than the unconstrained alpha one. 
This expectation does not change under the different weighting 
schemes which I use to assess if the results are crucially dependant on some 
specific weighting scheme. 
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3.4.3.1 Goodness of fit of the regressions 
In order to decide on the best forecasting model, I used the usual 
model selection criteria (Gujarati 2003), which measure the goodness of fit 
on the basis of the variance explained by the model (r-squared-type 
indicators) or the likelihood function (information criteria). The criteria 
presented in this section are the following: R-squared, adjusted R-squared, 
Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Schwarz information criterion (SIC). 
In table 3.1, I firstly run the regressions for the MIDAS models and the 
averaged high-frequency data model, for the entire period examined (June 
2010 – May 2019). This shows that most MIDAS regression have a moderate 
to high level of r-squared for the constrained formula (in column a, 
excluding regression average, most of the row values range from 0.50 to 
0.77); for the unconstrained scenario, r-squared is often lower.  
The models of both scenarios, especially for MIDAS regressions, are 
penalized if the number of regressors are taken into account. In fact, the 
adjusted r-squared (columns (b) and (g)) are much lower than the r-
squared values. The model that best fits the data, having a higher adjusted 
r-squared, is the beta model for both the constrained and the unconstrained 
solutions. Looking at the lowest information criteria, beta is generally the 
preferred model (only in the constrained scenario and for the Schwarz 
criterion it is the second best model) as highlighted in bold in table 3.1.  
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Table 3.1. Goodness of fit for the 2010-2019 period 
 
R squared 
(a) 
Adjusted R 
squared 
(b) 
AIC 
(c) 
SIC 
(d) 
Constrained 
Almon 2 0.37 0.02 5.38 5.54 
Almon 3 0.50 0.19 5.22 5.44 
Beta 0.54 0.26 5.12 5.34 
Regression average 0.21 0.19 5.14 5.22 
Step  0.61 0.21 5.33 5.99 
U-MIDAS 0.77 0.24 5.35 6.64 
     
Unconstrained 
 (f) (g) (h) (i) 
Almon 2 0.38 0.09 5.24 5.35 
Almon 3 0.44 0.15 5.22 5.34 
Beta 0.48 0.20 5.16 5.28 
Regression average 0.01 -0.01 5.36 5.41 
Step 0.33 -0.01 5.38 5.48 
U-MIDAS 0.52 0.03 5.53 6.19 
     Comparison of various indexes measuring the goodness of fit. 
Estimation period: June 2010 – May 2019.  
AIC stands for Akaike information criterion; SIC for Schwarz information criterion  
Almon 2 (or 3) stands for the PDL (polynomial distributed lag)/Almon weighting scheme 
with 2 (or 3) polynomial degrees; the number of lags has been chosen by using the 
automatic best lag selection provided by Eviews; Beta stands for the beta step weighting 
(20 lags). Step stands for the step weighting scheme (2 steps); the number of lags has 
been chosen on the basis of the automatic best lag algorithm provided by Eviews; U-
MIDAS stands for the unrestricted MIDAS (20 lags). Regression average means that the 
forecast has been run starting from the regression of the monthly variable on the 
monthly average of the daily variables.  
In bold is the best model suggested by the criteria (the highest adjusted r-squared, the 
lowest AIC, the lowest SIC), for the constrained scenario and for the unconstrained 
scenario.  
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If I limit the analysis only to the estimation period (June 2010 – May 
2017) and I perform an in-sample goodness-of-fit analysis, I get mixed 
results.  
In fact, as reported in table 3.2, for the constrained scenario the model 
that best fits the data, having a higher adjusted r-squared, is the step model. 
The one with the lowest information criteria, is the Almon with two 
polynomial degrees. In the unconstrained scenario, the preferred model is 
the Almon with three degrees, which has the highest adjusted r-squared 
and the lowest information criteria. 
Therefore, the selection of the model based on the goodness-of-fit 
analysis gives no straightforward results. Looking at the entire sampling 
period the suggested model appears to be the MIDAS model with a beta 
weighting function (table 3.1). However, by limiting the analysis to the 
estimation period, there are two suggested models (for the constrained 
formula: MIDAS model with Almon weighting function and two polynomial 
degrees; for the unconstrained formula: MIDAS model with Almon 
weighting function and three polynomial degrees). None of these is the beta 
model suggested for the entire period. The conclusions on model selections 
which can be drawn from the analysis performed in table 3.1 and 3.2 are 
thus extremely mixed.  
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Table 3.2. Goodness of fit – estimation period 2010-2017 
 
R squared 
(a) 
Adjusted R 
squared 
(b) 
AIC 
(c) 
SIC 
(d) 
Constrained 
Almon 2 0.53 0.26 5.08 5.26 
Almon 3 0.53 0.24 5.14 5.39 
Beta 0.51 0.21 5.18 5.43 
Regression average 0.13 0.11 5.22 5.31 
Step  0.70 0.33 5.18 5.92 
U-MIDAS 0.79 -0.01 5.50 6.95 
     
Unconstrained 
 (f) (g) (h) (i) 
Almon 2 0.39 0.09 5.25 5.35 
Almon 3 0.53 0.28 5.03 5.17 
Beta 0.48 0.22 5.12 5.26 
Regression average 0.01 -0.01 5.33 5.39 
Step 0.38 0.09 5.26 5.36 
U-MIDAS 0.61 0.15 5.41 6.15 
     Comparison of various indexes measuring the goodness of fit. 
Estimation period: June 2010 – May 2017.  
AIC stands for Akaike information criterion; SIC for Schwarz information criterion  
Almon 2 (or 3) stands for the PDL (polynomial distributed lag)/Almon weighting scheme 
with 2 (or 3) polynomial degrees; the number of lags has been chosen by using the 
automatic best lag selection provided by Eviews; Beta stands for the beta step weighting 
(20 lags). Step stands for the step weighting scheme (2 steps); the number of lags has 
been chosen on the basis of the automatic best lag algorithm provided by Eviews; U-
MIDAS stands for the unrestricted MIDAS (20 lags). Regression average means that the 
forecast has been run starting from the regression of the monthly variable on the 
monthly average of the daily variables.  
In bold the best model suggested by the criteria (the highest adjusted r-squared, the 
lowest AIC, the lowest SIC), for the constrained scenario and for the unconstrained 
scenario.  
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Against this background, it is worth noting that the model is used for 
forecasting purposes in this chapter. As reported in the literature, the 
forecasting ability and goodness of fit may not always have the same results, 
since a well-fitted model can be poor at forecasting. More specifically, the 
relevant literature (Wooldridge 2003, Gujarati 2003, Brooks 2002, 
Alexander 2008) highlights that the application of the usual model selection 
criteria, when the model is used for forecasting, may favour the choice of 
models which are overfitted on the current data and do not have good 
forecasting performance. Therefore, given the forecasting purposes of the 
present chapter, I chose the best model on the basis of the out-of-sample 
forecasting ability, as suggested by Wooldrige, Gujarati and Alexander. The 
results of the out-of-sample forecasting accuracy are reported in the 
following section. 
 
3.4.3.2 Baseline results 
The results of the analysis of the accuracy of the out-of-sample 
forecasts, listed in table 3.3, show that constrained alpha is far better in 
forecasting the investment decisions in risky assets of Italian banks than the 
unconstrained alpha. In the table, for every weighting scheme used for the 
high-frequency variable (reported in the rows), the indicators of 
forecasting accuracy (RMSE, MAE, MAPE, SMAPE, Theil’s u2 as defined in 
the note of table 3.3) are much lower in the constrained scenario (columns 
(a) through (e)) than in the unconstrained (columns (f) through (j)). Hence, 
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forecasting is more accurate with the constrained formula than with the 
unconstrained one.  
Among the constrained alphas, the best are the regression of alpha on 
the monthly average of the daily data for the variable (for RMSE, MAE; MAPE 
SMAPE) and MIDAS with the beta weighting scheme (for Theil’s u2), 
highlighted in bold in the table. The results suggest that using daily data on 
the basis of the MIDAS approach does not supply additional information to 
the forecast since the monthly average appears to have better forecasting 
performance.  
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Table 3.3. Forecast evaluation for alpha 
Comparison of actual values with static forecast regressions  
 
No obs. RMSE 
(a) 
MAE 
(b) 
MAPE 
(c) 
SMAPE 
(d) 
Theil - u2 
(e) 
Constrained 
Almon 2 73  3.36  2.75  32.20  25.10  0.91 
Almon 3 73  3.33  2.79  32.30  25.38  0.95 
Beta 73  3.03  2.52  29.18  23.73  0.76 
Regression average 107  2.86  2.46  27.68  23.32  1.16 
Step  73  3.69  3.24  35.30  28.86  1.03 
U-MIDAS 73  3.70  3.14  31.40  27.23  1.17 
       
Unconstrained 
  (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) 
Almon 2 59  4.03  3.16  39.07  28.30  1.08 
Almon 3 74  5.04  3.97  44.84  36.22  1.25 
Beta 74  4.05  3.16  39.20  28.31  1.08 
Regression average 108  4.02  3.23  39.34  28.91  1.63 
Step 74  4.14  3.30  39.55  28.96  1.07 
U-MIDAS 74  6.65  5.05  55.30  37.40  1.28 
       
Comparison of various indexes measuring the quality of forecast. 
Estimation period: June 2010 – May 2017; forecast period: June 2017 – May 2019.  
RMSE (root mean squared error), MAE (mean absolute error), MAPE (mean absolute percentage 
error), SMAPE (symmetric mean absolute percentage error) and Theil (U2) are the usual measures 
for forecasting evaluation.  
Almon 2 (or 3) stands for the PDL/Almon weighting scheme with 2 (or 3) polynomial degrees; the 
number of lags has been chosen by using the automatic best lag selection provided by Eviews; Beta 
stands for the beta step weighting (20 lags). Step stands for the step weighting scheme (2 steps); 
the number of lags has been chosen on the basis of automatic best lag algorithm provided by 
Eviews. U-MIDAS stands for the unrestricted MIDAS (20 lags). Regression average means that the 
forecast has been run starting from the regression of the monthly variable on the monthly average 
of the daily variables. In bold the best forecasting results. 
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However, given that the indicators are not fully concordant, to better 
assess if one of the two methods is clearly better than the other, I carried 
out the one-step Diebold Mariano test. On the basis of this test, the two 
forecasts under analysis (Beta-MIDAS and monthly average) are not 
significantly different.  
Hence I report the regressions regarding these two methods. As stated 
in table 3.4 and table 3.5, for both regressions the expected volatility 
variable (based on implied volatility measured by Italian VIX) has a 
significant impact, with the expected positive sign on the inverse of 
constrained alpha (hence with a negative sign on constrained alpha); the 
level of significance is 1%.  
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Table 3.4. Impact of monthly average of daily data  
Dependent variable: inverse constrained alpha 
Variables Coefficients 
  
Implied volatility  23.14*** 
 (5.77) 
  
Yield 0.18 
 (0.51) 
  
C 7.30*** 
 (1.62) 
OLS estimates for model (3.10). Dependent variable (monthly): inverse 
constrained alpha; regressors (monthly): implied volatility of the Italian 
market index (to measure the expected volatility in (3.10)) and the returns 
(measured by the monthly average of daily returns of the index). Standard 
errors in parenthesis. - *** - significant at 1% level, ** - significant at 5% 
level; * - significant at 10% level. Number of observations: 107. 
 
 
In contrast, the yield variables, relevant for the unconstrained alpha, 
are not significant.  
For the MIDAS regression (table 3.5), only the slope is examined since 
it has a direct impact on the dependent variable without being directly 
affected by the weighting scheme. The results show that implied volatility 
is highly significant with the expected sign (slope 20.70), while yield is not 
significant. Hence, the results confirm that banks’ investment behaviour is 
highly dependent on expected risk, while investment decisions appear not 
to be influenced by the yield. Such results, in line with literature and 
expectations, seem reasonable since the analysis is limited to investment 
decisions in risky assets in a risk-constrained environment. 
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Table 3.5. MIDAS regression with beta weighting 
Dependent variable: inverse constrained alpha 
 
Variables Coefficients 
  
C 7.97*** 
 (1.97) 
  
Implied volatility (-1) 
  
Slope 20.70*** 
 (7.12) 
Beta-01 0.02 
 (35.30) 
Beta-02 0.03 
 (35.30) 
    
Yield (-1) 
  
Slope 0.10 
 (0.17) 
Beta-01 -0.03 
 (34.66) 
Beta-02 -0.02 
 (34.66) 
    
MIDAS estimates for model (3.10). Dependent variable (monthly): inverse alpha (inverse of 
the ratio between listed unencumbered shares and HFT portfolio); regressors (daily): implied 
volatility and returns of the Italian market index Standard errors in parenthesis. - *** - 
significant at 1% level, ** - significant at 5% level; * - significant at 10% level. Number of 
observations: 73. 
 
 
3.4.3.3 Robustness 
Given that the time span of data used is so long that it includes 
completely different evolutions of risk, the results about the prevalence of 
constrained alpha on unconstrained alpha can be affected by the time 
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windows used to estimate the regression and to assess the forecast. To 
check if the forecast accuracy is conditioned by the time windows used for 
estimation and forecast, I recomputed the indicators, for constrained alpha 
and unconstrained alpha, by estimating the models on the first quartile of 
the observations (from June 2010 up to May 2012) and by forecasting alpha 
for the residual part of the sampled period (from June 2012 up to May 
2019). I did not use the U-MIDAS and the step weighting scheme since they 
have convergence problems due to the limited number of observations.  
The goodness-of-fit indicators for the new estimation period (June 
2010 – May 2012) have very low, and even negative, values, given the few 
observations. For the unconstrained scenario, the best model is the 
regression on the averaged high-frequency data; for the constrained one, 
the selection criteria do not suggest a unique model. The model with the 
highest adjusted r-squares and the lowest Akaike information criterion is 
the MIDAS with Almon weighting scheme (three degree-polynomial). For 
the Schwarz criterion the suggested model is the MIDAS with beta 
weighting scheme. 
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Table 3.6. Goodness of fit – estimation period 2010-2012. 
 
 
R squared 
(a) 
Adjusted R 
squared 
(b) 
AIC 
(c) 
SIC 
(d) 
Constrained 
Almon 2 0.39 0.01 5.45 0.39 
Almon 3 0.79 0.59 4.61 0.79 
Beta 0.28 -0.05 5.12 0.28 
Regression average 0.46 0.41 4.83 0.46 
     
Unconstrained 
 (f) (g) (h) (i) 
Almon 2 0.16 -0.21 5.57 5.72 
Almon 3 0.16 -0.29 5.67 5.87 
Beta 0.20 -0.20 5.60 5.80 
Regression average 0.04 0.00 5.32 5.41 
     Comparison of various indexes measuring the goodness of fit. 
Estimation period: June 2010 – May 2012.  
AIC stands for Akaike information criterion; SIC for Schwarz information criterion  
Almon 2 (or 3) stands for the PDL/Almon weighting scheme with 2 (or 3) polynomial 
degrees; the number of lags has been chosen by using the automatic best lag selection 
provided by Eviews; Beta stands for the beta step weighting (20 lags). Regression 
average means that the forecast has been run starting from the regression of the 
monthly variable on the monthly average of the daily variables.  
In bold the best model suggested by the criteria (the highest adjusted r-squared, the 
lowest AIC, the lowest SIC), for the constrained and unconstrained scenarios.  
 
As reported in section 3.4.3.1, I therefore selected the model on the 
basis of the out-of-sample forecasting accuracy, in line with relevant 
literature (see table 3.7). 
For the out-of-sample forecasting, even under such a limited 
estimation time window the constrained alpha (table 3.7, columns (a) 
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through (e)) has better forecasting accuracy than the unconstrained alpha 
(table 3.7, columns (f) through (j)), although the difference is smaller than 
with the previous test (see table 3.3). The best model is confirmed to be the 
MIDAS with beta weighting scheme. 
Table 3.7. Forecast evaluation for alpha 
Comparison of actual values with static forecast regressions  
 
No obs. RMSE 
(a) 
MAE 
(b) 
MAPE 
(c) 
SMAPE 
(d) 
Theil - u2 
(e) 
Constrained 
Almon 2 19  3.70  3.06  24.00  25.14  1.18 
Almon 3 19  4.26  3.46  26.07  29.12  1.40 
Beta 19  1.41  0.50  6.10  4.75  0.38 
Regression average 24  3.65  3.04  24.09  24.88  1.19 
       
Unconstrained 
  (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) 
Almon 2 19  3.60  2.94  24.45  23.67  1.11 
Almon 3 19  3.95  3.14  26.05  26.33  1.23 
Beta 19  1.62  0.58  7.10  5.31  0.47 
Regression average 24  4.40  1.23  14.97  10.02  2.25 
       
Estimation period: May 2010 – May 2012; forecast period from June 2012 to May 2019. 
RMSE (root mean squared error), MAE (mean absolute error), MAPE (mean absolute percentage 
error) and SMAPE (symmetric mean absolute percentage error) and Theil (U2) are the usual 
measures for forecasting evaluation.   
Almon 2 (or 3) stands for the PDL/Almon weighting scheme with 2 (or 3) polynomial degrees; the 
number of lags has been chosen by using the automatic best lag selection provided by Eviews; Beta 
stands for the beta step weighting (20 lags). Step stands for the step weighting scheme (2 steps); 
the number of lags has been chosen on the basis of automatic best lag algorithm provided by 
Eviews. U-MIDAS stands for the unrestricted MIDAS (20 lags). Regression average means the 
forecast has been run starting from the regression of the monthly variable on the monthly average 
of the daily variables. In bold the best forecast indicators. 
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To check if the result is affected by the choice of volatility variable 
(implied volatility), in the following robustness test I change it and use the 
volatility estimated by the best fitted GARCH model, for the best forecasting 
model (Beta-MIDAS). For the time span used, the best ARMA-GARCH model, 
on the basis of the usual information criteria, is the one-lag autoregressive 
model with one-lag moving average (ARMA(1,1)) for yield, and E-GARCH, 
with one asymmetric order and t-distribution of residuals for variance (in 
line with literature on financial series modelling on non-normal conditional 
error distributions, for instance see Brooks (2007). I run the beta weighting 
scheme without endpoint or shape constraints for the period June 2010 – 
May 2017, to forecast the period June 2017 – May 2019. Forecast indicators 
with ARMA-GARCH are even better than those stated in table 3.3 for beta-
MIDAS constrained alpha, hence its accuracy in forecasting is better than 
one of the other models examined in table 3.3.  
Examining the estimation coefficients reported in table 3.8, the slope 
of volatility (equal to 24.80) is significant and with the expected sign, in line 
with the results reported in table 3.5.  
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Table 3.8. MIDAS regression with beta weighting (constrained alpha) 
Variables Coefficients 
C 7.64*** 
 (1.45) 
GARCH Volatility – Lags: 20 
Slope 24.80*** 
 (6.16) 
Beta-1 3.25 
 (5.85) 
Beta-2 3.73 
 (8.28) 
Beta-3 -0.08 
 (0.04) 
Return – Lags: 20 
Slope 0.60 
 (0.69) 
Beta-1  0.52 
 (61.57) 
Beta-2 0.52 
 (61.57) 
Beta-3 -0.73 
 (1.96) 
GARCH Volatility – Beta shape 
 Lag Coefficient Distribution 
 0 3.24           * 
 1 3.08           * 
 2 2.62          *  
 3 1.93         *   
 4 1.15       *     
 5 0.38      *      
 6 -0.27    *        
 7 -0.76   *         
 8 -1.02   *         
 9 -1.04   *         
 10 -0.83   *         
 11 -0.41    *        
 12 0.15     *       
 13 0.81       *     
 14 1.50        *    
 15 2.13         *   
 16 2.65          *  
 17 3.02           * 
 18 3.20           * 
 19 3.24           * 
MIDAS estimates for model (3.10). Dependent variable (monthly): inverse of 
alpha (inverse of the listed unencumbered shares divided by the HFT); regressors 
(daily): volatility (estimated with a GARCH model) and returns of the Italian 
market index standard errors in parenthesis. - *** - significant at 1% level, ** - 
significant at 5% level; * - significant at 10% level. Number of observations: 84. 
The forecast evaluation indicators for the model are the following: RMSE: 2.46; 
MAE 2.11; MAPE 22.2; SMAPE: 19.5; Theil U2: 0.89. 
 
120 
 
 
Besides helping in studying the relation among variables, the MIDAS 
approach also contributes to the analysis of the evolution of the relations 
between variables for different lags. From table 3.8, the first two beta 
coefficients are significantly different from 1 thus showing a peculiar U-
shaped beta. This shape may be an expression of the overshooting (and pro-
cyclical) effect reported in literature in case of risk-constrained investment 
decisions and highlighted in the previous chapter.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
The financial crisis proved that the modern risk management 
techniques cannot prevent crises from happening. In addition, various 
authors have underlined that some of these risk management techniques, 
such as value at risk for market risk, may deepen the recession and, more 
generally, may have a pro-cyclical effect by affecting investors’ behaviour.  
In literature, research about the impact of value at risk on investment 
decisions deliver mixed results. Alexander and Baptista (2002), in a mean-
VaR framework, found that risk-averse agents may end up selecting riskier 
portfolios if they use VaR as a risk measure. Basak and Shapiro (2001) also 
found that regulation leads financial institutions to accept higher exposure 
to risky assets. 
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In contrast with these results, Cuoco and Isaenko (2008) find that 
exposure to risky assets is lower for a trader subject to a VaR limit than for 
an unconstrained investor. Yiu (2004) also finds that VaR may reduce 
allocation to risky assets. Such theoretical results are not supported by the 
empirical analysis. 
In this chapter, I solved a constrained maximization problem in a 
theoretical mean-variance framework, and I found that when VaR 
constraint binds, investments in risky assets are lower than in an 
unconstrained environment, in line with some of the literature. In addition, 
I found that when the constraint does not bind, the portion of wealth 
invested in risky assets is in line with the standard mean-variance result, as 
expected.  
Unlike several papers on the topic, I also performed some empirical 
tests, limited to Italy, finding that the VaR-constrained solution discussed in 
the theoretical part of the chapter is more accurate in forecasting banks’ 
investments in risky assets than the unconstrained one, thus giving 
empirical support to the result obtained in the theoretical part.  
In terms of policy, the results obtained appear to back the regulators’ 
decision to impose risk limits on individual banks. In fact, the application of 
VaR causes a decrease of investments in risky assets, thus potentially 
reducing the exposure to market risk, in line with regulators’ goal. The 
result found that risky investments are lower under the constrained-VaR 
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scenario than in the unconstrained one, which paves the way for additional 
analyses on the amplification effect, whose existence has been empirically 
proved in chapter 2. In fact, on the basis of the result of this chapter the shift 
from an unconstrained scenario to a constrained one (or from a low-
volatility period to a high-volatility period) causes a reduction of 
investment in risky assets and therefore may explain the above-mentioned 
amplification effect. This additional effect of the model, which can further 
explain the conclusions reached in chapter 2, will be tested in chapter 4 
where the model defined in the present chapter will be complemented with 
a measure of uncertainty.  
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Appendix 3.A 
The maximization problem with a general risk constraint reported in 
the chapter is represented as follows: 
 
max
𝛼𝑡
𝐸𝑡(𝑅𝑃,𝑡+1) − 0.5𝛾 [𝜎𝑡
2(𝑅𝑃,𝑡+1)]      
subject to: 𝑓[𝜎𝑡(𝑅𝑃,𝑡+1)] ≤ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡   (3.5) 
 
The related Lagrangian expression is 
ℒ = α𝑡Et (Rk,t+1) + (1 − α)R −  0.5 γ α
2𝜎𝑡
2(𝑅𝑘,𝑡+1) + 
 λ [RL −  f(σ𝑡(R𝑝,𝑡+1))]     (3.A.1) 
 
Since it is a one-variable optimization problem with one inequality 
constraint, I verify the conditions reported in Baldani et al. (1996) for the 
binding constraint (λ > 0) and the non-binding constraint (λ = 0) 
scenarios. 
Non-binding constraint scenario. 
When the constraint does not bind (λ = 0), conditions are the 
following: 
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a) λ = 0 
b) 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕α
= 0 
c) 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕λ
≥ 0  
d) λ 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕λ
= 0, which holds given that λ = 0 (see a) 
 
Condition b) can be written as follows: 
 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕α
= [Et ( Rk,t+1) − R]  −   γ α 𝜎
2
t( R𝑘,𝑡+1)  −   λ [
𝜕 𝑓[𝜎 𝑡  (R𝑃,𝑡+1)]
𝜕α
] = 0 
         (3.A.2) 
where lambda is equal to zero (non-binding constraint). From 3.A.2 I 
obtain: 
 
α𝑡 =
[Et ( Rk,t+1)−R]
γ  𝜎2t( R𝑘,𝑡+1)
      (3.A.3) 
 
which is the usual identity for alpha in the unconstrained scenario. 
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Hence, in the case of the non-binding constraint,  the portion of wealth 
invested in risky assets is given by (3.A.3) and is directly related to the 
excess return and inversely related to the variance of risky assets.  
Finally, from c) I obtain:  
RL −  f(σ𝑡(R𝑝,𝑡+1)) ≥ 0   (3.A.4) 
then 
f −1(σ𝑡(R𝑝,𝑡+1)) ≤RL   (3.A.5) 
 
Hence, when the constraint does not bind, the portion of wealth 
invested in risky assets is at a level below the maximum possible, where the 
maximum is the one that determines that f(σ𝑡(R𝑝,𝑡+1)) is equal to the risk 
limit. 
 
Binding constraint scenario 
When the constraint binds (λ > 0), conditions are the following: 
a) λ > 0 
b) 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕α
= 0 
c) 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕λ
≥ 0  
d) λ 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕λ
= 0 i.e. 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕λ
= 0  (given that λ > 0, as in a))  
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From b) I get the following expression:  
 
α𝑡 =
[Et ( Rk,t+1)−R]
γ  𝜎2t( R𝑘,𝑡+1)
  − λ 
[
𝜕 𝑓[𝜎 𝑡 (R𝑃,𝑡+1)]
𝜕α
]
γ  𝜎2t( R𝑘,𝑡+1)
  (3.A.6) 
 
which can be written as follows: 
 
α𝐶 = α𝑈   − λ 
[
𝜕 𝑓[𝜎 𝑡 (R𝑃,𝑡+1)]
𝜕α
]
γ  𝜎2t( R𝑘,𝑡+1)
   (3.A.7) 
 
Where, for the sake of simplicity, α𝑈 is the unconstrained alpha (see 
(3.A.3)), whereas α𝐶is the VaR-constrained alpha. 
Regarding the second term of the difference reported in the right-hand 
side, in the scenario examined lambda is strictly positive (see a), the 
numerator of the ratio is positive (since sigma is positive in alpha by 
assumption), and the denominator is positive. As a consequence, the entire 
second term of the right-hand side is negative. Therefore, when the 
constraint binds, the constrained alpha is lower than the unconstrained 
one, as is reasonable.  
From c) and d) I get: 
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𝜕ℒ
𝜕λ
= 0 
 
Hence  
 
RL −  f(σ𝑡(R𝑝,𝑡+1))=0   (3.A.8) 
 
which can be written, in terms of alpha, as: 
 
f −1(σ𝑡(R𝑝,𝑡+1))=RL    (3.A.9) 
 
Hence the proportion of wealth invested in risky assets, in case 
of binding constraints, is given by (3.A.7) and is related only to the 
function used to measure risk and to the risk limit. 
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Appendix 3.B 
The maximization problem with a VaR risk constraint reported in this 
chapter is represented as follows: 
max
𝛼𝑡
𝐸𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝 ) − 0.5𝛾 [𝜎𝑡
2(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝 )]      
subject to: 𝑧𝜎𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝 ) −  𝐸𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝 ) ≤ 𝑉   (3.B.1) 
 
The Lagrangian expression associated to the constrained 
maximization is the following:  
 
ℒ = Et (Rp,t+1) − 0.5γ𝜎
2
t(R𝑝,𝑡+1) + λ [V − z 𝜎 𝑡 (R𝑝,𝑡+1) + E𝑡 (R𝑝,𝑡+1 )] 
 
which is written also as follows: 
 
ℒ = [α𝑡Et ( Rk,t+1) + (1 − α𝑡)R]  −  0.5 γ  𝜎
2
t(α𝑡 R𝑘,𝑡+1) + 
+ λ [V − z 𝜎 𝑡 (α R𝑘,𝑡+1) + (α𝑡Et ( Rk,t+1) + (1 − α𝑡)R)] 
 
given that risk (sigma) for the free risk asset is equal to zero by 
definition. 
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Non-binding scenario 
Following Baldani et al. (1996), I verify the following conditions for the 
non-binding constraint (λ = 0) scenario: 
 
a) λ = 0 
b) 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕α
= 0 
c) 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕λ
≥ 0  
d) λ 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕λ
= 0, which holds given that λ = 0 (see a) 
 
Condition b) can be written as follows: 
 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕α
= [Et ( Rk,t+1) − R]  −   γ α 𝜎
2
t( R𝑘,𝑡+1) + 
+λ [−z 𝜎 𝑡 (R𝑘,𝑡+1) + (Et ( Rk,t+1) − R)] = 0  (3.B.2) 
 
from which I get: 
 
α𝑡 =
[Et ( Rk,t+1)−R]
γ  𝜎2t( R𝑘,𝑡+1)
  − λ 
[z 𝜎 𝑡 (R𝑘,𝑡+1) −(Et ( Rk,t+1)−R)]
γ  𝜎2t( R𝑘,𝑡+1)
 (3.B.3) 
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when lambda is equal to zero, (3.B.3) becomes: 
 
α𝑡 =
[Et ( Rk,t+1)−R]
γ  𝜎2t( R𝑘,𝑡+1)
        
 (3.B.4) 
 
which is the usual identity for alpha in the unconstrained scenario. 
It is worth noting that c) implies  
V − z 𝜎 𝑡 (R𝑝,𝑡+1) + E𝑡 (R𝑝,𝑡+1 ) ≥ 0 
Hence  
V − z 𝜎 𝑡 (α R𝑘,𝑡+1) + (α𝑡Et ( Rk,t+1) + (1 − α𝑡)R) ≥ 0 
This means that: 
α𝑡 ≤
𝑉+𝑅
z 𝜎 𝑡 ( R𝑘,𝑡+1)+(Et ( Rk,t+1) − R)
    (3.B.5) 
Hence, the portion of wealth invested in risky assets under a non-
binding constraint is lower than the expression reported at the right-hand 
side of (3.8.5), which is the value of alpha under a binding constraint (see 
(3.B.8)). 
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Binding constraint 
When the constraint binds (λ > 0), the conditions are the following: 
a) λ > 0 
b) 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕α
= 0 
c) 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕λ
≥ 0  
d) λ 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕λ
= 0 i.e. 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕λ
= 0  (given that λ > 0, as in a))  
From b) I get the (3.B.3) expression which can be written as follows: 
 
α𝐶 = α𝑈   − λ 
[z 𝜎 𝑡 (R𝑘,𝑡+1) −(Et ( Rk,t+1)−R)]
γ  𝜎2t( R𝑘,𝑡+1)
  (3.B.6) 
 
Where, for the sake of simplicity, α𝑈 is the unconstrained alpha (3.B.4) 
whereas α𝐶is the VaR-constrained alpha. 
With reference to the second term of the difference reported in the 
right-hand side, in the scenario examined, lambda is strictly positive (see 
a)), the numerator of the ratio is positive, as detailed below, and the 
denominator is positive. As a consequence, the entire second term of the 
right-hand side is negative. Therefore, the constrained alpha is lower than 
the unconstrained one, as is reasonable.  
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As mentioned above, the numerator of the ratio is positive. In fact, 
from the constraint I know that: 
 
VaR= z [𝜎 𝑡 (Rp,t+1)] - Et (Rp,t+1)  
 
that is: 
 
VaR = z 𝜎 𝑡 (α𝑡 R𝑘,𝑡+1) − (α𝑡Et ( Rk,t+1) + (1 − α𝑡)R) 
 
from which I get: 
 
𝑉𝑎𝑅+𝑅
α𝑡
= z 𝜎 𝑡 (R𝑘,𝑡+1) − (Et ( Rk,t+1) − R)  (3.B.7) 
 
On the basis of the assumptions of the model, VaR and alpha are 
positive, and the return R of the risk-free asset is close to zero. Hence, the 
right-hand side of (3.B.7) (which is the numerator of the second term of 
(3.B.6)) is positive, too.  
From (3.B.6) I get: 
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𝛼𝑡 =
𝑉+𝑅
z 𝜎 𝑡 (R𝑘,𝑡+1)−(Et ( Rk,t+1)−R)
    (3.B.8) 
 
which is in line with condition d). In fact, from d) I get: 
 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕λ
= −z 𝜎 𝑡 (α R𝑘,𝑡+1) + (αEt ( Rk,t+1) + (1 − α)R) + V = 0 
(3.B.9) 
 
which, in turn, satisfies also condition c). From (3.B.8) I obtain the 
result for constrained alpha, which is the expression (3.B.8). 
 
For the sake of completeness, from (3.B.3) the value of lambda for the 
Lagrangian equation is the following: 
 
𝜆 =  
  [Et ( Rk,t+1) − R] 
z 𝜎 𝑡 (R𝑘,𝑡+1)  − (Et ( Rk,t+1) − R)
− 𝛼𝒸  
γ  𝜎2t( R𝑘,𝑡+1)
z 𝜎 𝑡 (R𝑘,𝑡+1)  − (Et ( Rk,t+1) − R)
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Hence lambda is positive when [Et ( Rk,t+1) − R]  > 𝛼
𝒸γ  𝜎2t( R𝑘,𝑡+1); 
therefore if, and only if, 𝛼𝓊 > 𝛼𝒸 , which is true in the constrained scenario 
under analysis.   
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 Appendix 3.C 
For the MIDAS model, the starting point could be considered the 
traditional regression used for forecasting: 
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡    (3.C.1) 
 
where h denotes the forecast horizon and both yt+h and Xt are sampled 
at a low frequency (e.g. in this chapter, monthly). In this approach Xt is an 
aggregate of high-frequency series (e.g. daily series). The aggregation 
scheme of high-frequency data (e.g. equal weight for simple averages of 
high-frequency variables) may be represented as follows: 
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (  ∑ 𝑋𝑡−𝜏
𝑆
𝑆−1
𝜏=0 ) 𝜆 + 𝜖𝑡   (3.C.2) 
 
where 𝑋(𝑡−𝜏)/𝑆 are the data at the 𝜏 high frequency periods prior to t, 
with S values for each low frequency data point. The aggregation approach 
may be thought of as one in which the component higher frequency lags all 
enter the low frequency regression with a common coefficient, 𝜆. 
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MIDAS regressions assume that the aggregation of high frequency data 
is captured by a known weight function; hence the mixed frequency model 
may be represented as follows: 
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑓(  𝑋𝑡
𝑆
𝐻 , 𝜃, 𝜆) + 𝜖𝑡   (3.C.3) 
 
where 𝑦𝑡 is the dependent variable, sampled at a low frequency; 𝑋𝑡/𝑆
𝐻  
is a set of regressors sampled at a higher frequency with S values for each 
low frequency value; 𝜃, 𝜆 are vectors of parameters.  
MIDAS regressions allow a more flexible weighting structure than 
traditional low-frequency models and can also be more parsimonious. 
Moreover, the MIDAS framework can easily accommodate the timely 
releases of high-frequency data.  
As mentioned before, different classes of MIDAS model exist, based on 
different weighting functions.  
Foroni and Marcellino (2014b), Foroni et al. (2015), and Marcellino 
and Schumacher (2010) referred to the unrestricted MIDAS regression as 
the one where there is no predefined weighting scheme for the high-
frequency data:  
 
137 
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽0 +   𝛽𝑡 ∑ 𝑋(𝑡−𝜏)/𝑆
𝐻 ′𝑆−1
𝜏=0  + 𝜖𝑡   (3.C.4) 
 
where 𝑋(𝑡−𝜏)/𝑆
𝐻  are the data at the 𝜏 high frequency periods prior to t. 
This approach estimates a distinct coefficient for each of the high frequency 
lag regressors. Hence, U-MIDAS does not alleviate the issue of requiring a 
large number of coefficients. 
Some of the most used weighting schemes which help to reduce the 
number of coefficients to be estimated are the Almon lag, the step function 
and the beta function weightings.   
In the Almon lag weighting (also called polynomial distributed lag or 
PDL weighting), for each high frequency lag the regression coefficients are 
modelled as a lag polynomial in the MIDAS parameters. The resulting 
restricted regression model can be written as follows: 
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑖  ∑ 𝑍𝑖,𝑡
′𝑝
𝑗=0 + 𝜖𝑡   (3.C.5) 
 
𝑍𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ (𝜏
𝑖)𝑋(𝑡−𝜏)/𝑆
𝐻𝑘−1
𝜏=0    (3.C.6) 
 
where p is the Almon polynomial order, and k the chosen number of 
lags. 
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In the step function weighting the regression model can be written as 
follows: 
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑡   ∑ (𝜏
𝑖)𝑋(𝑡−𝜏)/𝑆
𝐻 ′𝑘−1
𝜏=0 + 𝜖𝑡  (3.C.7) 
 
where k is the number of lagged high frequency periods chosen, and 
the coefficient  𝛽𝑡 is the same for every observation included in the step-
length time window; hence it restricts consecutive lags to have the same 
coefficient (Forsberg and Ghysels 2007). 
Lastly, Ghysels et al. (2007) considered the beta polynomial as a 
possible alternative for the weighting function, assuming that the weights 
are determined by a few hyperparameters θ. 
The corresponding regression model is given by: 
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽𝑡  ∑ 𝑍𝑖,𝑡
′𝑘
𝑖=0 + 𝜖𝑡   (3.C.8) 
 
where 
 
𝑍𝑖,𝑡 = (
𝜔𝑖
𝜃1−1−(1−𝜔𝑖)
𝜃2−1
∑ 𝜔𝑗
𝜃1−1(1−𝜔𝑗)
𝜃2−1𝑘
𝑗=0
+ 𝜃3) 𝑋(𝑡−𝑖)/𝑆
𝐻   (3.C.9) 
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The beta function is extremely flexible and can take many shapes, 
including gradually increasing or decreasing, flat, humped, or U-shaped, 
depending on the values of the three MIDAS parameters (θ1, θ2, θ3). In 
practice the beta function is usually restricted with θ1=1, θ3=0.  The first 
restriction implies that the shape of the weight function depends on a single 
parameter (slow decay if θ2 >1, slow increase when θ2 <1); the restriction 
θ3=0 implies that there are zero weights at the high frequency lag endpoints 
(0 and k-1).  
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Chapter 4. Uncertainty and risk in a VaR – constrained portfolio 
choice 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 shows that the relationship between investors’ decisions 
and regulatory risk limits is theoretical founded and is supported by 
empirical evidence. More specifically, the theoretical constrained mean-
variance framework, presented in the previous chapter, confirms that the 
adoption of regulatory VaR has a risk-limiting impact on investors’ choices. 
In addition, the theoretical results of chapter 3 pave the way for additional 
analyses on the amplification effect, since the shift from an unconstrained 
to a constrained scenario causes a reduction of the investments in risky 
assets and therefore may explain the amplification effect empirically 
proved in chapter 2. In this chapter, by using the closed form formula on 
risky investments found in chapter 3, to which I add an uncertainty variable, 
I will further test the model to assess its ability to describe also the 
amplification effect and the impact of uncertainty on investors’ decisions.  
I enrich the model with an uncertainty variable because, as 
demonstrated in literature, risk is not the sole parameter taken into account 
by investors. Especially since the financial crisis, uncertainty has come to 
light as a relevant variable to explain market behaviour. In 2010, the former 
Chairman of the Fed, Ben Bernanke, said that “during the worst phase of the 
financial crisis, many economic actors metaphorically threw up their hands 
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and admitted that, given the extreme and, in some ways, unprecedented 
nature of the crisis, they did not know what they did not know...The 
profound uncertainty associated with the ‘unknown unknowns’ during the 
crisis resulted in panicky selling by investors” (Bernanke 2010).  
In fact, since the financial crisis of the 2007-2008, papers on risk 
management and uncertainty have proliferated. In general, during a 
financial crisis, investors start to cut their risk exposure by selling assets, 
thus impacting the rest of the financial system and causing a deterioration 
of the whole market. The consequent fall of prices and increase of volatility 
determine the need to further reduce exposure to risky assets, thus feeding 
a vicious circle. In such circumstances the reinforcing effect of uncertainty 
becomes more visible.  
In this chapter, building further on the results obtained in chapter 3, I 
examine the impact of risk limits and uncertainty in a simple framework 
where agents have mean-variance preferences and choose to allocate their 
wealth between risk-free bonds and risky assets. In line with other papers, 
I find that uncertainty is inversely related to the proportion of wealth 
invested in risky assets, potentially contributing to the vicious circle 
(increase of risk and uncertainty, increase of fire sales and volatility) typical 
of crises.  
Several other papers have studied uncertainty in the field of finance, 
also in portfolio allocation problems. Bekaert and Hoerova (2014) find that 
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the variance premium, which is the difference between the squared VIX and 
an estimate of the conditional variance and is used as a measure of risk 
aversion, is a significant predictor of stock returns, but the conditional 
variance, as a measure of uncertainty, mostly is not. However, conditional 
variance robustly and significantly predicts economic activity, whereas 
variance premium has no predictive power for future output growth. 
Drechsler (2013) indicates that fluctuation in the variance premium 
strongly reflects changes in the level of Knightian uncertainty and predicts 
monthly stock returns. In the same line, Bollerslev et al. (2014) find that a 
measure of variance risk premium, seen as a proxy for aggregate economic 
uncertainty, predicts aggregate stock market returns. In an empirical 
analysis of the dynamics of investors’ beliefs, Ozoguz (2009) finds a positive 
relation between uncertainty and volatility. 
With regards to portfolio allocation, Maccheroni et al. (2013) set a 
theoretical mean-variance framework adjusted for ambiguity with a risk-
free asset, a risky asset, and an ambiguous asset. In this framework 
Maccheroni et al. find that ambiguity has an inverse impact on the fraction 
of wealth invested in non-risk-free assets. 
However, to the best of my knowledge, no previous research focused 
on the portfolio allocation with uncertainty by considering also a VaR 
constraint in a mean-variance framework. Furthermore, theoretical articles 
concerning the impact of uncertainty on portfolio allocation do not provide 
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empirical evidence in support of their theories. In addition, among the 
empirical articles, no researchers empirically investigate how a VaR-
constrained portfolio allocation framework (including uncertainty and 
obtained in a mean-variance setup) concretely works, in two different 
periods of high and low volatility.  
In the empirical part of the chapter I test the results obtained in the 
theoretical part by using a unique dataset on Italian banks and official data 
for the Italian stock market, with the idea that  the relation between banks’ 
behaviour and the domestic financial market is more visible in Italy than in 
other big European countries or in the United States where the role of 
international financial agents is stronger and the relation between national 
stock exchanges and domestic banks is weaker. The empirical tests with 
OLS confirm the theoretical dynamics; furthermore, in line with literature, 
in high-volatility periods the importance of uncertainty is stronger than in 
low-volatility periods. 
The results obtained provide further theoretical and empirical 
support to the role of uncertainty in portfolio allocation choices, especially 
in turmoiled periods, and at the same time raise further concerns about the 
role of uncertainty in more stable times. 
Therefore, the contribution of this chapter is twofold. In the first part, 
I find a new closed formula for portfolio allocation which, unlike theoretical 
literature, includes both a VaR-constraint and uncertainty in a mean-
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variance framework; in the second part, I successfully complete some 
empirical tests of this formula, providing supporting evidence to the 
formula and finding that banks’ behaviour is more influenced by 
uncertainty in periods with higher volatility. To the best of my knowledge, 
no empirical test of the impact of both VaR constraint and uncertainty have 
been previously performed in literature. 
 
4.2 The effects of risk limits and uncertainty: relevant literature  
The chapter examines the impact of risk and uncertainty on 
investment decisions in a regulated environment, from a theoretical and 
empirical points of view. Hence, it is related to theoretical papers which 
analyse the impact of risk and regulation on financial agents’ behaviour and 
the effects of uncertainty on investment decisions, and to empirical papers 
which analyse the role of risk and uncertainty on investments. However, the 
chapter provides a new theoretical contribution by adding a VaR constraint 
to the framework and, unlike other papers, empirical evidence in support of 
the framework. 
With respect to the influence of future risk on current investment 
decisions, Bacchetta et al. (2012) focus on the relationship between risk and 
price in a mean-variance environment. They assume that asset price 
depends (negatively) on asset risk, defined as the variance of tomorrow’s 
asset price. In addition, they add a variable (“S”) which can be a fundamental 
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variable (e.g. dividends) or a variable extrinsic to the model (a sunspot 
variable). Since they assume that the variance of tomorrow’s asset price 
(risk) depends on the variable “S”, the asset price (which depends on risk) 
is also related to “S”. This relationship between asset risk and asset price 
level can generate self-fulfilling shifts in risk, coordinated around the 
variable “S”. In general, the relation between risk and investment decisions 
examined by the authors is classically related to Markowitz’s Modern 
Portfolio Theory.  
Other researchers focus their analyses on regulatory constraints, for 
instance in terms of impact of value at risk (VaR), on investment decisions. 
VaR  is the regulatory standard measure of market risk. The results of these 
studies are mixed; however, in general they show that, in specific 
circumstances, the impact of VaR constraints may unintentionally alter the 
investment allocation process and amplify shocks. Jang and Park (2016) 
integrated a VaR constraint in the fund manager’s wealth function, and 
found that fund managers using VaR-based risk management are exposed 
to large losses in turbulent times, as did Vorst (2001) and Meral (2019). 
Furthermore, Danielsson et al. (2004) show that VaR-constrained operators 
can cause the cycle to be more pronounced. Brunnermeier and Pedersen 
(2009) called margin spirals the amplification effect – via feedback – coming 
from capital constraints. 
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Still examining the impact of regulatory constraints on investment 
allocation, Alexander and Baptista (2006) find that, in a mean-variance 
framework with VaR constraint, regulation may increase the probability of 
extreme losses. Furthermore, the portfolio chosen in a constrained 
framework would be even riskier than the one chosen in an unconstrained 
environment.  
Finally, with respect to the impact of uncertainty in the field of finance, 
it is worth noting that, despite the proliferation of papers on the topics, the 
definition is not uniform; furthermore, empirical evidence about the impact 
of uncertainty on investment decisions is not copious.  
In general, uncertainty is associated with Knight (1921) who separated 
the notion of risk, as a measurable uncertainty, from the non-measurable 
one, known as Knightian uncertainty. Knightian uncertainty is 
unobservable, though some proxies can be used to assess changes over time. 
Non-Knightian uncertainty refers to the uncertainty of a variable for which 
the probability distribution of ex-ante realizations can be defined, but the 
values are not defined.  
In literature, uncertainty has been variously defined and measured. 
Looking at the classification by Makarova (2014), macroeconomic 
Knightian uncertainty may be classified in at least two main categories: 
policy uncertainty (which is related to policy actions) and macro (or 
financial) uncertainty.  
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The former has been extensively examined in literature. For this 
chapter, the results obtained by Vinogradov (2012), who focused on 
regulatory ambiguity in the market equilibrium framework, are of interest, 
as he concluded that some negative effects of ambiguity can only be seen in 
times of high aggregate risk. Additionally, in the policy uncertainty strand, 
Baker et al. (2016) developed the Economic Policy Uncertainty index (EPU) 
for US, Canada, China, the Eurozone, France, Germany, India, Italy, Spain and 
UK. For the US they measured uncertainty on the basis of three components: 
frequency of newspaper references to economic policy uncertainty, tax 
provision, and disagreement among professional forecasters.  
With regard to macro (or financial) uncertainty, the most influential papers 
are by Jurado et al. (2015), and by Bloom (2009). Jurado et al. define 
uncertainty as “the conditional volatility of a disturbance that is 
unforecastable from the perspective of economic agents”. They use a large-
scale dynamic factor model with stochastic volatility to extract joint 
forecastable components from 279 macroeconomic and financial indicators 
(for US only) allowing for idiosyncratic shocks in each of the indices. This 
analysis is complemented by the analysis of common variation of 
uncertainty at firm level by examination of a panel of 155 firms. In Bloom 
(2009), the VIX (Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index) 
is used as a proxy for of macroeconomic uncertainty. Although VIX was 
originally designed for measurement of uncertainties related to financial 
markets only, it has become a widely used measure of uncertainty (e.g. 
148 
 
Haddow et al. (2013), for a critique see Bekaert et al. (2013)). In order to 
measure uncertainty, some of the literature uses the variance risk premium 
(Drechsler 2013), which is the difference between the squared VIX and an 
estimate of the conditional variance (Carr and Wu 2009, Bekaert et al. 
2013). The variance premium is nearly always positive and displays 
substantial time-variation. In addition, Miao et al. (2018) has recently 
offered an ambiguity-related interpretation of variance premium, finding 
that most of the variance premium could be attributed to ambiguity 
aversion.  A recent paper (Slim et al. 2019) uses variance risk premium to 
enhance the accuracy of VaR in measuring market risk. 
Uncertainty has also been applied to asset allocation problems, 
sometimes by adding an ambiguous asset category to the traditional risky/ 
riskless dichotomy. Investors face risk and ambiguity when they evaluate 
an investment in an asset because they know neither the future realization 
of the asset’s payoff (risk), nor the probability of it occurring (ambiguity). In 
this stream of literature, financial investors have a form of aversion not only 
to risk but also to ambiguity. Guetlein (2016) studied the relation between 
risk and ambiguity attitude and reached the conclusion that in the standard 
expected utility framework an increase in risk aversion reduces the demand 
for risky assets, whereas in a model considering ambiguity and risk aversion 
an increase in risk aversion does not necessarily determine an decrease of 
investment in uncertain (meaning risky and ambiguous) assets. Pinar 
(2014) also examines the impact of ambiguity aversion in a mean-variance 
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setting, by finding, among other results, that under certain circumstances 
ambiguity aversion leads to giving less weight to a fund consisting of risky 
assets in a portfolio composed of a riskless asset and the risky asset fund. 
Illeditsch (2011) builds on the work by Epstein and Schneider (2008), who 
examine the effect of ambiguous information on stock prices, to argue that 
the interaction between risk and uncertainty can cause drastic changes in 
the stock prices. This interaction may explain the large increase in volatility 
after unexpected events. Gollier (2011) sets a framework where the Arrow-
Pratt approximation is exact (i.e. normality of the priors, constancy of 
absolute risk aversion), and investors’ preferences exhibit constant 
absolute risk aversion (CARA) and constant relative ambiguity aversion. In 
this framework, he finds that the optimal demand for the uncertain asset is 
negatively related to both the risk measure (and risk aversion) and 
ambiguity (and ambiguity aversion). One of the most relevant papers on the 
topic is by Maccheroni et al. (2013) who identified a new framework by 
adding model uncertainty and ambiguity aversion variables. Under the 
standard conditions used for the Arrow-Pratt approximation to be exact (i.e. 
risk is normally distributed and the utility function is exponential) and using 
CARA utility functions both for risk and uncertainty, they set a mean-
variance framework adjusted for ambiguity with a risk-free asset, a risky 
asset and an ambiguous asset. Using this framework Maccheroni et al. found 
that ambiguity has an inverse impact on the fraction of wealth invested in 
non-risk-free assets.  
150 
 
In contrast to this chapter, no theoretical paper on uncertainty also 
focuses on the impact of risk limits on decisions of investment in a mean-
variance framework. 
On the empirical side, there is no concordant way to measure 
uncertainty. The quantification methods (or combinations of them) used in 
literature are numerous; among them the implied volatility measured with 
VIX (Bloom 2009); the disagreement among forecasters (Giordani and 
Söderlind 2003, Clements and Harvey 2011); the ARCH/GARCH-type 
models, where conditionally-autoregressive errors are associated with 
uncertainty (Elder 2004, Kontonikas 2004, Daal et al. 2005 Neanidis and 
Savva 2011); the uncertainty of the parameters, the variables, the data or 
the model (Onatski and Williams 2003, Orlik and Veldkamp 2013, Fritsche 
and Glass 2014); and the distribution of ex-post forecast errors (Jordà et al. 
2013, Knüppel 2014).  
A more recent measure of uncertainty (Izhakian 2016) built on 
volatility of probabilities of returns. Additionally, on the empirical side, 
Brenner and Izhakian (2018) examined the effects of risk, ambiguity and 
ambiguity attitudes on excess returns. They show that, in case of a high 
probability of losses, the effect of ambiguity on excess returns is negative, 
while in the case of a high probability of gains it is positive. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the number of papers dealing 
contemporaneously with portfolio optimization, value at risk constraints, 
and ambiguity (or uncertainty) is limited. Puelz (2001) uses real data to 
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conclude that VaR optimal portfolios are more likely to incur large losses 
when losses occur. Campbell et al. (2001) find that the higher the confidence 
level of VaR, the lower the percentage of risky asset in the portfolio.  In the 
value at risk strand of literature, model uncertainty has been examined by 
Opschoor et al. (2014), who obtain a more accurate forecast of the left tail 
of the distribution by combining density forecasts to account for model 
uncertainty. Along the same line, Peng et al. (2018) also enrich the VaR with 
uncertainty thus obtaining an increase in accuracy of forecasting the VaR. 
In contrast to this chapter, no empirical papers examine the relation 
among portfolio allocation decisions taken under VaR constraints in a 
mean-variance framework, and uncertainty.  
To sum up, in this chapter, in the theoretical part I extend the mean-
variance framework with the risk constraint determined in chapter 3 by 
adding an ambiguity measure. In line with other papers, such as Maccheroni 
et al. (2013), I find that risk and uncertainty are inversely related to the 
portion of wealth invested in risky assets. The result is new, given that 
literature does not find this result under a VaR constraint in a mean-
variance framework. The empirical part, given the limited number of 
empirical articles on the topic and the use of a unique dataset, produces 
several new pieces of evidence. More specifically, I examine if the inverse 
theoretical relation among investments in risky assets, risk and uncertainty 
holds empirically. Based on a data of the Italian financial market and 
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unencumbered stocks held by Italian banks, for the period June 2010 – May 
2019, I confirm this inverse negative relation between the portion of wealth 
invested in risky assets and risk and uncertainty measures. Furthermore, in 
line with Vinogradov (2012) and Brenner and Izhakian (2018), the impact 
is negative and significant in high-volatility periods; in more stable periods 
the relation between investment in risky assets and the uncertainty 
measure is not significant. In literature no empirical evidence has been 
produced on the impact of risk and uncertainty on investment decisions in 
a VaR-constrained framework. 
 
4.3 Theoretical framework  
4.3.1 The unconstrained and the constrained mean-variance 
framework 
As in section 3.3, I start from the standard model of maximization of 
mean-variance utility over portfolio return proposed by Bacchetta et al. 
(2012) (unconstrained framework); then, I determine a closed-form 
solution of the maximization problem under market risk constraint 
(constrained framework).  
I report the main steps of the maximization procedure in this section. 
Further details on the procedure are in section 3.3.2 and appendix 3.B. 
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The model designed by Bacchetta et al. (2012) considers an 
overlapping generation setup where investors are born with wealth (W). 
Investors have an endowment W and purchase risk-free bonds (exogenous 
constant return R) and risky equity. They allocate their wealth between a 
risky equity and a risk-free bond that pays a gross return R. In their model, 
investors maximize mean-variance utility over their portfolio return: 
 
max
𝛼𝑡
𝐸𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝 ) − 0.5𝛾 [𝜎𝑡
2(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝 )]    (4.1) 
 
where γ measures risk aversion, 𝜎𝑡
2(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝 ) is the variance of portfolio 
returns at t+1 expected at time t,  𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝
 is the portfolio return at time t+1:  
 
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝 =  𝛼𝑡 𝐸𝑡 (𝑅𝑡+1
𝑘 ) +  (1 − 𝛼𝑡) 𝑅  (4.2) 
 
therefore 𝜎𝑡
2(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝 ) also depends on 𝛼𝑡 . 
In (4.2), αt stands for the share of the portfolio invested in equity, R is 
the gross return of a free-risk bond and 𝐸𝑡 (𝑅𝑡+1
𝑘 ) is the return of the equity 
at t+1. The equity return is computed as follows: 
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𝑅𝑡+1
𝑘 =  
𝐴𝑡+1+𝑄𝑡+1
𝑄𝑡
    (4.3) 
 
where 𝑄𝑡+1 is tomorrow’s equity price; 𝐴𝑡 represents the dividends 
and 𝐴𝑡 = ?̅? + 𝑚 𝑆𝑡 with S as an exogenous state variable that follows a 
stochastic process, and Ā is the constant dividend when m=0. 
From the maximization condition, Bacchetta et al. (2012) find that the 
portion invested in equity is equal to: 
 
𝛼𝑡 =
𝐸𝑡 (𝑅𝑡+1
𝑘 )− 𝑅
𝛾 𝜎𝑡
2 ( 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑘 )
      (4.4) 
 
Therefore, the portion of wealth invested in risky assets increases if 
the excess returns of equity with respect to bonds increases or if the 
variance of the expected returns decreases. The alpha obtained in (4.4) is 
the solution to the unconstrained maximization problem stated at (4.1). 
To move towards a constrained framework from the model (4.1 – 4.4), 
I assume that investment decisions of professional investors are bound by 
risk limit constraints imposed by internal risk management or, ultimately, 
by regulation. Such constraints are not considered in the model described 
above, therefore I add them to the maximization problem stated in (4.1). 
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I focus on market risk limits which are more relevant for security 
investments process. The standard way to measure market risk limits is by 
computing the value at risk of the investment. Value at risk (VaR) is a 
probabilistic metric of market risk used by banks and other investors to 
monitor risk exposure of their trading portfolios. Value at risk indicates the 
maximum loss expected on an investment, at a certain confidence level, and 
over a given time horizon.  
Following Kaplanski and Levy (2015) and Alexander and Baptista 
(2002, 2006), I express value at risk as a positive number measured as 
𝑧𝜎𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝 ) where 𝜎𝑡 is the volatility of portfolio returns at t+1 expected at 
time t, and 𝑧 is the confidence level parameter corresponding to the chosen 
confidence level. If the returns are not assumed to be zero, VaR becomes 
𝑧𝜎𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝 ) −  𝐸𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝 ). In a VaR-limited investment process, investors 
would not buy a portfolio of securities with VaR higher than a risk limit V. 
Specifically: 
 
max
𝛼𝑡
𝐸𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝 ) − 0.5𝛾 [𝜎𝑡
2(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝 )]       
subject to: 𝑧𝜎𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝 ) −  𝐸𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝 ) ≤ 𝑉   (4.5) 
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As reported in section 3.3.2, from this constrained maximization, the 
portion of wealth invested in risky assets in a mean-variance framework 
with VaR-constraint is the following:  
 
𝛼𝑡
𝐶 =
𝑉+𝑅
z 𝜎 𝑡 (𝑅𝑡+1
𝑘 )−(Et (𝑅𝑡+1
𝑘 )−R)
   (4.6)   
 
4.3.2 Expected risk and uncertainty (unexpected risk) 
The inclusion of uncertainty in the optimal demand for assets has been 
examined in literature under diverse frameworks and with different 
assumptions. Gollier (2011) and Maccheroni et al. (2013), taking into 
account the standard condition of having the Arrow-Pratt approximation as 
exact, find that the optimal demand for uncertain assets is negatively related 
to both risk and ambiguity variables. Anderson et al. (2009), in a different 
context, augment their model to take into account uncertainty. 
More specifically, Maccheroni et al. (2013) start from the Arrow-Pratt 
approximation for the certain equivalent of the uncertain prospect 𝑤 + ℎ: 
 
𝑐(𝑤 + ℎ, Prob)   ≈  𝑤 +  𝐸𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏  (ℎ)  −  
1
2
 𝜆𝑢(𝑤)𝜎𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏
2  (ℎ)  
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where 𝑤 is initial wealth, ℎ is the investment, Prob is the probabilistic 
model associated with the approximation,  𝜎𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏
2  (ℎ) is the variance of ℎ with 
respect to Prob, and 𝜆𝑢(𝑤) is the coefficient that links risk premium and 
variance and is determined by the risk aversion of the investor. 
Starting from this approximation, and under the assumptions reported 
in their article, Maccheroni et al. write the portfolio problem as follows: 
 
max
𝛼𝑡
𝐸𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝 ) −
𝜆
2
 [𝜎𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏
2 (𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝 )]  −
𝜃 
2
 𝜎𝜇
2 (𝐸(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝 ))  
 
where 𝐸𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝 ) is the expected return of the portfolio under Prob,  
𝜎𝜇
2 𝐸(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝 ) is the variance of portfolio returns under μ (which is the prior 
of the investor over the possible probability models), and 𝜆 and θ represent 
the investor’s attitude toward risk and ambiguity respectively. 
Following Maccheroni et al. (2013), I augment the constrained 
maximization (4.5) for uncertainty as follows: 
max
𝛼𝑡
𝐸𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝 ) − 0.5𝛾 [𝜎𝑡
2(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝 )]  − 0.5𝜃 [𝜎𝑡
2̃(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝 )]    
subject to: 𝑧[𝜎𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝 ) + 𝜃 [𝜎𝑡
2̃(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝 )] −  𝐸𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝 ) ≤ 𝑉  (4.7) 
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where 𝜃 is the uncertainty aversion, 𝜎𝑡
2̃(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝 ) is the measure for 
uncertainty and all the other symbols have the same meaning as in (4.5)  
For the constraint, it is worth noting that regulation aims only at 
limiting risk. However, risk management units at banks are using 
increasingly accurate measures of the left tails of distributions to monitor.  
Therefore, in (4.7) although the regulatory limit V of the constraint does not 
change with respect to (4.5), I included the ambiguity variable in the 
measure of risk used by the bank (left hand side of the constraint) in line 
with literature (Opschoor et al. 2014) which shows that if model uncertainty 
is accounted for, a more accurate forecast of the left tail of the distribution 
is obtained. 
Furthermore, as underlined by Brenner and Izhakian (2018), there is 
no agreement in literature yet on the exact functional form to represent 
ambiguity in portfolio preferences. Since in this chapter I will measure 
ambiguity with VIX (calculated for the Italian financial market, see section 
4.4.1), it is natural to assume that it has some analogies with risk, hence:  
 
𝜎𝑡
2̃(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝 ) =  𝛼𝑡
2 𝜎𝑡
2̃(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑘 ) 
 
Against this background, the unconstrained and the constrained 
alphas, reported in (4.4) and (4.6) become:  
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𝛼𝑡
𝑈 =
𝐸𝑡 (𝑅𝑡+1
𝑘 )− 𝑅
𝛾 𝜎𝑡
2 ( 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑘 )+ 𝜃 𝜎𝑡
2̃(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑘 ) 
      (4.8) 
 
𝛼𝑡
𝐶 =
𝑉+𝑅
z[ 𝜎 𝑡 (𝑅𝑡+1
𝑘 )+𝜎𝑡
2̃(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑘 )]−(Et (𝑅𝑡+1
𝑘 )−R)
   (4.9)   
 
where, in line with literature uncertainty is inversely related to the 
portion of wealth invested in risky asset; however, literature does not 
consider the VaR constraint, 
 
4.3.3 Hypotheses 
The theoretical equations (4.8) and (4.9) may be empirically tested 
with OLS to assess the impact of every addendum. For the unconstrained 
alpha, I ran the following regression: 
 
𝐴𝑡
𝑈 = 𝛾1
𝛾 𝜎𝑡
2 ( 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑘 )
𝐸𝑡 (𝑅𝑡+1
𝑘 )− 𝑅
+ 𝛾2  
𝜃 𝜎𝑡
2̃(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑘 )
𝐸𝑡 (𝑅𝑡+1
𝑘 )− 𝑅
+  𝜀𝑡    (4.10) 
 
where Α𝑈 is the inverse of the unconstrained alpha. 
The addenda represent, respectively, the expected risk corrected for 
the expected excess return (which is closely related to the inverse of the 
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Sharpe ratio and to the inverse of the solution of the Merton’s Portfolio 
problem), and the uncertainty corrected for the expected excess returns.  
 
For the equation (4.9), where V and R are exogenous variables, I run 
the following regression, to assess the impact of every addendum: 
 
𝐴𝑡
𝐶 = γ1𝜎 𝑡 (𝑅𝑡+1
𝑘 ) + γ2 𝜎?̃?(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑘 ) +  γ3(Et (𝑅𝑡+1
𝑘 ) − R) +  𝜀𝑡   (4.11) 
 
where 𝐴𝑡
𝐶  is the inverse of the constrained alpha and  γ𝑖 (with i=1…3) 
are the coefficients of the addenda at the denominator of (4.9) and the 
uncertainty measure multiplied by z/(V+R). 
As reported in previous sections, the first addendum represents the 
expected risk, the second is a measure of uncertainty, and the third 
addendum is a measure of the expected excess return.  
The main hypothesis is that investments in risky assets are driven by 
the constrained formula since regulation is applied in every market 
scenario. Hence, the coefficients of regressors for the constrained alpha, 
uncertainty included, are expected to be significant. Furthermore, I expect 
that when volatility is high, and thus the market is more turbulent and VaR 
constraint hits, the risk and ambiguity variables become more relevant.  
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4.4 Data, empirical methodology and results.  
4.4.1 Data  
In this section the equations (4.10) and (4.11) are empirically tested. I 
use data of the Italian financial market and of Italian banks, the latter 
coming from supervisory reporting. 
More specifically, for alpha, I use the ratio between the amount of 
unencumbered listed shares held by the Italian banking system, which is 
based on a unique dataset coming from supervisory reporting, and the total 
held for trading (HFT) portfolio. I limited the analysis to the unencumbered 
shares, since they are freely disposable if the VaR constraint becomes tight. 
Among unencumbered shares, only the listed ones are included because, 
having an official market value, they are the risky asset class most impacted 
by VaR.  I limited the analysis to the HFT portfolio because it is the one 
relevant from a regulatory point of view (i.e. it is the portfolio targeted by 
market risk regulation, which is based on value at risk), hence it is the 
closest to the idea of a VaR-constrained investment portfolio .  
As mentioned above, in this section data on the HFT portfolio of banks, 
total unencumbered shares, and listed unencumbered shares come from 
monthly supervisory reporting and cover a time span of nine years (June 
2010 – May 2019).  The starting date has been chosen for comparability 
reasons since before June 2010 there is a break in the series reported by 
supervised entities. 
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For the other market-related variables (volatilities and returns), daily 
market data have been used for the same time span (May 2010 – June 
2019). In details, for the market yield, I computed the annualized daily 
return from the closing value of the Italian market index. For the VIX 
variable, I used the daily end-of-day values of the IV-MIB index (henceforth 
also Italian VIX), which measures the annualized 30-day volatility implied 
in some selected options listed in the national derivative market (IDEM) 
(i.e. near-term, out-of-the money options with non-zero bid and ask 
prices3). 
  
4.4.2 Empirical methodology  
In the regression models (4.10) and (4.11), risk is represented as 
𝜎𝑡
2 ( 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑘 ) which is the expected variance of future returns of the risky asset 
while uncertainty is reported as 𝜎𝑡
2̃(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑘 ). 
To measure uncertainty, in line with literature (e.g. Bloom 2009), I use 
the Italian VIX indicator, for the Italian financial market. In fact, as 
underlined by Haddow et al. (2013), VIX is one of the most widely used 
                                                          
 
33 For further details about the calculation methodology used by FTSE, see the 
https://www.borsaitaliana.it/borsa/indici/indici-di-
volatilita/dettaglio.html?indexCode=IVMIB30&lang=it and 
https://research.ftserussell.com/products/downloads/FTSE_Implied_Volatility_Index_Series.pdf 
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indicators of uncertainty. In the robustness tests, I check the stability of the 
results by using different measures of uncertainty and risk. 
To measure risk, the expected variance is computed on the basis of the 
most appropriate GARCH model. More generally, for the expectation-related 
variables, I assume that market investors use an ARMA-GARCH forecasting 
model based on daily market data; such models take into account the 
autocorrelation feature typical of financial series, highlighted by the 
analysis of correlograms. 
The model that best deals with such autocorrelations, in the period 
under analysis (June 2010 – May 2019) is the one-lag autoregressive model 
with one-lag moving average (ARMA(1,1)). The LM test shows that ARCH 
effects are present in the data; modelling volatility with an ARCH-type 
model is therefore suggested. On the basis of the Akaike information 
criterion, the best ARCH-type model is a E-GARCH, with one asymmetric 
order and t-distribution of residuals, in line with literature on financial 
series modelling (e.g. Brooks 2007) which highlighted that for financial 
series, the distribution of residuals of non-emerging markets is often non-
normal, and asymmetric volatility response (typical of E-GARCH with 
respect to ordinary GARCH) can capture some peculiarities of the data.  
I then use this model to estimate the expected returns (from the ARMA 
model) and the expected realized volatility (the ARCH part of the model).  
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The regression is performed by ordinary least squares. To deal with 
serial correlation among residuals, I use the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure 
(Gujarati 2003, Brooks 2002), which is a two-step estimation of a linear 
regression model with first-order serial correlation in the errors. In the first 
step, the first-order autocorrelation coefficient ρ is estimated on the basis 
of an AR(1) (autoregression with one lag) estimation on the residuals of the 
standard OLS. In the second step this estimate is used to rescale the 
variables. The regression in terms of rescaled variables has no serial 
correlation in the errors.  More formally, a generic standard regression: 
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 
becomes: 
 
𝑦𝑡
∗ = 𝛽0
∗ + 𝛽1𝑥𝑡
∗ + 𝜖𝑡 
 
where: 
𝑦𝑡
∗ = 𝑦𝑡 + 𝜌𝑦𝑡−1 
𝑥𝑡
∗ = 𝑦𝑡 + 𝜌𝑥𝑡−1 
𝛽0
∗ =
𝛽0
1 − 𝜌
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4.4.3 Baseline results  
In table 4.1, I report some summary statistics related to alpha. The 
table shows that unencumbered listed shares are on average 8.4% of the 
HFT (table 4.1, column a, mean) portfolio, with a maximum in period of 
around 20% (table 4.1, column a, maximum). 
 
Table 4.1. Listed shares on HFT portfolio. Summary statistics. 
 
Unencumbered 
listed shares 
(a) 
Listed shares 
(b) 
   
Mean 0.084 0.067 
Median  0.075 0.061 
Maximum 0.198 0.167 
Minimum 0.049 0.025 
Standard Deviation 0.030 0.025 
Number of observations 108 108 
   
Descriptive statistics for the unencumbered listed shares held by Italian 
banks and classified as held for trading (HFT). Monthly data for the period 
June 2010 – May 2019. 
 
Although the percentage seems to be low, it is still relevant as a proxy 
of risky asset class, since most of the HFT portfolio is composed of 
government bonds. Robustness tests will deal with this peculiar 
composition of the portfolio. 
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The descriptive statistics for the market variables are summarized in 
table 4.2: expected volatility is on average 23% (table 4.2, column a, mean) 
and daily returns are on average close to zero (table 4.2, column b, mean).  
 
Table 4.2.  Market variables. Summary statistics. 
 
Expected 
risk 
(a) 
Expected return 
(%) 
(b) 
   
Mean 0.227 0.001 
Median  0.213 0.000 
Standard Deviation 0.080 3.812 
Number of observations 2,348 2,348 
   
Descriptive statistics for the expected risk and the expected return of the 
Italian stock market. Daily data for the period 1 June 2010 – 31 May 2019. 
 
I then run the ordinary least squares regressions for equations (4.10) 
and (4.11), by using monthly data for the time span from June 2010 to May 
2019. To convert the daily market data into monthly data, I use the last 
observation of each month instead of using different criteria (e.g. the 
monthly average), since any investment choice is usually based on the most 
recent data.  
For the ordinary least squares regression of (4.10) and (4.11), the 
Jarque-Bera and the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey tests, for normality and for 
homoskedasticity respectively, are passed and correlation between 
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residuals and regressors is not significant. On the basis of the test 
performed (variance inflation factor) collinearity is not a problem. 
However, the analysis of residuals shows some serial correlation (on 
the basis of the Durbin Watson test, confirmed by the Breusch-Godfrey LM 
test and correlograms). 
 
Some positive serial correlation among residuals is in fact reasonable, 
since our investors, which are banks, do not create their portfolio from 
scratch every month.  To clean data from such correlations, I applied the 
Cochrane-Orcutt procedure and re-perform the regression. To measure the 
risk variable of (4.10) I used the expected volatility coming from the ARMA-
GARCH procedure described in section 4.4.2. For the ambiguity variable, as 
above mentioned, I used the Italian VIX, in line with Bloom (2009). The 
results are reported in table 4.3, where the significant variables have the 
expected sign.  
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Table 4.3. Constrained scenario estimation – corrected for 
autocorrelation. 
Variables Coefficients 
  
C 5.73*** 
 (2.09) 
  
Risk (expected volatility) 10.48*** 
 (3.76) 
  
Uncertainty (Italian VIX) 15.00*** 
 (5.65) 
  
Exp. Return -1.09 
 (1.40) 
  
OLS estimates for the constrained model (4.11). Dependent variable inverse of alpha 
(inverse of the listed unencumbered shares divided by the HFT); regressors: expected 
volatility (estimated with a GARCH model) and uncertainty (estimated with Italian VIX); 
returns of the Italian market index estimated on the basis of the same ARMA-GARCH 
model used for the expected volatility. Correction for autocorrelation of residuals with the 
Cochrane-Orcutt procedure. Standard errors in parenthesis. *** - significant at 1% level, 
** - significant at 5% level; * - significant at 10% level. Number of observations: 107.  
 
It is interesting to note that in table 4.3, the expected return is not 
significant, though it has the expected sign. In fact, when the regulatory 
constraint is active, risk measures seem to have a greater impact on the 
investment decisions. Unlike the constrained alpha, the unconstrained 
scenario (regression (4.11)) has no significant variable up to a confidence 
level of 10%, and after the correction for autocorrelation of residuals, for 
the entire period. The results are reported in table 4.4. Therefore, for the 
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entire sampled period, the constrained alpha framework helps to explain 
the relationships among the risk, uncertainty and banks’ behaviour. 
 
Table 4.4. Unconstrained scenario estimation – corrected for 
autocorrelation. 
Variables Coefficients 
  
C 12.84*** 
 (0.73) 
  
Risk (expected volatility) 0.12 
 (0.15) 
  
Uncertainty (Italian VIX) -0.13 
 (0.12) 
  
OLS estimates for the unconstrained model (4.10). Dependent variable inverse of alpha 
(inverse of the listed unencumbered shares divided by the HFT); regressors: expected 
volatility (estimated with a GARCH model) and uncertainty (estimated with Italian VIX); 
returns used in (4.10) are estimated on the basis of the same ARMA-GARCH model used for 
the expected volatility. Correction for autocorrelation of residuals with the Cochrane-Orcutt 
procedure. Standard errors in parenthesis. - *** - significant at 1% level, ** - significant at 
5% level; * - significant at 10% level. Number of observations: 107. 
 
From a graphical inspection of implied volatility (see figure 4.1) taken 
as a proxy of expected volatility, for the period under analysis I see that the 
first part of the time span has a higher volatility (in fact, it coincides with 
the period of higher financial turmoil) than the second one. 
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Fig. 4.1. Implied volatility of the Italian market index FTSE MIB. 
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Implied volatility for the Italian stock market, as measured by the index FTSE MIB IVI 30 
for the period 1 June 2010 – 31 May 2019; daily data. Source: Bloomberg. 
 
To identify the existence of a possible break in the series, I used 
Perron’s (1989) unit root break method with innovative outlier (the break 
occurs gradually without unusual innovation, which differs from the 
additive outliers where breaks occur immediately) and a break only in the 
intercept (minimum Dickey-Fuller t-statistics). On the basis of this test, the 
break in the series is estimated to occur in September 2016. For the 
regression reported in table 4.3 the Chow breakpoint test also rejects the 
null of no break in September 2016.  
Against this background, I assume that in the pre-break period (high 
volatility), the constrained formula is the one with the most significant 
impact of risk and uncertainty on investor decisions, while in the post-break 
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period (less turbulent) I expect risk constraints to be less relevant since the 
market returns are less volatile. Quite interestingly, the results of the 
regression (table 4.5) show that in high-volatility periods the constrained 
alpha is significantly related to volatility-type variables (table 4.5, column 
a, variables risk and uncertainty). In this time window, uncertainty 
(significant at 5%) has a larger impact, in terms of magnitude, than 
expected volatility (significant at 1%). In low-volatility periods, the 
estimated coefficients for the variables of the constrained formula are 
always non-significant (table 4.5, columns b and d, variables risk and 
uncertainty). In addition, in these more stable periods, the uncertainty 
variable may even change sign (though the variable is not significant), as 
underlined in literature (table 4.5, columns b and d, variable uncertainty). 
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Table 4.5 Constrained and unconstrained scenarios, pre and post 
break 
 Constrained 
scenario 
 Unconstrained 
Scenario  
 
Variable Pre-
break (1) 
(a) 
Post-
break 
(b) 
 Pre-break 
(1) 
(c) 
Post-
break (1) 
(d) 
      
C 8.18*** 10.56***  14.17*** 9.95*** 
 (1.93) (3.67)  (0.57) (1.11) 
      
Risk (expected volatility) 10.32*** 2.13  -0.48 -6.93 
 (3.90) (11.65)  (3.03) (10.18) 
      
Uncertainty (Italian VIX) 12.59** -4.68  -0.59 -0.30 
 (6.10) (15.95)  (0.61) (0.53) 
      
Exp. Return -0.36 -4.57  - - 
 (1.39) (4.99)  - - 
      
OLS estimates for models (4.10) and (4.11). Dependent variable inverse of alpha (inverse 
of the listed unencumbered shares divided by the HFT); regressors: expected volatility 
(estimated with a GARCH model) and uncertainty (estimated with Italian VIX); returns 
of the Italian market index estimated on the basis of the same ARMA-GARCH model used 
for the expected volatility. Correction for autocorrelation of residuals with the Cochrane-
Orcutt procedure. Break in September 2016. Standard errors in parenthesis. - *** - 
significant at 1% level, ** - significant at 5% level; * - significant at 10% level.  (1) 
Corrected for autocorrelation of residuals. Number of observations: 76 for (a), 30 for (b), 
75 for (c), 32 for (d). 
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4.4.4 Tests of robustness 
4.4.4.1 General framework of the robustness tests 
In this section I evaluate the sensitivity of the results to the different 
choices made in the empirical tests performed in the previous section. More 
specifically, I substitute the return variable, which has been modelled on 
the basis of an ARMA model, with the return of the last day of every month, 
to check if the results obtained in previous sections were highly dependent 
on the modelling of the returns with the ARMA approach. Furthermore, I 
add a control variable related to sovereign risk to the regression. In fact, for 
Italy, in the period being analyzed, this risk (measured by the spread 
between the yields of Italian and German government bonds) affected the 
market volatility variable, which I use as the basis to measure general 
market risk. The variation of this spread affected market volatility through 
two channels. First, an increase in the spread caused a decrease to the value 
of the portfolio held by Italian banks (a significant part of it consists of 
Italian government bonds) and, for listed banks, of the value of their shares. 
This effect had an impact on market volatility of the market index, which in 
Italy is strongly dependant on banks’ shares (in December 2013, almost one 
third of the market capitalization of the index was related to banks). An 
additional transmission of shock of the spread to market volatility was via 
risk management techniques (VaR). Since a significant portion of the 
portfolio held by banks consisted of BTP, a negative shock on BTP price, due 
to an increase of the spread, had an impact on VaR; consequently, in the 
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period under analysis, banks may have decided to sell any type of risky 
financial assets to reduce their market risk exposure, so fuelling the market 
instability.  
Therefore, to control for the quality of the market volatility variable as 
a measure of general market risk (net of the impact of sovereign risk), I 
added a variable measuring the spread between the yield of Italian and 
German government bonds. 
Finally, given Bloom’s (2009) criticism of the use of VIX as a measure 
of uncertainty (see Bekaert et al. 2013) I opted to use different measures of 
uncertainty. More explicitly, I use the variance risk premium (the difference 
between squared VIX and conditional volatility) which Drechsler  (2013) 
finds to be related to uncertainty but Bekaert et al. associate to risk 
aversion. The use of the variance risk premium, interpreted as risk 
aversion, helps to control the robustness of the results obtained for the 
uncertainty for the risk aversion variable. 
In the tests, I also used a measure of unexpected volatility, more 
related to the idea of uncertainty expressed by Jurado et al. (2015) and 
Maccheroni et al. (2013). In line with relevant literature, both theoretical 
and empirical (Maccheroni 2013, Jang and Park 2016, Puelz 2001, Peng et 
al. 2018, Bekaert and Hoerova 2014), in the examination of the impact on 
investment decisions, no idiosyncratic characteristics of investors are 
considered as control variables. In fact, from an economic point of view, 
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when VaR binds because of the regulatory constraint, the need to sell risky 
assets appears to be independent from any individual investors’ features. 
Furthermore, the main purpose of the analysis is the examination of the 
relation between the banking system as a whole and the financial market to 
assess possible macro-supervision implications, and is not the analysis of 
specific characteristics of banks which can affect market volatility.  
 
4.4.4.2 Results of the robustness tests 
In this section I perform some robustness tests, starting from checking 
the sensitivity of the results obtained in previous sections to the modelling 
of the returns. Hence, I substitute the expected return variable, calculated 
on the basis of the ARMA model, with the return for the last day of the 
month, where the return is calculated as the annualized daily return of the 
market index. The idea of using the latest information available to form 
expectations about the future variations of that variable is in line with the 
adaptive expectation hypothesis; with this different variable, volatility and 
uncertainty maintain a good level of significance in the pre-break period 
(table 4.6, column a, variables volatility and uncertainty).  
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Table 4.6. Constrained scenario – adaptive expected returns. 
 Coefficients 
Variables Pre-break (1) 
(a) 
Post-break 
(b) 
   
C 10.23*** 10.63*** 
 (1.94) (3.52) 
   
Risk (expected volatility) 9.79** -5.52 
 (4.04) (9.6) 
   
Uncertainty (Italian VIX) 12.45** 1.66 
 (6.10) (14.45) 
   
Exp. Return 0.05 0.12 
 (0.07) (0.19) 
OLS estimates for model (4.11). Dependent variable inverse of alpha (inverse of the listed 
unencumbered shares divided by the HFT); regressors: expected volatility (estimated as 
with a GARCH model) and uncertainty (estimated with Italian VIX); returns of the Italian 
market index estimated on the basis of return of the last day of the month. Correction for 
autocorrelation of residuals with the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure. Break in September 
2016. Standard errors in parenthesis. - *** - significant at 1% level, ** - significant at 5% 
level; * - significant at 10% level.  (1) corrected for autocorrelation 
Number of observations: 74 for (a), 32 for (b). 
 
As a further robustness test, I add to the regression an additional 
variable which has a specific impact on the Italian FTSE MIB index. This 
variable is the spread between the yield of the 10-year German government 
bonds and the yield of the 10-year Italian government bonds. This variable 
usually has a strong impact on the evolution of the Italian market index and 
expresses the sovereign risk included in the HFT portfolio of the banks. 
Since I am not interested in sovereign risk, but only in the impact of general 
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market risk, I control for the impact of the spread variable. My expectation 
is that this variable is significant and has a positive effect on alpha (an 
increase of the spread should decrease the investment in Italian 
government bonds and, potentially, increase alpha), which in this 
regression on the inverse of alpha means a coefficient with a negative sign. 
In fact, table 4.7 shows that the spread is significant for the relations under 
analysis, and with the expected negative sign (table 4.7, column a, variable 
spread). Despite the introduction of a new variable, the main conclusions 
remain unchanged: in fact, volatility and uncertainty still have a significant 
impact on the investment decisions in the high-volatility period (table 4.7, 
column a, variables risk and uncertainty). It is interesting to note that in the 
low-volatility period, expected returns are significant, although at a low-
level, thus confirming that in stable periods returns become a relevant 
variable (table 4.7, column b, variables expected returns).  
  
178 
 
 
Table 4.7. Constrained and unconstrained scenarios, pre and post 
break with sovereign risk  
 Constrained 
scenario 
 Unconstrained 
scenario 
 
Variable 
Pre-
break (1) 
(a) 
Post-
break 
(b) 
 Pre-break 
(1) 
(c) 
Post-
break (1) 
(d) 
      
C 10.10*** 13.60**  16.45*** 14.15*** 
 (1.94) (5.09)  (1.09) (2.69) 
      
Risk (expected volatility) 11.36*** 21.70  -0.54 -4.80 
 (3.76) (12.14)  (2.95) (9.79) 
      
Uncertainty (Italian VIX) 14.89** -19.40  -0.50 -0.19 
 (5.83) (15.25)  (0.60) (0.51) 
      
Spread Ita-Ger gov’t -0.01*** -0.02  -0.01** -0.03* 
 (0.004) (0.02)  (0.004) (0.015) 
      
Exp. Return -0.06 -10.38*  - - 
 (1.33) (5.20)  - - 
      
OLS estimates for models (4.10) and  (4.11). Dependent variable inverse of alpha (inverse of 
the listed unencumbered shares divided by the HFT); regressors: expected volatility 
(estimated with a GARCH model) and uncertainty (estimated with Italian VIX); returns of 
the Italian market index estimated on the basis of the same ARMA-GARCH model used for 
the expected volatility; sovereign risk measured as the spread of the yield of the Italian and 
German reference government bonds.. Correction for autocorrelation of residuals with the 
Cochrane-Orcutt procedure. Break in September 2016. Standard errors in parenthesis. - *** 
- significant at 1% level, ** - significant at 5% level; * - significant at 10% level 
Number of observations: 74 for (a), 32 for (b), 75 for (c), 32 for (d) 
 (1) Corrected for autocorrelation of residuals.  
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In addition, the spread variable is also significant in the unconstrained 
scenario (table 4.7, columns (c) and (d), variable spread). The sign of the 
regressor is the expected one, since an increase of the spread would cause 
a decrease of investment in risk-free assets, hence an increase of alpha (and 
therefore a decrease of the inverse of alpha, which is the dependent variable 
of the regression).  
Finally, starting from the robustness test reported in table 4.7, I also 
check the stability of my results to other different measures of risk and 
uncertainty, as described in section 4.4.3.1. The variable representing risk 
in the model presented in this chapter comes from the representation of 
value at risk as 𝑧[𝜎𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑝 )].  A recent article (Slim et al. 2019) empirically 
tests that, for developed countries (and long trading positions), the 
incorporation of the variance risk premium into the GARCH model greatly 
enhances the accuracy of VaR in measuring market risk. Therefore, I enrich 
the measure of risk used in previous regression, which was based on 
GARCH, with a measure of variance risk premium that is the difference 
between implied volatility (as measured by the Italian VIX) and realized (ex 
post) volatility. In addition, variance risk premium may be interpreted as a 
risk aversion measure (Bekaert et al. 2013, Bollerslev and Marrone 2014); 
therefore, adding it to the regression helps to control for risk aversion in 
the results regarding uncertainty. 
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For the uncertainty variable, I consider the critiques of Bekaert et al. 
(2013), who underline that the VIX is a proxy that includes both uncertainty 
and risk aversion measures. Therefore, as explained in section 4.4.3.1, I use, 
as a measure of uncertainty, the difference between the realized (ex post) 
volatility at time t and the volatility that I expected (at time t-1) for time t 
(on the basis of the GARCH model). This unexpected volatility seems more 
in line with the Knightian concept of uncertainty and with the model 
uncertainty variable used by Maccheroni et al. (2013), since it represents 
the difference between the volatility that investors expected on the basis of 
their model and the true realization of volatility. The results of this 
regression, reported in table 4.8, confirm that risk and uncertainty are 
strongly significant and have the expected sign in the high-volatility period 
(table 4.8, column a, variables risk and uncertainty). Furthermore, in the 
stable period, uncertainty is significant, though at a low level, with the sign 
reversed with respect to the high-volatility period (table 4.8, column b, 
variable uncertainty). This means that an increase of uncertainty in a calm 
period may even determine an increase of risky investments, possibly to 
increase the return of the portfolio. In fact, the variable expected returns (of 
risky assets) is also significant (at a low level) with the correct sign (table 
4.8, column b, variable expected return). These results appear to be in line 
with that literature (Puelz 2001) which supports the idea that in a low-
volatility period there is an accumulation of potential risk, thus determining 
a greater loss for risk-constrained investors when losses occur.  
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Table 4.8. Constrained and unconstrained scenarios, pre and post 
break with sovereign risk. New measures of risk and 
uncertainty 
 Constrained 
scenario 
 Unconstrained 
scenario 
Variable 
Pre-
break (1) 
(a) 
Post-
break 
(b) 
 Pre-
break (1) 
(c) 
Post-
break (1) 
(d) 
      
C 11.03*** 12.85**  16.34*** 14.89*** 
 (1.78) (4.67)  (1.08) (2.67) 
      
Risk (expected volatility) 23.01*** 0.92  1.18 -0.69 
 (6.53) (15.80)  (4.31) (13.96) 
      
Variance Risk Premium 18.57** -5.76  -11.38 -6.72 
 (8.78) (18.04)  (9.81) (20.09) 
      
Uncertainty (unexp. volatility) 21.92** -37.3*  -0.66 -10.21 
 (8.67) (20.86)  (11.50) (9.66) 
      
Spread Ita-Ger gov’t -0.01*** -0.02  -0.01** -0.03* 
 (0.004) (0.01)  (0.004) (0.015) 
      
Exp. return -0.66 -9.77*  - - 
 (1.44) (5.09)  - - 
      
OLS estimates for models (4.10) and  (4.11). Dependent variable inverse of alpha (inverse of 
the listed unencumbered shares divided by the HFT); regressors: expected volatility 
(estimated with a GARCH model), Variance risk premium (computed as the difference 
between the Italian VIX and the realized volatility), uncertainty (estimated as the difference 
between the realized volatility at time t and the volatility expected at time t-1 for time t); 
returns of the Italian market index estimated on the basis of the same ARMA-GARCH model 
used for the expected volatility; sovereign risk measured as the spread of the yield of the 
Italian and German reference government bonds. Correction for autocorrelation of residuals 
with the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure. Break in September 2016. Standard errors in 
parenthesis. - *** - significant at 1% level, ** - significant at 5% level; * - significant at 10% 
level (1). Corrected for autocorrelation of residuals.  
Number of observations: 76 for (a), 32 for (b), 75 for (c), 32 for (d). 
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4.5 Conclusion 
The financial crisis proved that modern risk management techniques 
cannot stop a crisis from happening. In addition, various authors have 
underlined that some of the risk management techniques, such as value at 
risk for market risk, may deepen the recession and, more generally, may be 
pro-cyclical. In the analysis of the crisis, the role of ambiguity and 
uncertainty has also been extensively discussed.  
In this chapter, by assuming that investors use a constrained mean-
variance model, augmented for uncertainty, when managing their trading 
portfolio, I analysed the impact of imposing VaR constraints to limit market 
risk exposure. I found that uncertainty is inversely related to the portion of 
wealth invested in risky assets. More explicitly, I leveraged the constrained 
maximization problem presented in chapter 3, where I found a solution for 
portfolio allocation of VaR-constrained investors operating under a mean-
variance framework. The solution shows that when VaR constraint binds, 
investments in risky assets is lower than in an unconstrained environment, 
in line with some of literature. In addition, I found that when the constraint 
does not bind, the portion of wealth invested in risky assets is in line with 
the standard mean-variance result, as expected. I enriched this solution by 
incorporating the impact of ambiguity, as in Maccheroni et al. (2013); the 
results show that ambiguity is negatively related to risky investments.  
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Unlike several papers on the topic, I also performed some empirical 
tests, limited to Italy, and found that the VaR-constrained solution found in 
the theoretical part of the chapter explains risky investments of Italian 
banks better than the traditional, unconstrained mean-variance formula. 
More specifically, empirical tests for the Italian market (security market 
and Italian banking system) confirm the negative relations between 
uncertainty and risky investments which were highlighted by the 
theoretical framework. 
Both the theoretical and the empirical results, although in line with 
relevant literature, are completely new. In fact, the inverse relation 
between uncertainty and risky investments had already been found in 
literature, but in a framework different from mean-variance and without 
the application of the VaR constraint. In addition, to the best of my 
knowledge, existent literature provides no empirical evidence on the 
relation between the portion of the portfolio invested in risky assets and 
several measures of risk and uncertainty. In this respect I used a unique 
dataset, based on details retrievable from supervisory reporting, to identify 
which part of the portfolio of the Italian banks is invested in risky assets. 
Furthermore, no similar analysis has previously been performed for Italy. 
An additional new result coming from the empirical tests is that 
volatility and uncertainty have a strong impact on investment in risky 
assets exclusively in high-volatility periods. This behaviour does not 
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emerge in low-volatility periods; hence, in relatively calm periods, the 
increase of volatility or uncertainty appears to have no significant negative 
impact on the portion of the portfolio invested in risky assets. This result 
seems consistent with the behaviour, already highlighted in literature, of 
accumulating risky assets in calm periods and it helps to explain the 
possible conundrum raised by the joint exam of the results obtained in 
chapter 2 and chapter 3. In fact, in chapter 2 I found empirical support for 
the amplification effect of VaR on market volatility. As in Basak and Shapiro 
(2001), this effect, could have been explained by the fact that regulation 
leads financial institutions to take on higher exposure to risky assets which 
causes an amplification of stock market volatility at times of down markets. 
However, in chapter 3, I found that risk limits decrease risky investments. 
This result provided no direct support to the amplification mechanism 
found in chapter 2.  The results of chapter 4 connect the results of the 
previous chapters by finding that, as highlighted in chapter 3, investments 
in risky assets are lower, especially in high-volatility periods, when the risk 
limit binds. Hence the possible accumulation of risk in low-volatility 
periods may be the cause of the amplified effect in high-volatility periods 
when investors, as shown in chapter 3, have to reduce the portion invested 
in risky assets below the unconstrained level. 
This result is also extremely interesting in terms of policy implications, 
since it confirms that risk limits accomplish their function of reducing risk 
exposure for investors when limits are binding, in turmoil, whereas they 
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seem to be less effective in stable periods. Therefore, to avoid unintended 
amplifications of shocks, regulation should be complemented also by 
mechanisms of risk limitation to be activated in calm periods, which should 
go beyond those that were already implemented in the period examined in 
my analysis. 
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Chapter 5. Concluding remarks 
 
5.1 Conclusions 
Over the last two decades a new stream of literature analysing the 
effects of the regulatory constraints on the behaviour of market 
participants, and on the financial and banking system, has proliferated. 
Despite the significant progress made in this area, many findings are mixed 
and not supported by empirical evidence.  
As a first step, this thesis searches for empirical evidence on the impact 
of risk limits on market fluctuations. In fact, the existence of such evidence, 
not proven in literature, is the cornerstone of all additional investigations, 
especially on further impacts of imposing a risk limit based on value at risk 
(VaR). Several papers have examined the impact of risk constraints on the 
market, with limited empirical evidence and mixed theoretical results. 
Chapter 2 of the thesis gives evidence of the relations between banking and 
financial systems, showing that market risk limits on banks Granger-causes 
(hence occurs before) market fluctuations. Such evidence, completely new 
in literature, provides a substantial contribution to the discussion related 
to a market (the Italian market) which is not as international as other 
European (or US) markets where domestic financial intermediaries may 
have a relevant impact on the local financial market.  
However, such empirical evidence does not give information about the 
theoretical framework supporting the data dynamics examined. To 
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complement the empirical analysis in chapter 2, I focused on the choices of 
investors in a mean-variance framework, constrained by a VaR risk limit. 
Such constrained optimization is based on the idea that regulation 
intervenes as a constraint over investment decisions based on mean-
variance analysis. The theoretical result is then supported by empirical 
evidence which, by exploiting all the available data (using MIDAS 
regressions), show that behaviour of banks may be better forecasted by the 
constrained alpha formula than by the unconstrained one.  
Finally, I complement the analysis with the possible impact of 
uncertainty on the model obtained in chapter 3. When uncertainty is also 
considered, as in chapter 4, evidence that investors behave like risk-
constrained agents is confirmed; furthermore, there is evidence that in 
stable periods returns are significant, while in turbulent periods risk and 
uncertainty becomes relevant. These results concerning constrained 
optimization without and with uncertainty are new in literature and 
relevant to better understand the impact on the system of imposing a 
constraint on individual participants in the market.   
The overall contribution is that the regulatory constraints influence 
not only the way individual banks invest but also financial markets and 
some market variables used to measure risk. Furthermore, such constraints 
may determine different investment behaviour in stable periods compared 
with turbulent periods. The results obtained are robust also from the 
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empirical side as they are confirmed by the several different econometric 
techniques used. 
 
5.2 The overall contribution of the thesis and future research. 
The results obtained are very relevant for the topic under discussion 
and contribute to the existing literature, whose results are still mixed. In 
fact, the results reported in the chapters support, on a theoretical and an 
empirical side, the existence of unintended consequences of imposing risk 
limit measures based on market variables (such as value at risk), both on 
changing investors’ behaviour and financial system fluctuations. The latter 
are extremely important since they may affect financial markets, the 
banking system and even some variables (e.g. market volatility) used to 
measure risks. 
Hence, the thesis provides further evidence in support of the 
opportunity to revise the regulatory measures and constraints for market 
risk given that they may exacerbate financial crises, as suggested by some 
parts of the literature. In fact, the Basel Committee is moving in the 
direction of revising the market risk measures and limits. The Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (2019) has recently acknowledged that 
the design of the VaR metrics created incentives to hold positions that 
featured significant tail risks but were subject to limited risk in normal 
conditions. Therefore, to overcome the pre-existing system, the Basel 
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Committee has proposed using a new model based on the expected shortfall 
(ES), which should capture the tail risks that are not accounted for in the 
existing VaR measures. While current VaR calculates the losses at a single 
cut-off point in the distribution (e.g. 97.5%), ES looks at the average of the 
losses which exceed such a cut-off point. Hence, the ES seems to rely on a 
cut-off point, which can be the current VaR, so VaR could stay as a crucial 
variable of the risk constraining framework.   
Such possible, future evolution of the regulation, which maintains the 
risk-limit approach based on the distribution of empirical data, further 
confirms the relevance of the topics of the thesis and its results, focused on 
the unintended effect of risk limits on market variables (e.g. volatility) and 
on investors’ behaviour.  
From the results of thesis, the goal of risk limits (i.e. reducing 
investment in risky assets) seems to have been reached, though at a cost of 
impacting the market volatility, possibly exacerbating financial crises. 
Hence, the above-mentioned innovations in regulation, by keeping the risk-
limit approach, should still achieve the goal of diminishing risky 
investments. However, as the thesis show, the goal is better achieved when 
market volatility is high, while in low-volatility periods the impact does not 
seem in line with the regulation ambitions. 
Therefore, from the results of the research done here, two additional 
issues seem to still need to be tackled by regulation: the impact of risk limits 
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on financial systems, hence the relations between individual regulation and 
the financial system; and the effects of such limits in periods of transition 
from low-volatility to high-volatility periods.  
Hence, the results of the thesis provide more solid ground to build 
further directions of research on.  
In particular, further theoretical analysis may be done on the results 
of chapter 3 to model the passage from constrained to unconstrained 
alphas. Furthermore, it would be interesting to leverage on the results 
obtained in chapter 4, where two different investment behaviours emerge 
for stable or turbulent periods, to investigate the impact on the market of 
the passage between the two regimes of the market, both on the theoretical 
and empirical sides  
Finally, further theoretical and empirical analysis could be done to 
investigate the interactions between individual-based regulation and the 
macro-prudential behaviour of supervision authorities. 
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